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Abstract 
The rise of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the apparent transition from the post-
Cold War unipolarity to multipolarity of the twentieth-first century have resulted in a highly fluid 
geostrategic environment in the Asia-Pacific region, where signs of potential aggressors are not 
clear cut, and structural power among major states still unfolds with considerable uncertainty. This 
condition inclines small states such as Cambodia to reject traditional bandwagoning and balancing 
schools of thought that require them to choose a side between contesting big powers. Instead, they 
opt for a pragmatic foreign policy known as “hedging” by forging relations with multiple external 
players concurrently. 
Through the lens of survival of authoritarian regimes, this qualitative study contends that 
Cambodia’s general election cycle influences its hedging between the United States and the PRC 
from 1999 to 2019. On the one hand, Cambodia’s economic and military relations with the United 
States remain stable and mature over time, whereas its political ties deteriorate temporarily during 
elections because of government repression. On the other hand, Cambodia’s relations with China 
deepen without fluctuation regardless of electoral cycles. The ultimate goal of this strategy is to 
uphold the legitimacy of the ruling Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) by retaining the support of 
two key constituencies in Cambodian politics: the winning coalition and the opposition group. 
This study concluded that Cambodia hedged by engaging not only with the United States 
and China but also with Japan, the European Union, and the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) in order to bolster economic growth, maintain internal stability, strengthen its 
armed forces, preserve the regional balance of power, and project an ambivalent image of its 
alignment posture. The thesis offers policy implications for the scholarship on the foreign policy 
of small autocratic states and the future of U.S. foreign policy in Asia. 
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1 
Chapter 1 - Introduction 
Since 1993, the Kingdom of Cambodia has implemented a pragmatic foreign policy known 
as “hedging.” The term is used here to describe a hybrid foreign policy of institutionalized 
engagement and limited alignment vis-à-vis one or more major powers. A hedger attempts to 
maximize economic and political returns with minimal security risks, to safeguard autonomy, to 
secure the incumbent’s domestic legitimacy, and to create a regional balance of power during a 
time of transition in the geopolitical order. The hedger employs counteracting effects within its 
foreign policy to project an ambiguous alignment posture. As a small underdeveloped state 
emerging from a sustained civil conflict, Cambodia has exercised this policy to avoid choosing a 
side between two competing powers, the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC), 
which are engaging in a strategic competition for influence in the Asia-Pacific region.1  
Although many small powers in Southeast Asia are hedging, Cambodia’s hedging has a 
pattern and characteristics distinct from those of the other countries. This thesis argues that 
Cambodia’s hedging between the United States and China from 1999 to 2019 has been influenced 
by its general election cycles in 2003, 2008, 2013, and 2018. Under the leadership of Prime 
Minister Hun Sen of the ruling Cambodian People’s Party (CPP), the country hedges in order to 
preserve peace and domestic stability, to bolster economic growth, to maneuver through a fluid 
geopolitical landscape around its peripheries, and to retain the electoral support of pro-China and 
pro-U.S. domestic constituencies. 
This study offers supporting evidence for the hypothesis that electoral cycles affect foreign 
policy choices made by the CPP government. Cambodia’s economic and military relations with 
 
1 The Asia-Pacific region includes states in Northeast Asia (China, Japan, North Korea, South Korea, and Russia), 
Southeast Asia (Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, 
Timor-Leste, and Vietnam), Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and the United States (Peou 2010). 
2 
the United States remain stable and mature over time, whereas its political ties deteriorate during 
a general election because of government repression. Electoral cycles are associated with 
restrictions on the free press, civil society, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and 
opposition parties by the government. Around an election year, Cambodia distances itself 
politically from the United States to secure the electoral outcome favored by the CPP. After the 
CPP wins, Cambodia rebalances its hedging by accommodating U.S. policy to repair any potential 
damage, usually by loosening control over domestic opposition and perpetuating the illusion of 
multiparty liberal democracy. In contrast, Cambodia’s economic, political, and military relations 
with China are impervious to the political repression typical during elections. Sino-Cambodian ties 
have deepened gradually because both sides see one another as a willing partner offering 
international legitimacy without regard to the political system. Moreover, the ruling CPP needs 
China’s backing around election time to offset U.S. influence, to rally its winning coalition, to 
secure the election, and to prolong its time in office. 
The United States and China are not the only critical factors in Cambodia’s hedging 
formula. To diversify its economic affairs and to reduce dependence on any one country, Cambodia 
trades with the European Union (EU), which is the largest collective consumer of its exports every 
year, accounting for over 40% of annual goods sold. To preserve its diplomatic autonomy and 
avoid external domination, the kingdom has engaged in a strategic partnership with Japan that it 
continues to develop, covering a wide range of bilateral engagements and coordination on 
economic, political, military, and security matters. Although Japan is one of several foreign 
countries with which Cambodia maintains diplomatic relations, it serves as a key balancing force 
against China, whose influence on the CPP has grown considerably in recent decades, and an 
extension of the Western community that does not criticize openly about the problems of human 
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rights and democracy. Last, Cambodia works concertedly with fellow members of the Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to enmesh the United States and the PRC in regional norms, 
dialogues, and institutions to create a regional balance of power. 
This study has three implications for U.S. policy toward small authoritarian states and in 
Asia. First, since regime survival plays a central role in foreign policy calculation of the CPP 
leaders, the United States should expect to see Phnom Penh2 distance itself repeatedly from 
Washington around each general election, and it should view this decision as a temporary move 
made by the CPP elites to secure their power. Since the CPP leadership is highly sensitive to 
criticisms about human rights and democracy, the United States should tone down its rhetoric and, 
instead, further its engagement with Cambodia in order to foster mutual trust with government 
leaders, to shape choices of the Cambodian electorates, and to offset China’s growing influence. 
Second, Cambodia is and will continue to hedge into the future due to the characteristics 
of its internal political process and the uncertain strategic environment around its peripheries. As 
a weak state that was once subject to foreign interferences and went through a sustained period of 
civil war, Cambodia understands how grave a risk it is to choose an overt alignment with one 
foreign power and become a pawn on a geopolitical chessboard. The CPP government needs to 
engage with both the United States and China to preserve its domestic and international legitimacy. 
That said, it has to shifts its position between these powers during election time to prolong its 
power. The United States should voice its concerns more selectively and discreetly through private 
channels. Moreover, it should invigorate its formal or informal contacts with the CPP elites, 
especially the reform-minded second-generation cadres who will succeed the current party’s 
leaders, because they will play key roles in formulating Cambodia’s foreign policy in the future. 
 
2 Phnom Penh is the capital city of Cambodia. 
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Third, because Cambodia and other ASEAN members will continue to hedge between the 
United States and China, Washington should use this opportunity to support ASEAN’s leadership 
roles in promoting a rules-based order in Southeast Asia, which opens the field to involvements of 
other Western powers and disincentivizes China from choosing a revisionist posture that may 
destabilize this region. That requires U.S. leaders to show up at key regional meetings led by 
ASEAN and to adopt a consistent policy aimed at fostering regional engagement through 
government-to-government and people-to-people diplomacy. 
This thesis has four chapters. Chapter 1 presents the theoretical framework and outlines the 
research design. Chapter 2 briefly discusses Cambodia’s history and its diplomatic relations with 
the United States and China from 1953 to 1998. Chapter 3 tests a hypothesis concerning the 
relationships between the independent variable, Cambodia’s domestic politics (general election) 
and, the dependent variable, its hedging foreign policy between Washington and Beijing from 
1999 to 2019. Chapter 4 summarizes key findings, discusses implications, and offers policy 
recommendations of the research.  
The rest of this chapter introduces the theoretical foundation, the central hypothesis, and 
the research design of the study. It begins by surveying the literature on the survival of 
authoritarian regimes and hedging strategy as used by small powers in Southeast Asia. 
 1.1 Literature Review 
 This section surveys two bodies of political science literature. The first is on the survival 
of the authoritarian regime. It identifies the political dilemmas facing autocratic leaders and the 
tactics they use to deal with those dilemmas in order to stay in power. The second literature 
examines debates about the definition, rationale, and operationalization of the hedging strategy in 
the context of small states in Southeast Asia.  
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Together, these two bodies of literature form the theoretical bedrock of this thesis, which 
explains how Cambodia’s domestic politics has affected its hedging foreign policy between the 
United States and China from 1999 to 2019. 
 Survival of Authoritarian Leaders 
This section surveys the literature on what authoritarian leaders do to survive. There are 
two reasons why it is crucial to examine this subject. First, it helps us understand how Cambodia 
under Hun Sen has calculated cost-benefit analysis in its response to domestic constituents, a 
process that is fundamentally linked to its foreign policy of playing between the United States and 
China. Since the ruling CPP searches for external support, whether financial, political, or 
legitimation, from foreign partners in order to satisfy domestic constituents, exploring this practice 
as a matter of theory sheds light on how the Cambodian government uses foreign policy as a tool 
for its domestic agenda. Second, unlike established democracies in the West, Cambodia has an 
underdeveloped economy coupled with a relatively young and flawed democracy (Croissant 2018; 
Morgenbesser 2018; O’Neill 2017; Un 2011). Its foreign policy process is not transparent. 
However, when viewed closely, Cambodia’s domestic politics is intrinsically linked with its 
external relations because internal stability, economic growth, and national autonomy all figure 
prominently in assuring the continuity of the CPP government. Therefore, observing domestic 
politics is one way to understand how the country navigates its way through the U.S.-China 
strategic competition today. 
In his classic text about political trade-offs under autocracy, Ronald Wintrobe (1998) 
argues that no autocrat in this world can rule alone. They need a handful of loyal subordinates who 
follow their orders to implement policies, to oppress the public, or to take out a rogue member of 
their inner circle. One dilemma facing a dictator is that the more powerful he becomes, the less he 
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knows what his supporters and the public think of him because of their fear of speaking the truth. 
Furthermore, since political institutions under dictatorship tend to be highly partisan, flawed, and 
too weak to enforce the equal application of rules and regulations, physical retribution is a constant 
possibility. Thus, distrust between tyrants and the people they control is continuously present 
(Svolik 2012). To get around this dilemma, dictators depend on three tools: repression, co-optation, 
and legitimation.  
First, repression entails the use of both violent and non-violent tactics to punish, intimidate, 
or discourage political dissenters. Although repression is useful, it is an expensive tactic that can 
backfire. To repress opponents, a leader needs a security apparatus such as the police and the army 
to plan, follow up, and orchestrate action. In return, the tyrant rewards his key supporters with 
excessive salaries, military rank, and political protection. This tactic, however, allows his close 
confidants such as powerful generals to know the regime’s weaknesses, to further their bargaining 
position through increased power within the regime, and to plot against the leader. That is why a 
dictator needs co-optation as part of a formula to maintain power. 
For co-optation to work, the dictator needs to provide his key followers more than what his 
opponents can, so that they remain loyal to him (Geddes 2004). Co-optation requires revenue 
streams from tax and non-tax sources. Tax revenues are collected from the public directly or 
indirectly, whereas non-tax revenues can be extracted from natural resources, offshore investment, 
or foreign aid. Although rents allow a dictator to keep supporters satisfied, co-opt opponents, and 
decrease the reliance on brute force, not every dictator is fortunate to have the resources necessary. 
Likewise, even though a dictator can raise tax rates to increase revenue, high taxes can provoke 
popular uprisings, primarily when levied on the middle class (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006). 
Meanwhile, non-tax revenues from foreign aid and trade are often subject to international sanctions 
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stemming from the dictator’s repression in the first place. Besides financial largesse, a dictator can 
co-opt the opponent using political institutions. Gandhi and Prezeworski (2007) and Gandhi (2008) 
argue that political institutions are another effective co-optation tool because they enable leaders 
to rotate and broaden patronage resources among key followers and to co-opt potential opponents.  
 The third tool is legitimation, which refers here to the conduct of sham elections and the 
provision of public goods. First, although elections pose dangers to an autocrat’s power, they also 
legitimize his rule and enable him to sustain the “patron-client exchange process” by rotating and 
propping up various factions among his key supporters by distributing various lucrative offices 
(Magaloni 2008; McCargo 2005; Morgenbesser 2017). Second, public goods provisions increase 
leaders’ legitimacy. Unlike private goods, which are distributed from a leader to his inner circle, 
public goods provide benefits for everybody in a society. To survive in office, autocrats must 
carefully calculate a balance in their reliance on repression, co-optation, and legitimation to satisfy, 
deter, and control key local constituents. Moreover, the autocrats’ domestic agenda must fit into 
broader foreign policy vis-à-vis major powers in order to prolong the incumbent’s rule. 
 Hedging Strategy in Foreign Policy 
 The end of Vietnam’s occupation of Cambodia in 1989 and the conclusion of the 
Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodian Conflict, widely known as the Paris Peace 
Agreements (PPA), two years later paved the way for the end of the last civil war that had divided 
major powers and states in Southeast Asia for over two decades.  
In the post-Cold War era, Southeast Asia has become one of the most stable and 
economically dynamic regions in the world. While people in the Middle East are fighting in armed 
conflicts fueled by sectarian division, terrorist activities, refugee crises, and the possible collapse 
of some states, people in Southeast Asia are spearheading a different reality, which is more 
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peaceful, stable, and prosperous. This region has become the center of gravity of global politics 
and economic growth in the twenty-first century. However, as Kurt Campbell (2016) aptly notes, 
hiding beneath the Asian economic miracle and prolonged peace is a quiet arms race, which seems 
to have accelerated over the past decade. Developed and underdeveloped states alike are acquiring 
newer and more advanced weaponry in response to the rise of China’s military assertiveness in the 
South China Sea and throughout the Asia-Pacific region. One way to explain this contradictory 
reality is to study how small powers in this region manage their relationships with both China and 
the U.S., and how they navigate their ongoing strategic competition.  
Although hedging has gained growing recognition as a logical theory to explain the 
international relations of smalls powers in Southeast Asia in the twenty-first century, this concept 
is still widely misunderstood and contested by political scientists and other experts alike. Hedging 
literature has become more prominent in the study of foreign policy because traditional schools of 
thought focused on balancing and bandwagoning have failed to explain how small powers have 
responded to relations between the United States and China and among the small powers and the 
big ones. First, the realist conception offered by Kenneth Waltz (1979) argues that states will 
balance against a dominant hegemon by siding with a secondary hegemon. This depiction does not 
capture the full geopolitical reality in Southeast Asia today. Although the United States has been 
and will continue to be the dominant regional player for years to come, small states have not sided 
with Beijing to balance against Washington.  
Meanwhile, Stephen Walt (1990) poses the concept of balance of threat, positing that states 
side with a countervailing power to balance against a commonly identified threat. This argument 
also does not entirely explain the fact that Singapore, Malaysia, and Vietnam have not forged a 
formal military alliance with the United States to balance against the PRC, even though they feel 
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threatened by Beijing to a varying degree. Instead of forging alliances, these countries sustain a 
U.S. military presence by giving U.S. forces access to logistical bases, acquiring its arms, and by 
conducting joint military exercises.  
Randall Schweller (1994) argues that bandwagoning with the rising power brings benefits 
and protection for small power. However, while Southeast Asian nations have enjoyed deepening 
economic ties with China, they have been concerned by its military power. They have been inviting 
the United States and middle powers such as Japan, India, Russia, and Australia to get involved in 
regional affairs and to act as potential offshore balancers. Moreover, due to historical sentiment 
against great-power domination, the region accommodates China’s rise in the economic realm but 
keeps it at arm’s length in the defense arena to safeguard their independence (Cho and Park 2013).  
This absence of a clear-cut position of small states has given rise to hedging as a choice 
that seeks the middle course between the two schools of thought. Since balancing and 
bandwagoning require a state to choose one side over the other, Southeast Asian states in the post-
Cold War era opt for a mixture of both in order to maximize returns and minimize security risk 
while the threat is not clear cut and structural shifting among big powers still unfolds with 
considerable uncertainty (Chung 2004; Ciorciari and Haacke 2019). There is still little consensus 
in the debate about hedging in two areas: definition of the term and the logic of its use. 
Let us first turn to its definition. Four major conceptualizations of hedging have emerged 
in recent years. The first and most common one defines it as a mixed strategy that combines 
engagement and accommodation, on the one hand, with old-fashioned realist balancing, on the 
other (Feng 2013; Medeiros 2005; Roy 2005; Tunsjø 2017). States hedge to prevent geopolitical 
tension from turning into violent conflict by stressing economic ties and multilateral security. 
States feel threatened by a potential adversary even when the threat does not pose an immediate 
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danger, and reaction with overt military balancing at that time might only turn a perceived threat 
into a self-fulfilling prophecy (Hiep 2013). Southeast Asia’s hedging combines “low-intensity” 
military balancing with economic and diplomatic engagement with China and encourages 
continued U.S. diplomatic and military presence. Meanwhile, the regional institution such as 
ASEAN intends to become the principal intergovernmental body, which facilitates peaceful great-
power-to-great-power relations as well as great-power-to-small power ties in the region, promoting 
peaceful dialogues, confidence-building, and preventive diplomacy among interested parties. 
The second conceptualization is outlined by Evelyn Goh (2006, 2007), who defines 
hedging as an alternative strategy used by small states when they are bent on avoiding a choice 
between pure balancing or pure bandwagoning in its triangular relations between the United States 
and China. In this version, the hedgers combine indirect balancing and engagement to hedge. 
Although this conceptualization agrees with Roy (2005) and Feng (2013) that a hedger combines 
indirect balancing and engagement to keep all doors open, the argument attaches greater 
significance to the role of ASEAN and its multilateral platforms, which facilitate and promote 
economic and political interdependence, “a normative framework for regional security,” and 
peaceful relations between all powers (Jackson 2014). In other words, small states bilaterally and 
multilaterally enmesh the United States and China with regional platforms led by ASEAN such as 
the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus), 
and the East Asia Summit (EAS). Their purposes are to deepen big powers’ engagements and 
stakes in regional affairs, giving them a sense of obligation and membership in a rule-based, 
peaceful community of states. 
The third conceptualization is expressed by John Ciorciari (2010), who argues that hedging 
is just another type of alignment. “Limited alignment,” as he puts it, enables small states to 
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optimize security risks in their relations with one or more great powers because a formal alliance 
is too costly and too risky. Moreover, an alliance can lessen the autonomy of weaker states and 
drag them into an unwanted war for which they are not prepared to fight. On the other hand, 
genuine nonalignment or strict neutrality exposes small states to the risk of having no partner on 
which to rely. Therefore, all Southeast Asian countries adopted limited alignment with either the 
United States or China in the past four decades. Ciorciari (2019) defines hedging as a utility-
maximizing and risk-management strategy that enables minor powers to seek non-alliance 
relations with big powers and to extract material benefits and protection at a low cost.  
Since no one can predict what exactly the rise of China will do to the existing regional 
economic and security orders and how the United States’ engagement will evolve, small states will 
choose to hedge. Material benefits such as foreign aid can bolster the incumbent governments, 
while endorsement from a great power can offer credibility in the international arena. Due to the 
non-binding characteristic of these bilateral ties, small states can obtain a varying level of security 
guarantee from the stronger partner at low risk of being abandoned or entrapped in an unreliable 
alliance. This model differs from the expectation set by Medeiros (2005), who argues that small 
powers hedge because they believe potential risk today will translate into a threat tomorrow 
(Ciorciari 2010, 2019; Ciorciari and Haacke 2019). Due to its positive economic expectation and 
lower perception of threat posed by big powers, small powers hedge by projecting an ambiguous 
signal about future alignment and by adopting pragmatic economic relations (Haacke 2019). 
The fourth and most comprehensive conceptualization of hedging comes from Cheng-
Chwee Kuik. Kuik (2008, 2016a, 2016b) defines hedging as a strategy, which combines return-
maximization with risk-contingency policies to allow states to extract economic, diplomatic, and 
political benefits and to prepare for potential security risks vis-à-vis major powers when the 
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strategic environment remains highly uncertain. In contrast to the previous models, Kuik divides 
hedging into two clear-cut pillars, each of which consists of three sub-elements. The return-
maximization pillar is composed of three policies: economic pragmatism, binding engagement, 
and limited bandwagoning. Likewise, the risk-contingency pillar consists of three policies: 
economic diversification, indirect balancing, and dominance denial. A state is identified as a 
hedger when it meets three conditions. First, it insists on not siding with one of the contending 
powers. Second, it concurrently adopts a mixed combination of the two pillars to create 
counteracting effects on its ambivalent position between great powers. Third, it uses these effects 
to reap gains and to prepare itself against potential security threats created by strategic uncertainty. 
Hedging is not only an alternative foreign policy model. It also serves the domestic legitimacy of 
the ruling elites (Kuik 2008).  
Although different in some ways, these four models of hedging all agree with three 
respects. First, hedging enables small states to maximize returns in economic, security, and 
political dealings with great powers. Second, hedging creates maneuverability for small states 
when the power structure among major states is in a transitional period and when an immediate 
threat is not clear cut. Third, hedging combines accommodation and balancing behaviors. The next 
section discusses the rationale behind Phnom Penh’s hedging between Washington and Beijing. 
 Why Does Cambodia Hedge? 
Three strategic conditions incline Cambodia to adopt hedging as its foreign policy between 
the United States and China: opportunity, risk, and uncertainty. After World War II ended, the 
preeminent status of the United States and the Soviet Union created a bipolar system that pressured 
small states to take a side along the ideological line. Because they perceived a clear threat from 
communist China, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand balanced against Beijing by aligning with 
13 
Washington. In contrast, Cambodia, which became independent in late 1953 and wanted to steer 
clear of Cold War politics, opted for neutrality, even though this effort succeeded for just a brief 
period before failing due to geopolitical hyperpolarization and interferences by foreign powers. 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the consequent end of the Cold War in 1991, the 
bipolarity system yielded to unipolarity because the United States emerged as the only global 
hegemon. In this situation, Cambodia and other small states saw more benefits in either aligning 
with the dominant player or not balancing against it. 
The global financial crisis in 2008 and the rise of China in the twenty-first century, 
however, pose the most critical challenge to U.S.-dominated unipolar system for the first time 
since the Cold War ended. Some would interpret these developments along the lines of Organski 
and Kugler’s (1980), using the power transition paradigm that takes conflict among great power 
to be inevitable. This thesis, however, argues that the post-Cold War unipolarity in the Asia-Pacific 
has been gradually shifting back to Cold War bipolarity, wherein Beijing represents one side and 
Washington represents the other. Meanwhile, middle powers such as Japan, India, Russia, and 
Australia are still considered as middle powers that are arguably behind the United States and 
China in either economic or military dimensions or both. Beijing is catching up and closing the 
gap with Washington in many aspects of global power, and at the same time, the latter’s 
technological and military prestige in Asia has been waning (Allison 2020; Heginbotham et al. 
2015; Lee 2018; Townshend et al. 2019; Yoshihara and Holmes 2018). Though this transition is 
at an early stage, it has created a strategic dilemma for small powers in Southeast Asia that are 
trying to position themselves between the contending powers. The ongoing U.S.-China strategic 
competition is different from the Cold War competition because today’s world is much more 
economically intertwined and interdependent. A direct militarized conflict between these major 
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powers is highly unlikely not because of fear for total annihilation caused by nuclear weapons, but 
because war will undoubtedly lead to mutually assured economic destruction for both sides. 
The aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, the withdrawal of U.S. forces from the Subic 
Naval Base in the Philippines in 1992, the rise of China, and the emergence of militarily active 
middle powers including Japan, India, and Australia have created uncertainties about the regional 
security structure and potential sources of conflict in the Asia-Pacific. For these reasons, the Royal 
Government of Cambodia (RGC) has hedged by forging economic ties with Beijing and by 
accommodating it on sensitive political issues such as Taiwan, Xinjiang, Tibet, and the South 
China Sea. This bandwagoning boosts bilateral trade, foreign aid, and investment, all of which 
help the CPP government maintain economic growth. Moreover, this accommodation of China’s 
interests serves Cambodia’s strategic and geopolitical purposes, offsetting threats posed by its 
immediate neighbors such as Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam. 
Meanwhile, the U.S. Global War on Terror in the early 2000s opened up a new frontier for 
U.S.-Cambodian engagement, especially after the Bali terror attack in 2002 by the Jemaah 
Islamiah (JI) terrorist network. To accommodate Washington, the RGC arrested suspects linked to 
the JI group and destroyed 233 Soviet-made surface-to-air missiles with assistance from U.S. 
officials (Thayer 2012). As a result, the Bush administration lifted the ban on bilateral aid to 
Cambodia and paved the way for a defense exchange program, the provision of financial and 
technical support, the docking of U.S. Navy ships, and joint military exercises. President Barack 
Obama’s “pivot” to Asia in the early 2010s created a new opportunity for bilateral and multilateral 
engagement with Washington (Clinton 2011). Besides, Cambodia has maintained strong economic 
ties with the United States, which has been its single largest export market. Furthermore, the United 
States is a reliable provider on issues such as human rights, democracy, public health, cultural 
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preservation, and education. The Trump administration’s “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP) 
strategy places ASEAN at the center of U.S. strategic interests in Asia and opens up new 
opportunities for Phnom Penh to invigorate political ties with Washington (Poling 2019). The 
collision between the rise of China and the United States’ volatile engagement in Asia creates 
sensible economic, security, and diplomatic reasons for Cambodia to adopt hedging. 
That said, their competition presents Cambodia with risks. First, there is the risk of being 
trapped in the middle of the strategic contest between the United States and China. On the one 
hand, getting close to the PRC may lead to adverse domestic and foreign policy implications. The 
memory of Chinese support for the Khmer Rouge is alive and well among the population. An 
influx of Chinese investments and immigrants has stoked corruption, domestic crimes, and concern 
about negative impacts of China’s activities in Cambodia (Ellis-Petersen 2018; Hul 2018b; Khidhir 
2019; Nachemson and Kong 2019; Taing 2018; Wright 2018). Externally, bandwagoning with 
China may jeopardize Cambodia’s relations with its former patron, Vietnam, which is a claimant 
to rights in the South China Sea maritime dispute. Its relationships with fellow ASEAN states and 
economic partners such as Japan, South Korea, the United States, and the EU will also be impacted. 
On a similar note, it is politically challenging for Cambodia to be close to the United States. 
First, the two governments have had difficult diplomatic relations due to disagreement over 
democracy and human rights. Second, even though the United States is Cambodia’s single largest 
export market, China is the biggest lender, donor, investor, and political backer of the CPP. 
Furthermore, controversial legacies such as Washington’s alleged involvement in the 1970 coup 
d’état that ousted then-Prince Norodom Sihanouk and plunged Cambodia into the Vietnam War,  
support for the Lon Nol regime, the bombing of Cambodia (1969-1973), and support for the 
isolation of the Vietnam-backed regime in the 1980s have sown deep mistrust between both sides. 
16 
The third condition that incentivizes Cambodia to hedge is uncertainty, which refers to the 
unpredictable military and political postures of China and the United States in the Asia-Pacific. 
First, although Beijing has been building up its military, Phnom Penh does not see it as a direct 
threat because they do not share immediate borders. Inconsistencies in U.S. policy in Asia is 
another factor. Although President Obama’s “pivot” to Asia in the early 2010s excited regional 
expectation for a brief period, that effort slowly retreated due to preoccupations with the Arab 
Spring and looming political gridlock at home. President Trump’s “America First” rhetoric, his 
transactional view of international diplomacy, his apparent lack of interest in Asia, and his 
unilateral withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) all demonstrate that bandwagoning 
with the United States can be hazardous for Cambodia. 
At the same time, alignment with Beijing against Washington is also counterproductive 
because there is no apparent reason to foresee U.S.-Cambodian conflict soon. Although 
government-to-government ties have strained over the issues of democracy and human rights, 
disagreements have not spilled into the economic realm. Two-way trade between the two countries 
grew significantly amid a deterioration in political ties. Furthermore, Cambodia cannot risk losing 
access to the U.S. export market, for it would impact the local textile and footwear industries that 
employ more than one million workers, many of whom are the ruling CPP’s rural constituents. 
These exports constituted 26% of its total export in 2019 (Ean 2019). There is also a legal basis in 
Cambodia’s 1993 constitution, which dictates that the country’s foreign policy is to be “permanent 
neutrality and non-alignment.” Last but not least, although the United States and China are 
competing in a strategic contest, it is uncertain whether this will turn into a confrontation like the 
Cold War. Since geopolitical and strategic environment around its peripheries remains fluid and 
that there is no apparent threat, Cambodia is better off keeping some distance from both powers. 
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A recent survey by the Singapore-based ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute shows that 49.6% of 
Southeast Asians are worried about growing military tensions in the region, while 73.2% think 
ASEAN is turning into an area of great-power competition (Mun et al. 2020). The same poll 
indicates that 77% of people see a decrease in the level of regional engagement by the U.S. under 
President Donald J. Trump compared to President Barack Obama’s administration. Only 34.9% 
view the United States as a reliable strategic partner. Even though 79.2% and 52.2% of respondents 
see the PRC as the most influential economic and strategic power in Southeast Asia, respectively, 
perception about China has met with skepticism as 38.2% believe that it will become a revisionist 
power aiming to establish a sphere of influence in the region. This poll illustrates that the general 
public in Southeast Asia is mostly aware of the current geopolitical landscape and is becoming 
increasingly worried that existing conditions will worsen in the coming years because of the U.S.-
China competition. Instead of choosing a side, 48% of people living in ASEAN countries prefer 
that this regional organization improve its internal resilience and unity in order to cope with the 
geopolitical contest between these two major powers. Due to each country’s internal challenges, 
pessimism about China’s military intention, waning confidence in U.S. engagement, and distrust 
toward great powers caused by post-colonial nationalism, it is logical that Southeast Asian states 
are engaging both Washington and Beijing simultaneously by hedging. 
 1.2 Hedging Foreign Policy and Cambodian Domestic Politics 
This thesis defines hedging as a hybrid foreign policy of institutionalized engagement and 
limited alignment vis-à-vis one or multiple major powers, which enables a small state to maximize 
economic and political returns with minimal security risks, to safeguard its autonomy, to secure 
the incumbent regime’s domestic legitimacy, and to create a regional balance of power within a 
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transitional world order. It is hybrid in the sense that it is neither pure-balancing nor pure-
bandwagoning. 
Before proceeding to the hypothesis, we need to look at the operationalization of the 
hedging strategy. This study adopts the model proposed by Kuik (2016a) because the explanations 
it offers are the most detailed. The key to the implementation of hedging is to adopt a mixture of 
sub-elements from both return-maximization and risk-contingency in order to project an image of 
not choosing a side with any power. The return-maximization pillar puts a state into a close 
relationship with a major power for positive economic, political, and diplomatic benefits. In 
contrast, the risk-contingency pillar keeps some distance between the hedger and that very same 
power in order to minimize security risks. Hedgers need to concurrently implement these behaviors 
so that their effects balanced against one another. 
Figure 1.1 on the following page shows that hedging consists of two policy prongs, each 
of which consists of three sub-elements. The return-maximization prong consists of economic 
pragmatism, binding engagement, and limited bandwagoning. Economic pragmatism means that 
a state builds economic ties with major powers to reap tangible benefits through trade, investment, 
and aid. Binding engagement is shown when a small state diplomatically engages external powers 
at bilateral and multilateral levels. Bilaterally, the smaller state establishes formal diplomatic 
relations. Multilaterally, small powers act concertedly through a regional organization such as 
ASEAN to enmesh big powers in existing norms, dialogues, and practices in order to create and 
maintain a balance of power. Limited bandwagoning dictates that the hedger defers to a major 
power on selective policies in exchange for warm political relations. 
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Figure 1.1  Spectrum of Power Rejection/Acceptance in Hedging (Source: Kuik 2016a) 
 
The risk-contingency prong also consists of three sub-elements. Economic diversification 
means that the hedger expands its economic relations with many states in order to reduce economic 
dependency on any one of them. Dominance denial aims to prevent the emergence of hegemonic 
domination on the hedger’s foreign policy and on the region in which it is located. Dominance 
denial and binding engagement are two sides of the same coin. Hedgers implement them bilaterally 
and multilaterally. In the context of Southeast Asia, efforts to prevent great-power dominance go 
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beyond the enmeshment of the United States and China in regional affairs. States in the region also 
bilaterally engage middle-level powers such as India, Japan, Russia, South Korea, Australia, and 
the EU and enmesh them with ASEAN-led platforms. The last element is indirect balancing, which 
means that a state implements internal and external military balancing. Internally, it moderately 
upgrades its armed forces without identifying who potential aggressors are. Externally, it forges 
non-alliance defense relations with more than one power to enhance bilateral cooperation, to 
extract resources, to improve its self-defense, and to send an ambiguous signal of its alignment 
posture. A hedger does not have to implement all six elements at once. Over time, it may 
incorporate different combinations of hedging sub-elements based on internal and external 
conditions. That said, the hedger must incorporate at least one element from both return-
maximization and risk-contingency. 
Kuik (2008, 2015) argues that hedging serves a domestic purpose because it enables 
incumbent leaders to justify and maintain the principal sources of their legitimacy. Analyzing them 
through the framework of regime legitimation (RL) shows that leaders of Southeast Asian states 
adopt hedging to mitigates security, political, and economic risks affecting their internal capacity 
to rule, to prioritize risks based on the foundation of their political authority at a given time, and 
to preserve domestic cohesion and deliver economic growth for the population. For example, 
maintaining economic growth and political stability are the core aspects of the CPP’s legitimacy. 
That is why the primary objective of Cambodia’s hedging vis-à-vis the United States and the PRC 
is the maximization of diplomatic and economic benefits with a low emphasis on the military 
dimension. Economic relations with China help the RGC develop physical infrastructures, create 
jobs, foster commercial activities, and produce economic rents for the ruling elites. In the 
meantime, however, Cambodia needs ties with the United States to maintain access to its consumer 
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market; to appeal to urban voters; to address social issues such as corruption, civil society, 
democracy, environment, labor rights, and education; and to maintain good ties with other Western 
powers, which are key economic players in the country. Meanwhile, Cambodia moderately 
acquires news arms and forges defense relations with both China and the United States to 
strengthen the abilities of the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF). Threats from neighbors 
and geopolitics of Asia are driving forces of this policy. 
There are two domestic constituencies in Cambodia that hold opposing preferences in 
foreign policy but whose support the CPP needs to keep power. The first constituent is the CPP’s 
winning coalition, which is pro-China. It includes the CPP oligarchs, RGC ministers and 
lawmakers, heads of armed forces and security, and low-income rural voters. The second 
constituent is the “opposition group,” which is pro-U.S. It counts millennials, urban middle-class 
households, textile and garment factory workers, and opposition parties such as the Sam Rainsy 
Party (SRP), Human Rights Party (HRP), and Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP) as its 
members. This group is more outspoken than the CPP’s rural base, and it supports Western-style 
democracy. To be clear, the “opposition group” here does not refer to opposition parties, but four 
pro-U.S. groups of voters taken collectively. Chapter 3 will discuss this in more detail. 
What specific domestic political conditions affect Cambodia’s hedging between the United 
States and China? This thesis contends that Cambodia shifts its position between the two powers 
during each general election cycle because the ruling CPP government calculates the costs, 
benefits, opportunities, and challenges imposed upon it by domestic demands and by external 
forces. Since economic development, internal stability, and protection against external security 
threats are core pillars of its legitimacy, and the party needs to engage both the United States and 
China to remain in power. 
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Since 1993, Cambodia has benefited immensely from foreign aid, foreign direct investment 
(FDI), and trade with the United States and China. Although the two powers dominate different 
sectors of Cambodia’s economy and that they have competing strategic interests, both have played 
a vital role in fostering and maintain economic growth and internal stability. In order to maintain 
domestic legitimacy, the RGC must maintain strong and pragmatic economic ties with both Beijing 
and Washington to keep voters satisfied. At the same time, it also maintains commercial ties with 
fellow ASEAN members and others. The logic behind economic diversification is straightforward. 
If its relations with the United States or China go south, Cambodia may offset such calamities if it 
has diversified its economic portfolio. Furthermore, it is logical that more economic partners mean 
more jobs created, more FDI poured into the country, higher income for the people, and an overall 
growing economy. To these ends, Cambodia always incorporates economic pragmatism into its 
hedging, which does not fluctuate during election season. This sub-element remains stable and 
matures over time.  
At the same time, Cambodia implements dominance denial and binding engagement 
bilaterally and multilaterally. Similar to its practice of economic diversification, the country 
engages in bilateral relations not only with the United States and China but also with Japan, the 
EU, ASEAN members, and others to balance external influences on its foreign policy, thereby 
avoiding becoming dependent on any foreign power. Multilaterally, Cambodia works in a 
concerted effort with fellow Southeast Asia countries to invite and enmesh external powers with 
regional norms, practices, and dialogues through ASEAN. The primary goal of dominance denial 
and binding engagement is to foster and maintain the balance of power on the hedger’s foreign 
policy and on the region in which it is situated. 
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As a small country wedged between bigger neighbors, a strong emphasis on indirect 
balancing can be risky for Cambodia since it may escalate the security dilemma in a region where 
an arms race is already accelerating (Abuza 2020). Also, it is economically unwise for a developing 
country to invest too many resources on weapons acquisition when the resources could be invested 
more productively in education or physical infrastructure. That, however, does not mean that 
Cambodia ultimately reneges on building its military capability. To implement indirect balancing, 
Cambodia concurrently maintains non-alliance military ties with the United States and with China 
in order to extract logistical and technical assistance used to modernize and professionalize the 
RCAF and to project an ambivalent image of its alignment posture since geopolitical 
circumstances remain highly fluid. At the same time, in moderation, it acquires new arms for self-
defense purposes to prepare for possible aggression without actually identifying who the potential 
aggressors are. Much like the four sub-elements discussed earlier, internal balancing is less 
vulnerable to the election cycle because it is oriented more toward changes in the external security 
structure rather than in domestic political affairs. 
Finally, limited bandwagoning plays a role as well. Limited bandwagoning enables a small 
power to benefit from political relations with big powers without compromising its autonomy. By 
giving selective policy deference, the country can maneuver away from having to choose a side 
and adjust its strategic alignment from time to time based on domestic politics. Political deference 
can come in the adoption of a foreign policy favorable to a foreign power or, quite differently, as 
an implementation of a domestic policy encouraged by that power. For instance, since the early 
2000s, Cambodia has accommodated both the United States and the PRC on different sets of 
issues. On the one hand, it cooperated with the War on Terror and the “pivot” to Asia through 
various regional initiatives led by the U.S., among which are cooperation among law enforcement 
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agencies, the Peace Corps program, and educational and cultural exchanges. Piecemeal 
implementation of reform at home is another way Cambodia does to appease the United States. 
On the other hand, the kingdom is one of the strictest enforcers of the “One China” policy, and it 
stands firmly with Beijing regarding the maritime dispute over the South China Sea. It also 
accommodates Chinese investments and immigrants who seek business opportunities in its 
territory, even if they have created negative impacts on the local population. 
What differentiates Cambodia’s limited bandwagoning from the other five sub-elements of 
hedging is that Cambodia’s degree of accommodation with the United States and the PRC operates 
at a different level of deference during each general election. Therefore, we must clearly 
distinguish two patterns of bandwagoning here. Phnom Penh’s accommodation with Beijing is 
practically immune to its own domestic politics, and it strengthens over time because both sides 
are willing to work for mutually beneficial relations. In contrast, its political relations with 
Washington are very likely to deteriorate during the electoral cycle because of the CPP’s 
restrictions on human rights and democracy at home. In normal circumstances, Cambodia tends to 
balance its ties between both powers, even though engagement with China is closer by default due 
to the United States’ criticisms of Cambodia’s human rights records. When the CPP begins 
clamping down on opposition groups during electoral season, Cambodia retains strong ties or even 
leans politically closer to China. At the same time, it distances itself from the United States to 
secure Chinese endorsement; to rally the winning coalition; to insulate itself from Western pressure 
so that international costs for local suppression are low; and to safeguard the status quo. Once the 
CPP wins the election, Cambodia rebalances its hedging by mending political relations with the 
United States by loosening its grip on domestic opposition parties and toning down anti-
Washington rhetoric. 
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To summarize, there are two patterns in Cambodia’s hedging between the United States and 
China from 1999 to 2019. Economic pragmatism, economic diversification, binding engagement, 
dominance denial, and indirect balancing are implemented continuously by the RGC, and they are 
not likely to fluctuate during each election cycle due to various reasons discussed above. 
Meanwhile, Cambodia’s limited bandwagoning with the United States experiences fluctuation 
around election time due to the deterioration of democracy and human rights at home, but its 
relations with China remain stable and matures. That is because the CPP government tries to 
insulate itself from Western pressure and cracks down on domestic opposition to prolong its time 
in office through authoritarian tactics. Therefore, this thesis proposes the following hypothesis: 
• Hypothesis 1: From 1999 to 2019, Cambodia’s hedging between the United States and 
China experienced a stable degree of economic pragmatism, economic diversification, 
binding engagement, dominance denial, and indirect balancing but a high degree of 
fluctuation of limited bandwagoning with Washington during each general election cycle. 
Figure 1.2 on page 26 indicates the operational framework of Cambodia’s hedging foreign policy. 
From left to right, we first see the winning coalition and the opposition group, each of which 
consists of four groups of demographics. Both influence the way that the Cambodian government 
implements its hedging between the United States and China. In order to satisfy these two domestic 
constituencies and to remain in power, the CPP government needs to exercise a different degree 
of hedging-sub-elements during general elections, as discussed above.
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Figure 1.2  Analytical Framework of Cambodia’s Hedging (Source: Author)
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 1.3 Research Objective and Key Definition 
This thesis examines the causal relationship between the independent variable, Cambodia’s 
domestic politics, and the dependent variable, its hedging between the United States and China 
from 1999 to 2019. It traces how the kingdom’s relations with these two powers evolved during 
each general election in 2003, 2008, 2013, and 2018.  
Between 1999 and 2019, Cambodia was an authoritarian country. There was full adult 
suffrage, and there was no nonelected authority (military, monarch, or religious) exercising control 
over the RGC. Nevertheless, Cambodian elections were neither free nor fair to groups outside of 
the CPP. In addition, the government placed restrictions on civil liberties (Dahl 1971; Diamond 
1999; Huntington 1991; Schmitter and Karl 1991; Schumpeter 1976). However, what specific 
category of authoritarianism has Cambodia maintained? From 1999 to November 2017, the 
country was “competitive authoritarianism,” which refers to a government ruled by a civilian 
autocrat who abuses state resources to manipulate election outcomes in his favor (Levitsky and 
Way 2010). Although opposition parties such as SRP, HRP, and CNRP were able to compete for 
elected office, they had fair access to neither finance nor media coverage. Also, the CPP used its 
connection with the state to intimidate political opponents. After the CNRP was dissolved in late 
2017, Cambodia became a de facto one-party state or a “closed autocracy,” as Levitsky and Way 
(2020) put it. Since then, Hun Sen has had practically unchecked executive and legislative powers 
on domestic and foreign policy. 
 1.4 Research Methodology, Scope, Data, and Significance 
This thesis is a qualitative study, and it uses the process-tracing research methodology to 
analyze Cambodia’s hedging between the United States and China. Some scholars define process 
tracing (PT) as a method used to explain the chain of processes and a causal mechanism, which 
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links independent variable X to dependent variable Y in a given situation (Beach and Pedersen 
2013; Checkel 2005; George and Bennett 2005). Meanwhile, others define process tracing as a 
systematic examination of demonstrative evidence to support a given hypothesis or to contradict 
alternative hypotheses in a case study (Bennett 2010; Collier 2011; Ricks and Liu 2018). As 
Mahoney (2012) points out, PT helps a researcher explain the hypothesis of interaction that 
occurred between a cause and an outcome of that cause.  
The scope of this study begins with 1999, which marks the early return of Hun Sen to the 
sole premiership of Cambodia following a power struggle in 1997 between the CPP and 
FUNCINPEC.3 The year also marks the country’s admission into ASEAN as its tenth member. 
The year 2019 closes the study because it marks the first time since 1993 that Cambodia was 
transformed into a de facto one-party state following the general election in July 2018. 
As a qualitative study, this study relies mainly on secondary sources such as academic 
journals, books, book chapters, and think-tank studies to develop an understanding of the 
theoretical framework of hedging. Also, this thesis surveys expert commentaries, analyses, and 
news reports in the local and international press to trace the development of Cambodia’s domestic 
politics and foreign policy vis-à-vis the United States and the PRC between 1999 and 2019. 
 This study makes three significant contributions. First, it fills a gap in the literature about 
the diplomacy of small authoritarian states in Southeast Asia. This study is among the few existing 
pieces of research conducted on Cambodia’s hedging between the United States and China. 
Second, existing studies claim that Cambodia is China’s vassal state without carefully studying its 
complicated history, internal political process, and strategic dilemmas as a small state. This thesis 
carefully investigates how Cambodia’s domestic politics affect its foreign policy between Beijing 
 
3 Hun Sen initially served as Cambodia’s prime minister under the Vietnam-backed regime from 1985 to 1993. 
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and Washington, which is closely linked to the survival of the CPP government under Hun Sen. It 
suggests the rationality of Cambodia’s pragmatic foreign policy by viewing it as a contested 
territory between the winning coalition and the opposition group, which have opposing preferences 
and whose support the CPP needs to stay in power. Third, small powers in Southeast Asia will 
continue to play prominent roles in shaping great-power relations between the U.S. and China in 
the 21st century. As attention among scholars has gradually shifted away from Europe and the 
Middle East, this study sheds light on the future of security structure in the Asia-Pacific region. 
 The task at hand, then, is to analyze Cambodia’s hedging between the United States and 
China from 1999 to 2019 by looking at domestic political developments taking place before and 
after the general elections in 2003, 2008, 2013, and 2018. However, before we delve deeper into 
the empirical analysis, we must first study how the country has evolved since it became 
independent in 1953. That is the main subject of Chapter 2 to which we now turn. 
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Chapter 2 - A History of Cambodia:  From Independence to the 
Post-Cold War Era  
To understand the multi-faceted internal and external factors shaping the Kingdom of 
Cambodia’s foreign policy today, Chapter 2 provides a historical background of the country’s 
domestic politics and foreign relations with the United States and China from 1953 to 1998. 
 2.1 Norodom Sihanouk’s Neutrality, 1953-1965 
As a small and weak state, Cambodia had been subject to political interference and 
territorial subjugation by Thailand and Vietnam since the Khmer Empire, which once ruled over 
most of today’s mainland Southeast Asia, collapsed in the 15th century. In 1853, King Ang Duong 
of Cambodia asked France for status as a French protectorate, hoping to save his country from its 
neighbors. However, his request was to no avail (Smith 1965). It was under the reign of Ang 
Duong’s son and successor, King Norodom, that the country came under the French protectorate 
and then colonization until 1953.  
After his grandfather King Sisowath Monivong died in 1941, Norodom Sihanouk, an 18-
year-old prince at the time, was tapped by the French colonial officials to be the new king of 
Cambodia because they thought he would be apolitical. The decision, however, was a mistake. 
Sihanouk eventually stood up and, in the early 1950s, demanded Cambodia’s autonomy back from 
France. During his diplomatic crusade in Western capitals in early 1953, Sihanouk stopped in 
Washington D.C. to meet with then-Vice President Richard Nixon and Secretary of State John 
Foster Dulles to convince them of his cause (Leifer 1967). The American leaders rejected his plea, 
arguing that solidarity with France was crucial in dealing with communism. Disappointed by their 
“cold reception” and “ignorance,” Sihanouk continued his Royal Crusade for Independence until 
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France granted complete autonomy to Cambodia on November 9, 1953 (Rust 2016). Since then, 
that day has been celebrated as national Independence Day by the Cambodian. 
At the end of the 1954 Geneva Conference on Indochina, Cambodia once again found itself 
dealing with the same security threats as in pre-colonial days, encroachment by Thailand and 
Vietnam. King Norodom Sihanouk realized that he had to attach its survival and independence to 
the interests of the major powers in order to preserve Cambodia’s sovereignty. That was when 
neutrality became an appealing foreign policy for the young monarch (Gordon 1965). Geopolitical 
factors strongly shaped Sihanouk’s appetite for neutrality. Although he had a greater fear of North 
Vietnam and China than of the United States, siding with either one of them would open his 
country up to Cold War politics that had already enflamed Laos and Vietnam (Pradhan 1987). 
Therefore, neutrality, as Sihanouk saw it, was a “geopolitical necessity” for Cambodia (Leifer 
1967). The economic incentive was also a factor in this decision because the Cambodian economy 
was in poor shape. Neutrality also served domestic political purposes. To deter the Democratic 
Party from winning the 1955 election, the King abdicated the throne in favor of his father and ran 
the vastly popular Sangkum Reastre Niyum (Popular Socialist Community) movement, which 
galvanized political capital for his neutrality. The decision propelled him to a victory and cemented 
his grip over Cambodia’s foreign policy. 
The primary purpose of Cambodia’s neutrality at that time was to draw a balance of 
influence between two countervailing powers, the United States and the PRC, in order to offset 
threats posed by pro-East North Vietnam, on the one hand, and pro-West Thailand and South 
Vietnam, on the other.4 That way, Cambodia could avoid taking a side when it remained 
 
4 Although the Soviet Union was the leader of the socialist camp, the PRC figured more prominently in Cambodia’s 
neutrality because it rallied with other developing nations of the Non-Aligned Movement. China’s closer proximity to 
Cambodia and its attentive attitude to Sihanouk’s cause also played a role. 
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geopolitically feasible. Cambodia achieved a strategic balance between East and West at the end 
of the 1955 Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung, Indonesia, when it secured both the American 
and Chinese commitment to guarantee its neutral position (Leifer 1967). With Washington, Phnom 
Penh entered into a military agreement in May 1955, which led to the establishment of the Military 
Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) and paved the way for provisions of assistance for its armed 
forces (Rust 2016).  
With Beijing, Sihanouk obtained Chinese commitment to Cambodia’s neutrality by 
declaring that successful implementation of the five principles of peaceful co-existence or Pancha 
Shila by small states depended on the self-restraint of communist powers such as the Soviet Union, 
the PRC, and North Vietnam.5 His remarks put pressure on the North Vietnamese and Chinese 
delegations, who tried to ensure him of their peaceful intent.6 In exchange, Sihanouk promised 
Zhou Enlai, who headed the Chinese delegations, that Cambodia would not be part of the U.S.-led 
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) (Richardson 2010). The logic behind his 
commitment was twofold. First, as long as the socialist camp remained friendly to Phnom Penh, 
joining SEATO would be an unnecessary provocation. Second, since SEATO’s protocol 
automatically extended its protection to Cambodia despite its non-membership, there was no need 
for Phnom Penh to side with the West publicly. 
Neutrality was a pragmatic response to geopolitical uncertainty in Southeast Asia. It 
maximized Cambodia’s maneuverability between the two opposing sides of the Cold War. In its 
default mode, Cambodia befriends all nations regardless of their ideology and readjusts its position 
 
5 According to Sophie Richardson (2010), the five principles of Pancha Shila consist of peaceful coexistence, mutual 
respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, nonaggression, noninterference in others’ internal affairs, and equality 
and mutual benefits. 
6 North Vietnam and China gave their assurance to Norodom Sihanouk because they wanted to show the world that 
they were peaceful communist countries. 
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from time to time based on the direction of emerging security threats. When Cambodia identifies 
an aggressor, it adopts a provisional accommodation with the opposing power for protection and 
returns to its default mode after the threat disappears. Cambodian neutrality placed the United 
States on one side as a balance against North Vietnam and the PRC, and it counted China on the 
other as a balance against Thailand, South Vietnam, and, possibly, the United States. Laos was the 
third component of Cambodia’s neutrality, which served as a physical buffer separating Phnom 
Penh from Beijing and Hanoi. As long as Laos remained neutral, Cambodia would not have direct 
contact with the communist. 
China was the communist country most proactive in its support of Cambodia’s neutrality. 
First, China was an essential economic donor, making its first grant in aid to a non-communist 
country, which amounted to $22.4 million in 1956 (Leifer 1967). However, it was Beijing’s 
political support that won over Norodom Sihanouk because it was something he could never 
receive from the United States (Richardson 2010). The PRC upheld Sihanouk’s neutrality and 
stood in solidarity when Thailand and South Vietnam militarily threatened his government. 
The principal problem with neutrality was that Cambodia never received the same 
endorsement from the United States, Thailand, and Vietnam. First, Cambodia’s ties with Thailand 
strained due to a disputed control of the Preah Vihear temple and due to Bangkok’s support for the 
Khmer Serei, an anti-monarchy clandestine group led by Norodom Sihanouk’s chief nemesis, Son 
Ngoc Thanh. Meanwhile, cross-border raids by South Vietnamese troops, disputed control of 
islands in the Gulf of Thailand, and insults between Sihanouk and Ngo Dinh Diem stirred constant 
bilateral political and military contention. Cambodia’s ties with the United States had also never 
been easy. Sihanouk’s perception of Washington tainted during his early encounter with then-Vice 
President Nixon and Secretary of State Dulles (Clymer 2007).  
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Since the establishment of the U.S. diplomatic mission in Cambodia in 1950, U.S. officials 
had had difficulties dealing with Sihanouk due to his sensitivity and his colorful character, along 
with occasional ignorance on their part. Disparaging comments made against Sihanouk in the U.S. 
press were another cause for the endless diplomatic firestorm. Asides from that, two other factors 
sowed deep distrust between them. The first one was the unwillingness and inability of the United 
States government to restrain Thailand and South Vietnam and to keep them from threatening 
Cambodia. The second cause was a series of alleged plots against Norodom Sihanouk’s 
government with links to Thailand, South Vietnam, and the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA). The most infamous of them was the Dap Chhuon plot, which was a failed attempt to declare 
a secessionist region in northern Cambodia led by Sihanouk’s disgraced military commander, Dap 
Chhuon. Chhuon had connections with the South Vietnamese intelligence and with a CIA member 
named Victor Matsui, who was stationed in Phnom Penh (Rust 2016). Sihanouk became 
“permanently distrustful” of the United States after the Dap Chhuon plot (Chandler 1993). 
Despite tension with Thailand, South Vietnam, and the U.S., neutrality was a considerable 
success for Cambodia between 1953 and 1965 (Pradhan 1987). While Vietnam and Laos had 
engulfed in a civil war, Cambodia had maintained its independence and internal stability, and it 
had minimized the effects on it from neighboring wars. Foreign aid from more than a dozen 
countries contributed to the developments of physical infrastructures, education, and healthcare. 
Meanwhile, Sihanouk’s high popularity among voters enabled him to cope with factional fighting 
at home, namely, in the National Assembly, the country’s main legislature. 
The equilibrium of influence between East and West that Sihanouk had maintained since 
1955, however, began to crumble in 1965 after he broke off ties with the United States and aligned 
his government with the PRC. Three significant factors accounted for his shift in foreign policy. 
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The first one was the collapse of the neutralist regime in Laos that emerged after the Soviet-backed 
Pathet Lao insurgency defeated the U.S.-backed Royal Lao Army at the Plain of Jars (Leifer 1967). 
Once the Pathet Lao was on its march toward victory, it became clear that Cambodia would have 
to live with a communist country on its border. Also, Sihanouk believed that communism would 
sweep across the Indochinese peninsula, taking over states one by one. Therefore, Cambodia had 
to be useful to the PRC in order to survive in the long run. The United States’ stalling of Sihanouk’s 
effort to convene a Geneva conference to neutralize Cambodia was the second cause.7 Meanwhile, 
the downfall of Ngo Dinh Diem and his regime in Saigon in 1963 alarmed Sihanouk about a 
possible regime change effort against him led by the CIA. 
The U.S.-Cambodian relations reached the breaking point in 1965 after a Newsweek article 
released on April 5 accusing Sihanouk’s mother, Queen Sisowath Kossamak, of running a string 
of bordellos (Clymer 1999). Three weeks later, an air raid on a Cambodian village in Kampong 
Cham province by a U.S. plane killed a teenage boy and injured several others (Clymer 2007). 
Sihanouk parted ways with the United States on May 3, 1965, because he had enough of its 
repeated violations of Cambodia’s sovereignty, its support for the Khmer Serei, and its stalling 
effort against his proposals on the neutralization of Cambodia. The decision marked the end of 
Cambodia’s strict neutrality. From this point onward, Cambodia readjusted its position to align 
with China. Eventually, the PRC pressured Cambodia to allow the Viet Cong supply lines to run 
through its Sihanoukville province up to the Ho Chi Minh trail. The decision would eventually 
lead to attacks by U.S. B-52 Stratofortresses. Domestically, suspension of U.S. aid led to economic 
 
7 In August 1960, Sihanouk began floating the idea of an internationally recognized neutral zone over Laos and 
Cambodia, which would withdraw any foreign forces based in these countries and would declare them outside of any 
military alliance (Smith 1961). The proposal failed. Sihanouk then called for a 14-nations conference to neutralize 
Cambodia. Although this new initiative received swift support from the socialist bloc, it failed to materialize again 
because the United States and its allies remained uncommitted. 
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damage, stirring discontent among the army, the elites, and the general public. In the end, it created 
a conducive environment for an internal revolt against Sihanouk in March 1970 by his right-wing 
prime minister, General Lon Nol. 
Does Cambodia’s past neutrality have any implications for its foreign policy today? The 
first lesson is that common borders with Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam still pose immediate threats 
against its national security. Although the country has enjoyed relatively peaceful borders with its 
neighbors since the end of the Cold War, its shared land and maritime frontiers are far from 
conflict-free, as armed clashes with Thailand from 2008 to 2011, controversial border demarcation 
issue with Vietnam and, most recently, military standoffs with Laos in 2018 and 2019 have 
indicated. Similar to what Norodom Sihanouk did in inviting the United States and China to 
guarantee Cambodia’s independence and to forge a balance of power on its foreign policy and to 
maximize its diplomatic maneuverability, Cambodia today hedges between these two powers to 
seek a middle path that would guarantee its diplomatic independence, secure the borders, and 
safeguard its autonomy and security. 
Another lesson from this Sihanouk’s neutrality is that domestic politics has a great 
influence on Cambodia’s foreign policy. Sihanouk chose neutrality to show his supporters that he 
would do everything to safeguard Cambodia’s hard-earned independence. The policy enabled him 
to maintain steady flows of aid, trade, and commercial relations and to enjoy political support from 
both sides of the Cold War that helped him appease different constituencies at home such as the 
armed forces, business elites, government officials, and the general public. Likewise, Cambodia’s 
hedging today intends to achieve the similar objective as half a century ago: maintaining relations 
with the U.S. and China to keep the economy growing, to safeguard internal stability, to fulfill 
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demands of domestic constituencies at home, to strengthen national security, to avoid choosing a 
side between major powers, and to protect political autonomy on the global stage. 
 2.2 Years of Difficulty, 1965-1979 
The pressure continued to mount after Sihanouk broke off with the United States. While 
domestic tension was intensifying, the communist Khmer Rouge and the Khmer Serei groups 
increased their armed insurgency across Cambodia. Meanwhile, suspension of U.S. aid and 
Sihanouk’s nationalization of banking and trade industries pushed the economy into a tailspin and 
created simmering anger among the populace (Pradhan 1987). On the foreign policy front, the 
Vietnam War forced 20,000 refugees into Cambodian territory by 1967, as South Vietnam and 
Thailand continued their military provocations along the borders.  
Meanwhile, Sino-Cambodian relations ran into a crisis once the Great Proletarian Cultural 
Revolution unraveled across the PRC in 1966. China shifted its foreign policy from Pancha Shila 
to “Red Guard diplomacy,” which aimed to export revolution to foreign countries (Richardson 
2010). After Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai asked Sihanouk to allow ethnic Chinese who lived in 
Cambodia to express their allegiance to Mao Zedong and communism, a move that broke off with 
the PRC’s traditional policy, Sihanouk felt that he had painted himself into a corner. After all, he 
had once thought that Beijing would stand behind him without trying to impose its ideology within 
Cambodia (Pradhan 1987; Richardson 2010).  
In response to this looming crisis, Sihanouk extended the olive branch to the United States. 
He informed one U.S. Senator that he was ready to restore ties if the United States recognized 
Cambodia’s existing borders. Moreover, he accommodated the former First Lady Jacqueline 
Kennedy’s 1967 visit to Cambodia and went so far as to erect the J. F. Kennedy Boulevard to 
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honor her late husband for whose assassination in 1963 Sihanouk cheered.8 Politically, Sihanouk 
promised to allow “limited American incursions” in Cambodia “under certain conditions,” a vague 
statement that Henry Kissinger later used to justify U.S. bombings of Cambodia (Clymer 2007). 
Although the U.S.-Cambodian détente led to the re-establishment of diplomatic relations in 1969, 
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Earle Wheeler, and the Commander of U.S. 
Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV), General Creighton Abrams already advocated 
the plan for aerial bombardment against alleged Viet Cong sanctuaries in Cambodia. On March 
17, 1969, President Richard Nixon ordered the United States Air Force (USAF) to conduct a secret 
one-time bombing campaign known as “Operation Breakfast” to hit Viet Cong sanctuaries in 
eastern Cambodia (Shawcross 1979). However, Breakfast did not stand alone. The bombing 
campaign was expanded with subsequent operations such as Lunch, Snack, Dinner, Dessert, and 
Supper that lasted until May 26, 1970. Together, they constituted “Operation Menu,” which pushed 
the Viet Cong deeper into the Khmer9 territory and destabilized Cambodia. 
 On March 18, 1970, while Norodom Sihanouk was in Moscow, his right-wing Prime 
Minister and Minister of Defense, General Lon Nol, capitalized on public resentment about the 
weak economy, U.S. bombings, and an alleged 50,000 Viet Cong guerillas encroaching upon 
Cambodian territory to orchestrate a coup against the prince (Sak 1978). This coup marked the 
beginning of a period of civil wars for the next two decades. Once in power, Lon Nol abolished 
Cambodia’s centuries-old monarchy to create a pro-U.S. military dictatorship called the “Khmer 
Republic.” From 1970 to 1975, Cambodia abandoned its alignment with China and became a 
 
8 According to Clymer (1999), Sihanouk claimed that the deaths of Thai Prime Minister Sarit Thanarat, South 
Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem, and U.S. President John F. Kennedy, with whom he shared difficult relations, 
were a “divine intervention to save Cambodia” and that the three leaders “died and went to hell.” 
9 This thesis uses “Cambodian” and “Khmer” interchangeably. 
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puppet of the United States. The country was dragged into the Vietnam War, a conflict that 
Sihanouk had tried to steer Cambodia away from over the past decade.  
After the coup, Norodom Sihanouk fled to Beijing and sided with his archnemesis, the 
communist Khmer Rouge, to create a resistance movement called the Royal National Union 
Government of Kampuchea (GRUNK) with Beijing’s support. The Prince called on Cambodians 
at home to rise against Lon Nol’s regime. It was during this time that a young man named Hun 
Sen, who currently serves as Cambodia’s Prime Minister, joined the maquis. From that day on, the 
Khmer Rouge used Sihanouk’s name to recruit Cambodian peasants, many of whom had been 
devasted by U.S. bombings, into their ranks, and, as the Prince told one journalist in 1973, the 
Khmer Rouge would eventually spit him out like “a cherry pit” (Richardson 2010). 
After the Menu campaign and the joint land invasion10 into Cambodia by South Vietnamese 
and U.S. troops failed to yield satisfying results, in May 1970, President Nixon ordered the USAF 
to conduct another air campaign, “Operation Freedom Deal,” which was more intensive and lasted 
until 1973. Its mission was to destroy Viet Cong sanctuaries and to provide air support for Lon 
Nol’s war against the Khmer Rouge. “I want everything that can fly to go in there and crack the 
hell out of them. There is no limitation on mileage and there is no limitation on budget. Is that 
clear?” Nixon lamented to his National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger (Owen and Kiernan 
2007). Despite, or perhaps because of, U.S. air raids, the Khmer Rouge’s army swelled from 1,000 
men in 1969 to 150,000 strong by 1971 and 220,00 two years later (Kiernan 1989). From 1969 to 
1973, the USAF dropped 539,129 tons of ordnance on Cambodia and killed between 50,000 and 
150,000 people (Kiernan 1989; Kiernan and Owen 2015). During the entire period of the Vietnam 
 
10 The U.S. invasion of Cambodia in early 1970 sparked a deadly anti-Vietnam War protest at Kent State University 
campus, which led to the killing of four students by Ohio National Guards. 
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War, the United States dropped 2.7 million tons of explosives, including 80,000 cluster bombs and 
26 million submunitions, making Cambodia one of the most heavily bombed nations in the world 
(Martin et al. 2019). One-third of those bombs failed to explode and have contributed to 64,700 
casualties, including 19,700 deaths, since 1979. Cambodia, as Shawcross (1979) posits, was used 
as a “sacrificial pawn” in the U.S.’s grand strategic design in Vietnam. 
On April 17, 1975, the Khmer Rouge toppled the U.S.-backed Khmer Republic regime of 
Lon Nol and took over Cambodia. Once in power, they renamed the country “Democratic 
Kampuchea” (DK) and marched it toward a horrific chapter of genocide, war crimes, and crimes 
against humanity. DK implemented radical Maoism and transformed the country into a utopian 
agricultural project, which imitated Mao Zedong’s disastrous Great Leap Forward. Overnight, the 
fabric of a modern society such as money, markets, education, private property, culture, religion, 
and the arts were eradicated. The capital city Phnom Penh with two million residents was 
evacuated entirely, as people were marched at gunpoint to be relocated to provinces across the 
country. Public officials, monks, scholars, and students were taken away and exterminated, as were 
ethnic Vietnamese, Chinese, and Muslim Cham minority groups. People lived and worked in labor 
camps without sufficient food and healthcare. Power was under the control of the Communist Party 
of Kampuchea (CPK) with Pol Pot (aka Saloth Sar) presiding over it as General Secretary. Between 
1975 and 1979, Cambodia cut off its ties with the rest of the world, except for China and a few 
other communist states. Without Chinese support, DK would not have survived for almost four 
years.11 Cambodia’s foreign policy dramatically realigned itself from a pro-U.S. to a pro-China. 
 
11 See Ben Kiernan (1999) for detailed accounts of China’s support for Democratic Kampuchea. 
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From April 1975 to January 1979, nearly two million Cambodians – a quarter of the population at 
the time – died from persecution, starvation, and disease under the Khmer Rouge regime. 
 2.3 Vietnam’s Cambodia, 1979-1989 
 Two significant developments affecting Cambodia in fundamental ways took place from 
1975 to 1989. First were border clashes between Democratic Kampuchea and its former ally, 
Vietnam; and the second involved Hun Sen. In 1977, Hun Sen, who had served as Deputy 
Regimental Commander of the Eastern Zone under the DK regime at this point, fled to Vietnam 
with other cadres so that they would escape an internal purge (Mehta and Mehta 2013). With 
Hanoi’s support, he and other defectors founded the Kampuchean United Front for National 
Salvation (KUFNS) on December 2, 1978.12 Then on Christmas day that year, KUNFNS, 150,000 
Vietnamese troops, and other anti-Khmer Rouge elements stormed into Cambodia and drove the 
Khmer Rouge to Thailand’s borders (Richardson 2010). By January 7, 1979, Vietnam had taken 
control of Phnom Penh, established a puppet regime called the “People’s Republic of Kampuchea” 
(PRK), and stacked it with DK defectors. Vietnam’s invasion placed Cambodia under its tutelage 
for the next ten years and pushed the Washington, which had its scores to settle with Hanoi, to join 
Beijing-led isolation of the PRK and to support the Khmer Rouge. 
After ten years, Vietnam’s occupation of Cambodia came to an end on September 26, 1989, 
thanks to political breakthroughs within the Eastern bloc. In the late 1980s, Chinese President 
Deng Xiaoping grew weary of the prolonged war in Cambodia and wanted to redirect resources to 
his economic modernization program (Zhang 2015). Meanwhile, the Soviet Union, which was 
having its internal struggle, pressured Vietnam to seek a détente with China (Nathan and Scobell 
 
12 Beside Hun Sen, two other notable men, Heng Samrin and Chea Sim, were among leaders of KUFNS who would 
would play powerful roles in post-war Cambodia.  
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2012). The United States eventually cut off its support for DK. Seizing the opportunity to mend 
relations with Beijing, Hanoi agreed to withdraw its forces from the kingdom. After twenty years 
of brutal civil war and genocide, the first signs of internal stability, peace, national reconciliation, 
and return to normalcy were on the horizon in Cambodia. 
 2.4 UNTAC and the Second Kingdom of Cambodia, 1989-1998 
After the DK regime collapsed in January 1979, Cambodia was politically separated into 
four main factions. The Vietnamese-backed PRK was now headed by 37-years-old Hun Sen, who 
had quickly risen from foreign minister to deputy prime minister then to prime minister on January 
14, 1985, thanks to his “uncanny ability to bend with the political wind” that satisfied the 
Vietnamese leadership (Strangio 2014). The Khmer Rouge constituted the second faction, while 
the pro-Sihanouk element made up the third. The last faction was the Khmer People’s National 
Liberation Front (KPNLF) of former Prime Minister Son Sann. In July 1982, the last three of these 
groups merged to create the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK) to level 
the playing field against the PRK. 
Shortly after Vietnamese troops withdrew from the country in 1989, a Cambodian peace 
negotiation was spearheaded by Australia, Indonesia, and Japan with involvements from the major 
powers. After two years of intensive backroom maneuver, the PRK, the CGDK, and 18 foreign 
powers signed the Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodian Conflict, known simply 
as the Paris Peace Agreements (PPA) on October 23, 1991, which aimed to put an end to the civil 
war. The PPA established the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), 
which took control of the country’s foreign affairs, national defense, finance, and policing during 
its 18-month mandate. One of UNTAC’s principal tasks was to oversee the first free and fair 
general election in the post-war era. In May 1993, 4.7 million voters participated in “Cambodia’s 
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freest, fairest, and most secret elections since the colonial era” (Chandler 2007). After spending 
$2 billion and deploying nearly 16,000 troops, UNTAC’s mandate ended in October 1993 (Akashi 
2012). UNTAC was the costliest and most ambitious peacekeeping operation ever administered 
by the United Nations (UN) to date. For the first time since 1970, Cambodia reopened itself to 
normalcy, democracy, economic development, respect for human rights, civil liberties, and peace, 
as at least some optimists hoped. 
 Although the DK boycotted it, the UNTAC-administered general election went on as 
planned. Among all parties running for office were the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP), which 
consisted of PRK veterans such as Hun Sen, Heng Samrin, and Chea Sim, and the pro-royalist 
FUNCINPEC led by Norodom Sihanouk’s son, Prince Norodom Ranariddh.13 Though the UN 
oversaw the election, the playing field tilted mainly in favor of the CPP, which used its connections 
with the SOC/PRK bureaucracy to intimidate political opponents.14 According to Strangio (2014), 
there were about 210 politically motivated assassinations of political activists during the electoral 
campaign. The election results, however, turned out to be rather shocking for the CPP because it 
gained only 51 out of 120 seats in the Constituent Assembly. The royalist FUNCINPEC got 58 
and became the majority party. In response, the CPP rejected the results, accused UNTAC of 
rigging the polls, then threatened to declare a secessionist zone in six eastern provinces in order to 
strong-arm the royalists into sharing power. Eventually, the two parties decided to form a coalition 
government, in which Prince Norodom Ranariddh and Hun Sen would concurrently serve as first 
and second prime minister, respectively. The deal led to the adoption of a new constitution on 
 
13 The Cambodian People’s Party is the successor organization of the People’s Revolutionary Party of Kampuchea 
(PRPK), which ruled the PRK regime after Vietnam’s invasion in 1979. The PRKP kept its original name until October 
1991 when it changed its identity to the CPP (Vickery 1994). 
14 The PRK government renamed itself to the State of Cambodia (SOC) in April 1989. 
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September 24, 1993, which restored Norodom Sihanouk to the throne and gave birth to the second 
Kingdom of Cambodia. 
 The CPP-FUNCINPEC coalition was prone to collapse from the start because power was 
not shared evenly and because of mutual distrust. One of the issues facing the coalition were the 
remnants of the Khmer Rouge army, who had been waging guerilla warfare from the region along 
the border with Thailand. Tension rose as both parties tried to woo DK defectors into their ranks. 
When these tensions reached the breaking point on July 5-6, 1997, forces loyal to the CPP allegedly 
orchestrated a preemptive military coup against FUNCINPEC, which resulted in extrajudicial 
killings of about a hundred of the royalist’s top officials and forced Ranariddh to go into exile 
(Strangio 2014). The power struggle induced global outcries from Southeast Asian neighbors and 
Western donors and delayed Cambodia’s admission into ASEAN.  
The coup is one of the most critical decisions in Hun Sen’s political career because it 
elevated his status inside and outside of the CPP to that of a strongman who went against all the 
odds to get what he wanted and because it strongly marginalized the political influence of the 
royalists. Though Ranariddh returned home to participate in the second general election in 1998, 
FUNCINPEC slowly disintegrated into multiple factions and came to exist only in name. Hun 
Sen’s ascent to power marks the first time since at least the 15th century that one political leader 
controlled the entirety of Cambodia with one unified national armed force. 
Figure 2.1 on the next page shows a timeline summarizing key developments in 
Cambodia’s contemporary political history since 1863, which powerfully shape Cambodia’s 
internal political process and its foreign policy toward the United States and China today. 
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Figure 2.1  Key Events in Cambodia’s Political History (Source: Author) 
 
Now that we have discussed Cambodia’s complicated history, our next task is to look at 
how domestic politics influences its hedging foreign policy between the United States and the 
People’s Republic of China from 1999 to 2019. That is the subject of the next chapter.  
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Chapter 3 - Domestic Politics in Cambodia’s Hedging Foreign 
Policy, 1999-2019   
This chapter examines the relationship between the independent variable, Cambodia’s 
domestic politics, and the dependent variable, its hedging between the United States and China 
from 1999 to 2019. It consists of two segments: 1999-2008 and 2009-2019. In each segment, the 
chapter first discusses internal and external issues facing Cambodia and then studies the country’s 
political, economic, and military relations with the United States and China around four general 
elections in 2003, 2008, 2013, and 2018. 
 Key Constituencies in Cambodia’s Foreign Policy  
There are two domestic constituencies, which are in competition with one another and have 
a strong influence on Cambodia’s foreign policy. First is the winning coalition formed by the ruling 
Cambodian People’s Party, whereas the second is the opposition group. The winning coalition 
consists of the prime minister’s key selectorates, whose support is extremely vital for his political 
survival (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2012). This group, which favors a pro-China foreign 
policy, is composed of four factions. The first includes Hun Sen’s closest business allies, such as 
CPP Senator Lao Meng Khin and his wife, Choeung Sopheap, who own powerful property 
development conglomerates such as Pheapimex and Shukaku Inc. Other powerful associates 
include CPP Senators Mong Reththy and Ly Yong Phat, and tycoons such as Kith Meng, Try 
Pheap, Sok Kong, and Pung Kheav Se, many of whom are of Chinese descent and have ties with 
Chinese investors and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) (Global Witness 2018; Strangio 2011). 
In his comparative study about China’s financial power in Southeast Asia, Daniel C. 
O’Neill (2018) finds that the reason that Beijing has been far more effective than the other 
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countries in influencing Cambodia’s foreign policy is that it speaks the language that Khmer elites 
understand, personal ties. In what he describes as the “iron triangle” between the Chinese 
government and SOEs, the CPP oligarchs, and the Royal Government of Cambodia, O’Neill points 
to mutually beneficial reinforcements among the three parties. To support its “Go Out” strategy, 
Beijing channels money to its SOEs, which then use ties with the CPP oligarchs to penetrate 
Cambodia’s risky, corruption-prone sectors such as energy and agribusiness under the Build-
Operate-Transfer (BOT) scheme. BOT means that the RGC gives lucrative contracts to Chinese 
SOEs, which then build massive projects such as hydropower dams and operate them for an agreed 
period, which in some cases stretches to about 99 years. Once the contracts expire, these firms 
transfer ownership of the projects to Cambodia. Meanwhile, Beijing uses its diplomatic influence 
on Phnom Penh to guarantee that its SOEs receive better treatment than other foreign companies 
do. As co-investors in or interlocutors of Chinese investments, the CPP oligarchs have the most to 
gain from the political status quo and pro-China foreign policy. 
The second faction in the winning coalition consists of the upper echelons of Cambodia’s 
armed forces and security apparatus such as the heads of the RCAF, military police, and national 
police who keep a close tab on coercive forces. The third group includes CPP cabinet members, 
parliamentarians, and senators who are the gatekeepers of legislative and executive branches. The 
fourth group consists of poor and rural citizens, including rice farmers, plantation workers, and 
unemployed aging seniors who survive on remittances sent home by their adult children working 
in one of Cambodia’s textile and footwear factories. This last faction cares much more about daily 
survival than about Cambodia’s foreign policy. They are staunch supporters of the CPP’s “7 
January 1979” sloganeering, which refers to the day when Vietnamese troops toppled the Khmer 
Rouge and the peace, developments, and stability that have come with it. They are poor people 
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living across parts of underdeveloped provinces such as Svay Rieng, Stung Treng, Ratanakiri, and 
Preah Vihear as well as in more developed places such as Kandal, Kampong Cham, Kampong 
Speu, and Battambang.  
One public opinion poll by the International Republican Institute (IRI) in early 2008 
indicated that 77% of Cambodian people believed that the country was heading in the right 
direction (IRI 2008a). When asked why they supported the CPP, 77% pointed to developments of 
new roads and 63% cited the improvement of schools. Five years later, the approval rate stood at 
79% for infrastructure developments, which continued to be a primary focus of those providing 
overwhelming support for the CPP (IRI 2013). It is crucial to note that two-thirds of respondents 
in these polls were rural inhabitants. Together, the CPP oligarchs, the heads of armed forces and 
security, CPP cabinet ministers and lawmakers, and low-income rural voters form the winning 
coalition, which provides Hun Sen with coercive, financial, legislative, and executive powers 
along with the votes required to stay in power. 
In contrast, urban voters, millennials, garment and footwear factory workers, and 
opposition parties such as the SRP, HRP, and CNRP constitute the pro-U.S. camp, which favors a 
Western-style democratic system of government, free speech, free press, and open political 
participation. This group also favors foreign policy diversification, where Cambodia would forge 
ties with many like-minded states around the world in order to retain its political autonomy and 
territorial integrity. As Huntington (1996) argues, cities and urbanized provincial regions form the 
most substantial bases for opposition voices in Cambodian politics. Each of the four groups has a 
different aspiration for pro-U.S. foreign policy. First, the middle-class electorates living in Phnom 
Penh and parts of major provinces such as Siem Reap, Prey Veng, Kandal, Battambang, Kampong 
Cham, and Kampong Speu are financially better off, more digitally connected, and keenly aware 
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of public discourses than is the CPP’s rural base. It includes such people as private employees, 
NGO workers, small- and medium-sized business owners, vendors, teachers, and low- and mid-
ranking local officials.15  
The second faction of the opposition group consists of millennials who are either in high 
school or in college or have recently gone into the job market.16 Cambodia has one of the highest 
percentages of adult populations in Southeast Asia (UNFPA 2016). As of August 2019, its total 
population stood at 15.2 million people, and 49% and 65.3% are younger than 25 and 30 years old, 
respectively (Mom 2019; UNFPA 2016). These millennials are highly connected through the 
Internet, social media, and smart devices, and they have a greater thirst for political participation 
than their elders. According to Bong and Sen (2017), 79% of Cambodian youth informally discuss 
politics among peers, while 89% believe the government should give them a broader opportunity 
to engage in politics and to express their views freely. An opinion poll in 2016 shows that favorable 
views of the United States in Cambodia are “high and particularly acute” among the youth 
population (Dunst 2019b). Another survey indicates that 72.6% of Cambodian college students 
prefer close relations with Washington, compared to only 27.4% who favor Beijing (Heng et al. 
2017). Their preference for close ties with the U.S. is spurred by their exposure to and interests in 
U.S. pop culture, education, democracy, and human rights. 
 
15 It is important to emphasize that the social and geographical stratification between the CPP’s rural base and the 
middle-class electorates of the opposition group is not completely clear cut. These two groups may reside in the same 
provinces of Cambodia, and their foreign policy orientation is not always fixated in support of or in opposition to 
either pro-China or pro-U.S. camp. Some middle-class electorates may value Western-style democracy, but they also 
enjoy economic benefits created by commercials ties with China. Meanwhile, some poor rural families who support 
the CPP may also benefit from U.S assistance and they may want to see a more democratic Cambodia. What 
differentiates these two groups from each other is the degree of their deference to the CPP’s ruling. As explained 
earlier, the CPP’s base tends to be more politically passive than the middle-class due to their low level of education 
and economic status. They are more likely than the middle-class voters to defer to Hun Sen’s ruling in exchange for 
peace, stability, and gradually improved livelihood. In contrast, the middle-class people are more skeptical of the CPP, 
better informed of national politics, and more demanding of democracy, less corruption, and responsive government. 
16 This thesis defines millennial as every Khmer adult who is 30 years old or younger. 
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The third element consists of factory workers who migrate from provinces to work in one 
of hundreds of garments and footwear plants in Cambodia dominated by investors from the 
Chinese mainland, Taiwan, and Southeast Asian countries. Unlike their aging parents who tend to 
be supportive of the CPP, these young workers engage in urban politics through digital platforms 
such as Facebook, and they are better organized through labor unions than workers in other 
industries. They are also likely to participate in a public protest for public policy changes, as 
indicated by the nationwide protest demanding higher wages following the 2013 general election. 
Due to their sheer number of more than a million people, they are a significant source of manpower 
for dissent that opposition parties such as the SRP have rallied. 
The fourth faction of the opposition group consists of leading opposition parties such as 
the SRP, HRP, and CNRP. The SRP, for example, was overtly pro-U.S. in its platforms and 
rhetoric, and it received funding and technical support through U.S. government-funded NGOs, 
such as the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and IRI (Strangio 2014). SRP leader Sam Rainsy 
has consistently appealed to lawmakers in the U.S. Congress and the European Parliament to try 
to galvanize Western pressure on the incumbent CPP government. Together, middle-class 
households, millennials, factory workers, and major opposition parties form the opposition group, 
which favors democracy, and, therefore, a pro-U.S. foreign policy. 
Table 3.1 below is a summary of how major political parties in Cambodia performed in the 
last five general elections. From 1998 to 2008, the CPP’s performance improved significantly, as 
its parliamentary seats rose from 64 in 1998 to 73 in 2003 and 90 in 2008. However, it suffered a 
severe blow in 2013 by losing 22 seats, thanks to the surging popularity of the CNRP.17 Then in 
 
17 In 2012, SRP President Sam Rainsy and Kem Sokha, another prominent opposition leader who founded the U.S.-
funded Cambodian Center for Human Rights (CCHR) before establishing the HRP, merged their parties to create the 
CNRP. 
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2018, the CPP ran without a formidable opposition and won all 125 seats in the National Assembly 
following the dissolution of the CNRP in September 2017 by the Supreme Court. 
Table 3.1  Results of the Cambodian General Elections, 1993-2018 [Source: Un (2019)] 
Political 
Party 
1998 2003 2008 2013 2018 
Vote 
Share 
(%) 
Seats 
Won 
Vote 
Share 
(%) 
Seats 
Won 
Vote 
Share 
(%) 
Seats 
Won 
Vote 
Share 
(%) 
Seats 
Won 
Vote 
Share 
(%) 
Seats 
Won 
CPP 41.4 64 47.35 73 58.11 90 48.83 68 76.85 125 
FUNCINPEC 31.7 43 20.75 26 5.05 2 3.66 0 5.89 0 
CNRP N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 44.65 55 Banned 0 
SRP 14.3 15 21.87 24 21.93 26 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
HRP N/A N/A N/A N/A 6.62 3 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Others N/A N/A N/A N/A 5.62 2 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
 
 3.1 Early Hedging, 1999-2008 
 Internal Challenges 
Coming out of 20 years of civil war and genocide, the Cambodian economy in the early 
1990s was in poor shape, and it was primarily isolated from the global system. After the UNTAC 
mandate ended in 1993, a priority for the country was to develop its economy, to integrate itself 
into the international financial and economic systems, and to lift its people out of extreme poverty. 
Therefore, economic development was a priority for the CPP-FUNCINPEC coalition government, 
and this trend has continued until today. According to Table 3.2 on the next page, in 1999, 
Cambodia’s total gross domestic product (GDP) stood at only $3.52 billion, with income per capita 
of only $295.90. Although the GDP grew threefold, the number was $10.35 billion by 2008, 
making it one of the poorest economies in the world. 
Foreign aid was another incentive encouraging Cambodia to maintain ties with both the 
United States and China. After UNTAC opened the floodgate of foreign aid, Cambodia soon 
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became an aid-dependent country that received more than 75% of its budget from external 
assistance alone between 1997 and 2008 (Ek and Sok 2008). Two-thirds of this amount came from 
Western entities such as the United States, Japan, the EU members, the World Bank, and the UN’s 
specialized agencies. Foreign aid gave the Western community geoeconomics leverage, which 
discourages the RGC from tilting close to China. The PRC and the United States were among vital 
trade partners with which Cambodia dealt. Besides, the country diversified its economic relations 
by trading with other key players, namely, the EU, Japan, South Korea, and fellow ASEAN 
member states in order to create jobs and to bring in foreign capital and skills 
 
Table 3.2  Cambodia’s GDP and ODA Inflow, 1998-2008 (Source: World Development 
Indicators) 
Year 
GDP 
(current $ 
billion) 
GDP per 
capita 
(current $) 
Annual 
GDP 
growth (%) 
Net ODA 
received (current 
$ million) 
Net ODA received 
(% of government 
budget) 
1998 3.12 268.99 4.68 337.67 N/A 
1999 3.52 295.90 12.70 277.45 N/A 
2000 3.68 302.58 10.71 396.39 N/A 
2001 3.98 321.15 7.45 415.35 N/A 
2002 4.28 338.99 6.56 486.34 121.02 
2003 4.66 362.34 8.51 517.29 119.52 
2004 5.34 408.51 10.34 485.77 111.25 
2005 6.29 474.11 13.25 538.57 112.74 
2006 7.28 539.75 10.77 531.40 85.07 
2007 8.64 631.53 10.21 691.40 97.58 
2008 10.35 745.61 6.69 744.23 83.99 
 
Politically speaking, a vital task for the CPP was to consolidate its power over Cambodia 
by improving its electoral performance and by marginalizing the influence of the royalist 
FUNCINPEC and the SRP. To enhance its domestic position with external influence, the CPP 
began courting the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in order to thaw mutual suspicion and to offer 
Beijing an alternative to FUNCINPEC, which grew increasingly pro-West and pro-Taiwan 
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(Richardson 2010; Storey 2011). That said, Cambodia could not alienate Washington and its allies, 
which had been bankrolling much of Cambodia’s national budget since the end of the civil war. 
The emergence of the SRP in the late 1990s posed a new threat to the CPP. Since his expulsion 
from the coalition government in 1995, Sam Rainsy, a Paris-trained banker whose late father had 
served under Norodom Sihanouk’s government in the 1960s, slowly became the new face of the 
opposition movement in modern Cambodian politics due to his hard-hitting and open criticisms 
about public corruption, abuse of power, and growing authoritarianism. Rainsy echoed criticisms 
made against Hun Sen by hawkish U.S. lawmakers such as Congressmen Steve Chabot (R-OH), 
Alan Lowenthal (R-CA), Ted Yoho (R-FL), Dana Rohrabacher (R-CA), Ed Royce (R-CA), 
Senator John McCain (R-AZ), and others in the European Parliament. His popularity among the 
urban electorates sheds light on the CPP’s inability to capture support from the educated middle-
class, which is more financially affluent than its rural base.  
Inside the CPP, Hun Sen faced a powerful rival faction led by Chea Sim, a fellow DK/PRK 
veteran who was dominating the Ministry of Interior. Sim was attempting to propel his brother-in-
law, Sar Kheng, to the top spot (Un 2019). In terms of internal security, Cambodia viewed its weak 
law enforcement as enabling of domestic instability. Therefore, priorities for the RGC must include 
the maintenance of internal peace, stability, and order as well as the modernization and 
professionalization of the RCAF (Cambodian Ministry of National Defense 2000; Chap and Im 
2007). Meanwhile, corruption and the weak rule of law are other factors impeding economic 
development that must be addressed by the central government. 
 External Challenges 
 From 1999 to 2008, Cambodia faced with several external challenges. The power struggle 
between the CPP and the royalist FUNCINPEC in July 1997 dealt a severe blow to the country’s 
54 
pushed it into diplomatic isolation. The event invited condemnation from the West and forced 
ASEAN to postpone the admission of Cambodia to membership (Cheunboran 2017). Therefore, a 
priority for the RGC was to recover its external legitimacy as a stable regime. 
According to the Defense White Papers (DWP) published in 2000 and 2006, Cambodia 
identified several threats to its security. First, disputed control over maritime territory on the South 
China Sea between ASEAN members and China was a potential impediment to Cambodia’s 
economic development (Cambodian Ministry of National Defence 2000). The RGC also 
emphasized the economic and security roles of the Mekong River, which is a critical commercial 
as well as biodiversity sources for millions of Khmer people living along this river. Third, joint 
land and maritime borders with Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam were potential flashpoints. For 
example, the discovery of oil in the Gulf of Thailand increased tension over the Overlapping 
Claims Area (OCA) after Bangkok revoked a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on the 
continental shelf (Var 2017). Meanwhile, the decades-old overlapping claims at the Preah Vihear 
temple and its adjacent areas reignited tension in 2008 and led to a prolonged standoff until 2011. 
Tension also existed at the borders with Vietnam and Laos. Meanwhile, Cambodia’s perilous land 
frontiers were potential points of entry for transnational crimes such as drugs, human trafficking, 
illegal immigration, and weapon proliferation. The 2000 DWP also expressed concerns about 
strategic uncertainty in the Asia-Pacific region after the end of the Cold War. 
Describing its defense posture as “flexible and controlled response,” the RGC underscored 
improvements of its three-layered command and control structures, border patrol, troop mobility, 
and living standards of uniformed members, all of which required financial and technical 
assistance from foreign partners such as Australia, the United States, France, and China. In its 
2002 Strategic Review and the 2006 version of DWP, Cambodia’s Ministry of National Defense 
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placed terrorism and joint borders with neighboring states on top of its list of national security 
concerns. The terrorist attacks in New York and Washington on September 11, 2001, sent shock 
waves across the nation about potential terrorist activities. Although the Global War on Terror 
created opportunities for Cambodia to accommodate the United States, the campaign raised 
concern in Phnom Penh about the growing militarization of U.S. foreign policy and the erosion of 
a rules-based order in Asia and around the world. Cambodia was also concerned that the rise of 
China would present new challenges to its relations with Washington and with ASEAN members, 
especially Hanoi. Since 1979, Hun Sen has maintained close political relations with the 
Vietnamese Communist Party. Although his government had welcomed China’s increasing 
presence after the 1997 internal power struggle with FUNCINPEC, Hun Sen has carefully walked 
between Beijing and Hanoi to avoid alienating either side. Getting too close with Vietnam would 
be costly for his local popularity since Cambodians held strong feelings toward Vietnam because 
of its past aggression and because of issues involving illegal Vietnamese immigrants. 
Contrarily, subservience to Beijing would upset Hanoi, who is a former patron and an 
immediate neighbor with whom Phnom Penh needed to maintain good relations in order to secure 
peaceful borders, to maintain the flow of trade, and to preserve domestic stability. Although this 
is not an exhaustive list of every domestic and foreign policy challenge Cambodia faced from 1999 
to 2008, it gives us a sense of the risks and opportunities facing the RGC as it hedged between the 
United States and China. Now that we discussed what the kingdom faces internally and externally, 
the next step is to analyze how its foreign policy vis-à-vis these two powers shifted during the 
2003 and 2008 general elections. 
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 3.1.1 Chinese-Cambodian Relations: From Former Foe to Close Friend 
 Political Ties 
Sino-Cambodian relations in the early 1990s can be characterized as a mutual precaution. 
For its part, China maintained an ambiguous position toward both the CPP and FUNCINPEC. 
Although it viewed the CPP as better organized than the royalists due to its strong rural base, 
Beijing was suspicious of Second Prime Minister Hun Sen, who had previously served under the 
Vietnam-backed PRK government. Prince Norodom Ranariddh, who is the son of Norodom 
Sihanouk, led the FUNCINPEC, but his lackluster leadership, the Party’s internal fighting, and its 
elitist and pro-Western tendencies did not inspire Beijing’s confidence either. China was primarily 
upset by Ranariddh’s decision allowing the establishment of the Taipei Economic and Cultural 
Representative Office (TECO) in Cambodia in 1994 and was upset as well by a visit to Taiwan by 
a deputy mayor of Phnom Penh close to FUNCINPEC one year later (Thayer 2013a). In 1996, 
Beijing got furious when Ranariddh announced that EVA Air, a Taiwanese commercial airline, 
would begin direct flight between Phnom Penh and Taipei. The PRC was upset that the content of 
that agreement “bore too close a resemblance” to Cambodia’s official diplomatic recognition of 
Taiwan (Richardson 2010). The 1997 joint request by Cambodian co-prime ministers asking the 
UN to help establish the Khmer Rouge Tribunal (KRT) to prosecute former DK leaders was an 
alarm for Beijing as it would implicate it for its supporting roles in the Cambodian genocide 
between 1975 and 1979. 
To avoid betting on the wrong horse, China, therefore, adopted a wait-and-see approach by 
keeping both parties at arm’s length. By 1996, Beijing grew increasingly wary of Ranariddh, with 
his cozying up to Taiwan. As a result, China began its courting for close relations with Hun Sen, 
the man who would become the real kingmaker in Cambodia. China sent a special plane to pick 
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up the Second Prime Minister for a “royal” visit in Beijing on July 18-23, 1996, where he witnessed 
the conclusion of agreements in bilateral trade and on the protection of investment as well as 
exchange agreements between the CPP and the CCP (Jeldres 2012). Less than a year later, on 5-6 
July 1997, First Prime Minister Norodom Ranariddh was ousted from office in an armed power 
struggle with Hun Sen. While the United States condemned the CPP for the event and suspended 
$25 million in aids to Cambodia, the PRC seized this opportunity to cement its influence. It became 
the first country to recognize the reconstituted government with Ung Huot as Ranariddh’s 
replacement and provided a loan worth $10 million, including $2.8 million of military equipment 
for an army unit loyal to the Second Premier (Storey 2011; Strangio 2014).  
That was the turning point in contemporary Chinese-Cambodian relations. “A friend in 
need is a friend indeed.” With intense international pressure aimed at Cambodia, China stood 
behind its old foe, Hun Sen, and offered him the legitimacy he desperately needed. Since then, 
Cambodia’s limited bandwagoning with the PRC began to kick in. It took a page from Norodom 
Sihanouk’s 1960s playbook by becoming a very strict enforcer of the “One China” policy. For 
instance, Cambodia closed down TECO, banned the Taiwanese flag, and prohibited RGC officials 
from visiting the island (Thayer 2013a). Moreover, it allowed the number of Chinese language 
schools to increase from 13 in 1995 to 60 in 1999. Hun Sen went so far as to downplay China’s 
ideological influence on the Khmer Rouge, arguing that DK’s genocidal methods and policies were 
exported from North Korea, although China had sent hundreds of technical advisors to support the 
Khmer Rouge (Richardson 2010). In the aftermath of the U.S. bombing of the Chinese Embassy 
in Belgrade in 1999 and during the EP-3 incident over Hainan Island in 2001, Cambodia stood 
firmly on China’s side. Furthermore, it took a hardline stance on religious issues by refusing to 
invite the Dalai Lama to the Third World Buddhist Conference held in Phnom Penh in 2002 and 
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by deporting followers of the Falun Gong cult, which was banned by the Beijing government 
(Saing and Doyle 2002).  
Sino-Cambodian diplomatic rapprochement in post-1997 was mutual. After the 1989 
Tiananmen Square Massacre, China was the “loneliest” power, whose global influence was made 
“partial” because it lacked the complex web of friendships and security alliances of the kind that 
countries such as the United States had developed over generations (Pei 2012; Shambaugh 2013). 
The crackdown in Tiananmen Square isolated China from the world, but it also led China’s leaders 
to see Cambodia as offering an opportunity to forge a friendship and to establish a presence in 
mainland Southeast Asia. Deepening ties with Cambodia would also create strategic leverage over 
Vietnam (Burgos and Ear 2010). For its part, the RGC did not intend to use the “Chinese card” to 
get rid of Western presence completely. What it sought was a reliable partner who could provide 
Cambodia with breathing space from Western pressure (Long 2009). Cheunboran (2017) argues 
that growing ties with China after 1997 provided Cambodia with strategic comfort that offsets 
threats from Thailand and Vietnam and accelerated its admission into ASEAN, whose members 
were concerned that leaving Phnom Penh out of the grouping would push it closer to Beijing. 
Political relations between China and Cambodia reached a significant milestone in 2000 
when they signed the Joint Statement on the Framework of Bilateral Cooperation, which laid out 
the groundwork between both countries’ governments, political parties, and armed forces. Hun 
Sen touted the development as having “long term and strategic significance” (Storey 2011). From 
2005 to 2008, Cambodia continued to give particular policy deference to China in order to maintain 
close relations. For example, it supported the PRC’s anti-secession law and opposed Taiwan’s and 
Japan’s bids for membership in the UN and on the Security Council, respectively. In 2006, bilateral 
ties were upgraded to the Comprehensive Partnership of Cooperation, which was meant to enhance 
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government-to-government as well as party-to-party ties and to foster collaborative legislative 
exchanges and policies supporting shared international interests (Thayer 2013a). By December 
2008, the first Confucius Institute was established in Phnom Penh, signaling the growing presence 
of Chinese public diplomacy. 
There are three reasons why Cambodia opted for limited bandwagoning with China from 
1999 to 2008. First, the PRC had maintained a non-interventionist position regarding Cambodia’s 
domestic politics. Due to their mutual hostility toward Washington’s democracy-promoting 
foreign policy, the CPP and the CCP saw one another as partners who had a common cause. 
Second, diplomatic tension with the United States over gridlock in the Cambodian National 
Assembly and over lawsuits against opposition lawmakers in 2005, which attracted bipartisan 
condemnation from the U.S. Congress, pressured Phnom Penh to seek moral support from Beijing. 
Third, the military standoff with Thailand over the Preah Vihear temple in 2008 escalated into 
prolonged clashes reminding Cambodia of its geographical vulnerability and the threats posed by 
its immediate neighbors (Cheunboran 2017; Long 2009). Its weak military, marginal international 
credibility, and the inadequacy of third-party mediation by ASEAN forced Cambodia to seek 
external influence from China. Nonetheless, the kingdom kept a certain distance from Beijing by 
concurrently engaging Washington, which was seeking Cambodian cooperation in its War on 
Terror. In this way, the CPP government could extract military assistance from Washington to 
improve its armed forces, maintain access to the U.S. consumer market, and sideline the pro-U.S. 
domestic opposition led by Sam Rainsy. Last, given Cambodia’s recent admission into ASEAN in 
1999 and its growing interests in multilateral diplomacy, subservience to China would alienate 
other ASEAN members. 
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Here, we see evidence of Cambodia’s limited bandwagoning with China resulted in 
improvement in their political relations after the CPP marginalized FUNCINPEC in the July 1997 
power struggle. Because Cambodia became a strict enforcer of the “One China” policy and began 
siding with the PRC on international issues, the two countries upgraded their political ties to a 
comprehensive partnership in 2006, as government-to-government cooperation expanded steadily 
despite two general elections in 2003 and 2008.  
 Economic Ties 
Chinese aid and investment garnered Cambodia’s support. For example, after the United 
States suspended aids in post-July 1997, China stepped in with $10 million in assistance (Storey 
2011). Beijing reciprocated Cambodia’s accommodations of its Taiwan policies and other 
sensitive issues with $200 million worth of agricultural and infrastructure loans, half of which 
were interest-free, and another $18 million in foreign assistance after the CPP won the 1998 
election (Richardson 2010). One year later, Beijing gave $200 million in infrastructure loans 
without interest, as the two countries signed a bilateral agreement to promote trade and investment. 
 
Table 3.3  Cambodia’s Trade with China, 1999-2008 [Source: International Monetary 
Fund’s Direction of Trade Statistics (data.imf.org)] 
Year 
Exports to (mainland) 
China ($ million) 
Imports from (mainland) 
China ($ million) 
Trade Balance  
($ million) 
1999 8.9 85.9 -77 
2000 23.7 112.8 -89.1 
2001 16.7 86.9 -70.2 
2002 8.3 197.7 -189.4 
2003 6.4 223.3 -216.9 
2004 12.6 341.8 -329.1 
2005 14.2 423.51 -409.27 
2006 15.5 523.85 -508.35 
2007 46.44 969.38 -922.94 
2008 12.91 934.95 -922.04 
61 
Cambodia’s total goods exchanged with China between 1999 and 2008 were small when 
compared to its trade with the United States. Its exports to the PRC went through ups and downs 
and remained small in volume. Moreover, Cambodia imported much more than it was able to sell 
back to China. As a result, the total trade deficit with China grew more than tenfold from $77 
million in 1999 to $216 million in 2003 and $922 million in 2008. It is worth mentioning here that 
in stark contrast with the PRC, the United States is Cambodia’s single biggest export market. 
During the 2002 ASEAN Summit in Phnom Penh, Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji announced 
that China would forgive all debts owed to the PRC by Cambodia. The total amount was estimated 
to be as high as $1 billion, which included loans received under the Khmer Rouge regime. 
Moreover, China offered $39 million in grants and another $95 million in soft loans for the 2000-
20006 period (Thayer 2013a). In 2006, during Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao’s visit to the kingdom, 
he pledged $600 million in financial assistance in a multiyear project. One year later, China 
dominated the group of foreign donors to the Cambodian reconstruction effort led by the World 
Bank, known as the Consultative Group (CG). China gave $91 million out of a total package of 
$689 million (Storey 2011). By 2008, the PRC had provided another $208 million to build 
irrigation systems, roads, and power transmission lines. By the end of that year, it had contributed 
$257 million to the CG’s annual packages, set at $951 million 
Three characteristics differentiated Chinese aid from that of the United States. First, 
Chinese assistance drew directly from government accounts, whereas the United States strictly 
channeled the money to local and international NGOs through the U.S. Agency for International 
Development (USAID). Second, U.S. aid concentrates in strategic sectors vital to its interests such 
as civil society, democratization, community development, public health, and education, while 
China was the primary benefactor on infrastructure developments in rural, underdeveloped regions 
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where the CPP’s key constituents resided. Third, Washington attached strict human rights 
conditions to its aid, but Beijing did not. For example, Heng (2012) and O’Neill (2018) explain 
that, instead of placing conditions on democracy, China has sought foreign policy accommodation 
and favorable treatments for its investment firms.  
In addition to providing aid, China was one of the largest foreign investors. By 2007, it 
dominated Cambodia’s investment landscape with total capital of $1.58 billion. One year later, the 
amount jumped by nearly threefold to $4.3 billion, which represented 40% of Cambodia’s total 
FDI inflow that year. Unlike Western companies, which have avoided pouring in money into 
corruption-prone sectors, Chinese firms have used ties with the CPP to conduct backroom dealings 
and penetrate risky sectors such as construction, mining, and energy, especially hydropower. 
To summarize, as the hypothesis predicts, Cambodia’s economic relations with China 
remained stable and grew over time from 1999 to 2008, even though the former went through two 
general elections in 2003 and 2008. While Cambodia’s trade deficit with China expanded, total 
two-way trade volume rose significantly. Meanwhile, Beijing provided Phnom Penh with a 
considerable amount of aid to help it develop physical infrastructures. That is because the kingdom 
continuously implemented economic pragmatism in its hedging toward China with a high degree 
of stability and consistency.  
 Military Ties 
Although bilateral military relations with China in the early 2000s were lukewarm and 
progressed slower than cooperation with the United States, Cambodia looked for additional 
sources of military aid from the Chinese in order to strengthen internal security and self-defense, 
to prepare for potential terrorist activities, and to navigate the geopolitical fluidity in Southeast 
Asia and the broader Asia-Pacific region. This policy constituted an indirect balancing element in 
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hedging toward Beijing, in which Phnom Penh concurrently improved its defense capability while 
forging non-alliance military relations with this power in exchange for material and technical 
support that would help modernize its armed forces. Furthermore, ties short of formal alliance 
projected a nuanced image of Cambodia’s alignment posture, showing it to be willing to work with 
any country as long as its military autonomy is not subjected to the small power-big power 
imbalance that might drag it into an unwanted conflict. 
In 1996, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) offered $1 million worth of financial 
assistance to the RCAF, as the number of Chinese military attachés in Phnom Penh increased to 
more than 30 (Thayer 2013a). Immediately after the Cambodian political crisis in 1997, the PRC 
provided 116 military trucks and 70 jeeps with a total value of $2.8 million. There were also high-
level visits by RCAF leaders to China. For example, in 1999, Cambodian Defense Minister 
General Tea Banh toured the PRC for four days, where he met with then-Chinese Vice President 
Hu Jintao and with the head of the PLA’s General Staff Fu Quanyou (Marks 2000). Later that year, 
China donated $1.5 million for the RCAF’s construction of army barracks along with ten jeeps, 
ten ambulances, and parachutes. In 2003, the two countries signed an MOU to provide financial 
support for the RGC’s troop demobilization, construction of barracks, military schools, and 
hospitals, and professional education for the uniformed members. These expenditures were aimed 
at improving the RCAF’s power against external threats and maintaining internal stability. 
The 2006 Comprehensive Partnership for Cooperation agreement took bilateral defense 
ties to a new level as China began donating more material and technical assistance to its 
counterpart. For example, the agreement expanded military exchanges into non-traditional security 
issues, as China donated nine patrol boats valued at $60 million to the Royal Cambodian Navy in 
order to help it to maintain control of the coastline and offshore oilfields in the Gulf of Thailand 
64 
(Storey 2011). China also financed the refurbishment of the Ream Naval Base, raising speculation 
among U.S. officials that the location could potentially connect to China’s “string of pearls” 
maritime strategy for protecting Chinese sea lines of communication (SLOC) between the Pacific 
and the Indian oceans. By the end of 2008, Cambodia hosted a ship from the Chinese PLA Navy 
at Sihanoukville harbor. As with economic pragmatism and limited bandwagoning, Cambodia’s 
indirect balancing with China experienced a gradual but steady expansion during two general 
elections in 2003 and 2008. Despite assistance from the United States and other countries, 
Cambodia welcomed cooperation and support from China through its ties short of an alliance in 
order to improve its armed forces and prepare against the prospect of external threats. 
Cambodia’s deepening military relations with China in the 1999-2008 period indicates its 
stable exercise of indirect balancing in hedging strategy. The country fostered a non-alliance 
partnership with and extracted military assistance from the PRC to modernize its armed forces and 
prepare itself for the evolving strategic landscape in the Asia-Pacific region. The non-alliance 
nature of the defense ties with China is crucial for Cambodia’s hedging strategy because it sends 
a signal to its Southeast Asian neighbors, the United States, and other countries that it is a non-
aligned and autonomous player. As we will see in the next section, this particular policy also 
extended to its hedging vis-à-vis the United States. 
 3.1.2 United States-Cambodian Relations: From Sanctions to Engagement 
 Political Ties 
Although the CPP had dominated national politics since 1998, the royalist FUNCINPEC 
remained a formidable force, and the SRP had gradually established itself as an emerging face of 
the opposition movement. Two preeminent events dominated national politics before the July 2003 
general election. The first was an anti-Thai riot in Phnom Penh, which led to mobbed ransack of 
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the Thai Embassy.18 Although Cambodia had to pay $50 million to Thailand for damage 
reparation, the event created a “rally ‘round the flag” effect, helping to propel the CPP to a victory. 
Another event involved the assassinations of two notable critics. One of them was Sam Buntheoun, 
a dissident monk who advocated for monks’ right to vote. The second case was Om Radsady, 
FUNCINPEC’s senior advisor, who was killed two weeks after Buntheoun (Strangio 2014). There 
were two dozen other politically motivated homicides of opposition activists before polling day 
(IRI 2003; Sayres and Lum 2002).  
The election on July 27, 2003, handed a victory to the CPP, which won 77 seats, even 
though it fell short of the two-thirds majority that was required to authorize the unilateral formation 
of a new government. As a result, the SRP and FUNCINPEC, which received 24 and 26 seats, 
respectively, formed the “Alliance of Democrats” and boycotted the parliament to press the CPP 
for political concessions. The impasse dragged on for almost a year, and there was no new 
government until Prince Norodom Ranariddh agreed to form another uneasy coalition with Hun 
Sen in June 2004, following the CPP’s concession that the prince would become President of the 
National Assembly. Left out in the cold by FUNCINPEC, the SRP became the sole leading voice 
of opposition movement in Cambodia. 
 By late 2004, there were lawsuits filed against two SRP members, Chea Poch and Cheam 
Channy, on charges of defamation and operation of a secret army, respectively (Strangio 2014). 
Hun Sen sued Sam Rainsy himself after Rainsy accused him of involvement in the 1997 grenade 
attacks. In February 2005, the CPP-dominated National Assembly stripped these three SRP 
 
18 On January 18, 2003, one local Khmer newspaper alleged that the popular Thai actress Sovanan Kongying had 
recently remarked that “she would only ever accept an invitation to perform in Cambodia if the famous Angkor Wat 
[temple] was returned to Thailand” and that “if she was reincarnated, she would rather be a dog than a Khmer national” 
(Deth 2014). Her comments were offensive for Cambodians, who generally view Thai people with historical animosity 
due to Thailand's past subjugation of Cambodia’s territory. The incident led angry protestors to burn down Thailand’s 
embassy and dozens of Thai-owned businesses in Phnom Penh. 
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lawmakers of parliamentary immunity, forcing Poch and Rainsy to flee Cambodia, as Channy was 
detained in a military prison. Later that year, Mam Sonando, owner of an independent radio station, 
and Rong Chhun, leader of a teachers’ union, were arrested for criticizing the recent demarcation 
agreement with Vietnam, while three NGO members were apprehended. After the 2003 election, 
the assassination of Chea Vichea, a prominent labor union leader who rallied with Sam Rainsy, 
dominated national politics and added more frictions between Phnom Penh and Washington. 
Cambodia’s political relations with the United States between 1999 and 2008 took a very 
different trajectory from its dealing with China due to the concern of Washington at the 
deterioration of democracy and human rights in Cambodia. While political ties experienced 
turbulences, cooperation in economic and military realms improved significantly, as the hypothesis 
posits. After the UNTAC mission concluded in May 1993, Washington re-established diplomatic 
relations with Charles S. Twinning as ambassador. Relations began to nosedive following a 
grenade attack against a demonstration led by Sam Rainsy on March 30, 1997, which killed 16 
protestors and injured more than a hundred others, including one U.S. citizen (Strangio 2014). 
Following the CPP-FUNCINPEC power struggle in July, the Clinton administration suspended 
direct aid and opposed international loans to Cambodia, except for those used for humanitarian 
purposes (Thayer 2012). Meanwhile, the restrictions on political freedom and delays in negotiation 
for the Khmer Rouge Tribunal cemented criticism in U.S. Congress (Sayres and Lum 2002).  
Circumstances changed when the Bush administration’s War on Terror, which identified 
Southeast Asia as its “second front,” created an opportunity for Cambodia to bandwagon with U.S. 
policy to undo the damages incurred since the 1997 internal power struggle. Due to weak control 
over borders and dismal counterterrorism capability, Cambodia was a primary concern for U.S. 
policymakers, who perceived it as a potential springboard for terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda’s 
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affiliate, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). UN officials also expressed concerns that JI could potentially 
recruit new members from Cambodia’s Muslim Cham minority. These suspicions turned out to be 
true after authorities found that the chief planner of the 2002 Bali bombing, Hambali (Riduan 
Isamuddin), took refuge in Phnom Penh for several months after the tragic attacks that killed 202 
people, including seven U.S. citizens. In response, Cambodia cooperated with U.S. officials in 
2004 to destroy 233 Soviet-made surface-to-air missiles to prevent them from falling into the 
wrong hands. Cambodia then arrested four suspects linked to JI, shut down a Saudi Arabi-funded 
Islamic school, and took a hardline on Wahabism (Lum 2007; Stern 2009). It worked with 
Australian and British officials to draft a counterterrorism law and agreed to exempt U.S. citizens 
living in its territory from the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC). 
Furthermore, Cambodia signed a refugee repatriation deal with the United States in 2002 
that allows the deportation of Khmer refugees back to their native country. To reciprocate the 
favors, Washington arrested members of the Cambodian Freedom Fighters, whom Phnom Penh 
accused of violent incitements, and inked a bilateral agreement to prohibit the export of ancient 
Khmer artifacts (U.S. Embassy in Cambodia 2010). Political rapprochement continued after 
Cambodia ratified an agreement with the UN in 2004 to establish a hybrid tribunal to try senior 
Khmer Rouge leaders for genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity committed from 
1975 to 1979. This ratification was arguably a win for Washington and a loss for China, which had 
failed to convince the Cambodian National Assembly to reject the UN deal. 
 Due to Cambodia’s accommodations with the War on Terror, bilateral relations between 
the United States and Cambodia prior to the 2003 general election improved steadily despite the 
deterioration of democracy. To reiterate U.S. commitment to Cambodian democracy, U.S. 
Secretary of State Colin Powell visited the country three weeks before the election, where he met 
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with political parties and expressed hope for a free and fair procedure (U.S. Embassy in Phnom 
Penh 2010). As expected, the CPP won the 2003 election. Despite irregularities, vote-buying, 
unfair access to media, and alleged intimidation against opposition members, Washington 
concluded that the election was “more orderly” and “transparent” than the one that occurred five 
years ago (Lum 2007). Nevertheless, after the Cambodian National Assembly stripped off the 
parliamentary immunity of three SRP lawmakers in February 2005, the tension that had been 
building up in previous years began to spill out into public rhetoric. The United States issued a 
strong statement condemning the CPP-controlled legislature for “intimidation of opposition 
voices” (Lum 2007). Less than two weeks later, U.S. Senator Sam Brownback (R-KS) introduced 
a resolution calling for Channy’s release (S. Res. 65). Tension reached a new high after several 
critics such as Yeng Virak, Kem Sokha, Rong Chhun, and Chea Mony were arrested between late 
2005 and early 2006 (Human Rights Watch 2005). On 25 January 2006, the U.S. Senate passed a 
resolution calling for the dropping of charges against political prisoners (S. Res. 353).  
According to Thayer (2012), Hun Sen played his trump card by getting soft with 
Washington in 2006 because of pressure from Western donors and concern that Cambodia had 
been moving too far away from the United States politically. For these reasons, an hour after he 
met with U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Christopher R. Hill, 
who was on tour to Phnom Penh to inaugurate a new $47 million embassy, the Cambodian leader 
ordered the release of jailed dissidents and told Hill that the decision was a “gift” for the new 
diplomatic compound (Strangio 2014). Tension eased after the Cambodian king pardoned Sam 
Rainsy, who then returned home in February and had his parliamentary seat reinstated along with 
those of Poch and Channy. 
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Cambodia’s limited bandwagoning with the United States yielded positive results as 
bilateral ties improved for the next two years, even though U.S. foreign policy toward Cambodia 
at this point separated into two camps. The first camp advocated a hardline stance that tied aid and 
cooperation to Cambodia’s human rights records, whereas the second camp advocated broader 
engagement to push for a democratic Cambodia and to offset Chinese influence (Lum 2007). At 
the same time that the U.S. Congress had consistently maintained a bipartisan and tough stance, 
the White House had adopted a more flexible tone (Thayer 2012). 
 In December 2005, former U.S. President Bill Clinton visited Phnom Penh, where he met 
with Hun Sen and signed a Memorandum of Understanding, allowing the Clinton Foundation to 
upgrade Cambodia’s national health laboratories and to provide anti-retroviral medications (U.S. 
Embassy in Cambodia 2010). By 2007, the Bush administration officially lifted the 10-years ban 
on civilian and military aid to Cambodia imposed by the Clinton administration. On April 4, 2007, 
the first cohort of 29 Peace Corps volunteers began two-year assignments in seven Cambodia’s 
provinces. Later that month, the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) hosted Cambodia’s 
National Police Chief General Hok Lundy in Washington D.C. to enhance counterterrorism 
cooperation. Before the 2008 election, Cambodia’s political relations with the United States were 
more stable than five years earlier due to Cambodia’s accommodations with the War on Terror. 
For example, FBI Director Robert Mueller visited the kingdom to inaugurate a legal attaché office 
in January of that year to boost legal cooperation (Lum 2009). Two months after the election that 
had been held on July 27, which handed the CPP its biggest victory to date, U.S. Deputy Secretary 
of State John Negroponte paid an official visit carrying $24 million in aid (Thayer 2012). He also 
announced the U.S. decision to provide financial support to the Khmer Rouge Tribunal, which it 
had withheld since 2006 due to concern about the court’s independence (Lum 2018). 
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What explains the United States’ soft approach toward Cambodia this time around? First, 
the 2008 election was widely viewed by observers as more peaceful, better organized, and 
relatively freer of irregularities than the election five years prior (Lum 2009). From a war-stricken 
country that had previously divided and destabilized Southeast Asia, Cambodian had come a very 
long way from its tragic past, and its signs of progress deserved some praise. Whether it liked it or 
not, Washington had to learn to live with Hun Sen because he was the only person who could get 
things done, as attested by two former U.S. ambassadors (Strangio 2014). Second, Washington 
had already won a crucial political concession in 2006 when SRP leader Sam Rainsy, Cheam 
Channy, and Chea Poch were pardoned and allowed to return to politics and when other jailed 
dissidents were also released. Besides, as Levitsky and Way (2010) argue in their book on 
competitive authoritarianism, the Bush administration had competing foreign policy goals, and it 
was pulled toward taking a hard stance on rights issues and yet working with Cambodia to improve 
its counterterrorism capability that would serve the U.S. interests of its War on Terror. 
Overall, evidence shows that Cambodia’s political relations with the United States 
deteriorated after the 2003 general election. Five years later, this pattern repeated itself. However, 
since this part covers the developments between 1999 and 2008, what happened after the 2008 
election are discussed in the 2009-2019 section. It is vital to note that instability in U.S.-Cambodian 
ties in the early 2000s was mostly rhetorical and did not result in significant setbacks in 
government-to-government engagement. Even though the CPP suppressed domestic opposition 
during elections, which, according to the hypothesis, would lead the United States to respond 
negatively by reducing the intensity of cooperation, the Bush administration took a soft approach 
to gain Cambodia’s collaboration with the War on Terror. This posture indicates the result of 
Cambodia’s limited bandwagoning in hedging. The friendly position of the Bush administration 
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in post-election challenges the argument that backsliding in Cambodian democracy will strain its 
political relations with the United States. However, it does not alter the fact that ties between the 
two countries experienced fluctuations around the 2003 and 2008 elections. 
 Economic Ties 
In stark contrast to the political realm, U.S.-Cambodian economic ties from 1999 to 2008 
had steadily improved with little to no fluctuation regardless of the elections in 2003 and 2008. As 
explained earlier, Cambodia, under the ruling CPP, adopted economic pragmatism in its hedging 
toward the United States because the latter was the single largest export market since the early 
1990s. In 1996, the United States inked a trade deal with Cambodia at the same time that the U.S. 
Congress granted its normal trade relations (NTR) status. Then in 1997, it listed Cambodia in the 
Least Developed Country (LDC) category under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). 
Three years later, the two countries expanded trade relations by signing a three-year agreement. 
Cambodia was allowed to expand its export quota based on compliance with international labor 
rights standards (Sayres and Lum 2002). As a consequence, its textile exports to the United States 
rose dramatically from $3.6 million in 1996 to almost $1 billion by 2001. In 2006, the two countries 
signed the Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA), which led to the establishment 
of the U.S.-Cambodia Joint Council on Trade and Investment, a body co-chaired by the Cambodian 
Ministry of Commerce and the U.S. Trade Representative serving as a forum to address intellectual 
property rights, banking, and financial services (Thayer 2012).  
As a result, Cambodia’s exports to the U.S. jumped from $592.6 million in 1999 to $1.26 
billion in 2003, and $2.41 billion by the end of 2008, while U.S. exports to the kingdom increased 
by sevenfold from $20 million to $152.2 million. The U.S. exports to Cambodia consisted mainly 
of vehicles, machinery, animal feed, food waste, paper, soybeans, beef, grains, and nonwoven 
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textiles, whereas Cambodia exported back textile, footwear, plastics, leather products, and rubber 
(U.S. Trade Representative n.d.). Trade figures shown in Table 3.4 indicate an upward trend in 
two-way trade, as Cambodia enjoyed a growing trade surplus with the United States every year. 
 
Table 3.4  Cambodia’s Trade with and Foreign Assistance from the U.S., 1999-2008 
[Source: Lum (2004, 2007, 2009), Sayres and Lum (2002), and U.S. Census Bureau (n.d.)] 
Year 
Exports To 
($ million) 
Imports From 
($ million) 
Trade Balance  
($ million) 
Development Assistance 
($ million) 
1999 592.6 20.0 572.6 N/A 
2000 852.6 31.7 793.9 N/A 
2001 962.5 29.6 932.9 37 
2002 1,071.1 29.3 1.041.8 N/A 
2003 1,262.1 57.9 1,204.2 43 
2004 1,497.4 58.9 1,438.5 52.9 
2005 1,767.0 69.7 1,697.3 60.2 
2006 2,188.4 74.5 2,113.9 54.9 
2007 2,463.4 138.8 2,324.6 57 
2008 2,411.5 154.2 2,257.6 55 
 
The United States was also an essential source of foreign aid. Although the Clinton 
administration restricted bilateral assistance to the RGC in 1997, exceptions were made for aid in 
areas such as HIV/AIDs, human trafficking, civil society, demining, and humanitarian necessities 
(Sayres and Lum 2002). Since 1996, Washington was a major contributor to the Cambodian 
reconstruction efforts. From 1998 to 2007, international donors pledged $5.5 billion worth of 
official development assistance (ODA)19 to Cambodia, two-thirds of which came from the United 
States and other Western entities, and a half of which was spent on education, infrastructure, 
 
19 OECD (2019) defines ODA as “government aid that promotes and specifically targets the economic development 
and welfares of developing countries.”  
73 
health, and public governance (Ek and Sok 2008). By 2007, Cambodia had become the third-
largest recipient of U.S. assistance in East Asia and the Pacific region (Thayer 2012). 
 In contrast to the political arena, Cambodia’s economic ties with the United States were 
stable for the entire 1999-2008 period. Nothing confirms this pattern of its economic pragmatism 
in hedging more than growing bilateral trade. Unlike its trade with China, which ran on a deficit, 
the kingdom sold to the United States many times more than it purchased back. Meanwhile, 
Washington provided Phnom Penh with a modest amount of bilateral aid, which was small 
compared to Chinese assistance but played a supplementary role in areas such as democracy, civil 
society, and public health. The evidence supports the hypothesis that, unlike limited 
bandwagoning, Cambodia’s economic pragmatism toward the United States from 1999 to 2008 
experienced only stability and matured over time despite two contentious elections. It is because 
maintaining access to the U.S. market, aid, and other commercial exchanges helped the ruling CPP 
government maintain its domestic legitimacy. 
 Military Ties 
Although U.S.-Cambodian military relations ran into a major hurdle after a power struggle 
in Cambodia in 1997, ties improved gradually throughout the entire Bush administration. These 
positive developments were results of spillover effects from the RGC’s cooperation in the War on 
Terror, and they were also made easier by improved domestic stability in Cambodian politics 
following the 2003-2005 parliamentary gridlock. After seven years of suspension, defense 
relations resumed in 2004. However, it would take another three years for direct military aid to 
resume. After bilateral defense channels had been reestablished, the United States began providing 
training support to the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces through the Foreign Military Financing 
(FMF) program in the areas of border patrol and counterterrorism. In 2005, 40 RCAF personnel 
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participated in U.S.-funded training as Cambodia became qualified for the Regional Defense 
Counterterrorism Fellowship Program, which had provided English language instruction and 
demining lessons for its armed forces. Despite the political tension arising from charges made 
against SRP lawmakers, military cooperation grew stronger without interruption. This maturity 
happened because rapprochement in military ties was arguably a matter of mutual benefit. The 
United States needed Cambodia’s cooperation for its counterterrorism efforts in Southeast Asia 
and to offset encroaching Chinese influence, while Cambodia looked to the United States for 
defense assistance to strengthen its army and to improve law enforcement. Moreover, broader 
military relations helped Cambodia retain its distance from the Chinese PLA and to maintain 
balance in its hedging. Between 2004 and 2006, the United States provided Cambodia with $4.5 
million in equipment and technical assistance (Thayer 2012).  
After Sam Rainsy returned to Cambodia in 2006, a positive trend in the U.S.-Cambodia 
military relationship continued for the next two years. For example, Cambodian Defense Minister 
General Tea Banh visited the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) to seek assistance for the 
modernization of RCAF. Later that year, PACOM Commander Admiral William Fallon paid a 
“get-to-know-you” visit back to Cambodia to explore in more concrete terms what Banh’s call for 
modernization might require (Voice of America 2007). The high point came in February 2007 
when the USS Gary, a guided-missile frigate, paid a port visit to Sihanoukville. It was the first 
presence of the U.S. Navy in Cambodian waters since the 1975 Mayaguez Incident. During that 
five-day visit, some 230 U.S. sailors interacted with their counterparts in the Royal Cambodian 
Navy and engaged with local villagers through sporting events and goodwill medical checkups 
(Little 2007). Less than a year later, the USS Essex conducted a similar mission at the same time 
when a team from the U.S. Marine Corps began training personnel in Cambodia’s National 
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Counter-Terrorism Special Force (NCTSF), a newly established body created in response to the 
9/11 terrorist attacks with financial and technical aid from the U.S. government. In 2008, 
Washington donated 60 trucks and $4 million in military aid to assist the RCAF with participation 
in international peacekeeping operations, an activity that would boost Cambodia’s global image 
(Lum 2009; Thayer 2012). 
Improvement in Cambodia’s military relations with the United States from 1999 to 2008 
indicates its steady and continuous implementation of indirect balancing in hedging. The country 
forged non-alliance relations with the United States to extract logistical and financial resources 
that improved its capabilities in such areas as counterterrorism, border control, maritime domain 
awareness, and global peacekeeping. These ties created an opportunity for RCAF personnel to gain 
invaluable operational experience from their interactions with U.S. forces. Furthermore, they 
helped Cambodia diversify its defense engagement and project an ambiguous alignment posture, 
as ties with U.S. military balanced against the RCAF’s reliance on the PLA. Because the 9/11 
terrorist attacks paved the way for the RGC to collaborate with the War on Terror, a stable upward 
trajectory in U.S.-Cambodia military relations took place through the 2003 and 2008 general 
elections without any notable interruption. 
 Key Findings 
How did Cambodia hedge between the United States and China during the first decade of 
the twenty-first century? Here, there is evidence confirming the hypothesis that the kingdom 
maintains consistent military and economic relations with both powers but shifts politically away 
from the United States but not China during the election years. 
First, Cambodia implemented economic pragmatism concurrently toward the United States 
and the PRC to extract foreign aid and FDI, and to bolster bilateral trade, which benefits the local 
76 
economy. Although the 1997 political crisis in Cambodia had led the United States to restrict 
bilateral aid, the kingdom was soon after granted LDC status as well as an increased export quota 
expanded based on compliance with international labor standards. As a result, Cambodia’s exports 
to the United States quadrupled from $592.6 million in 1999 to $2.41 billion by the end of 2009, 
the upward trend being sustained every single year despite numerous cases of human rights 
violations and two elections in 2003 and 2008. At the same time, U.S. exports to Cambodia also 
expanded sevenfold, as the latter enjoyed a growing trade surplus every year. 
 Cambodia’s economic exchanges with China also flourished, namely, in the area of 
bilateral aid. Since Cambodia was a small country with an economy crippled by war, the financial 
assistance from China played a critical role in the construction of infrastructures such as roads, 
bridges, and irrigation systems that legitimized rule by the CPP government. Direct Chinese aid to 
the RGC gave the latter more flexibility and authority over how it allocated resources between 
private goods for the winning coalition and public goods for ordinary citizens. Trade with China 
is another area of economic relations. In contrast to the relationship it has with the United States, 
Cambodia imported much more from China than it was able to sell back, leaving it with a growing 
trade deficit every year from only $77 million in 1999 to almost $1 billion in 2009. Since economic 
growth is crucial for the CPP’s legitimacy, Cambodia concurrently implemented economic 
pragmatism as a profit-maximization measure in its hedging between China and the United States 
that did not fluctuate according to elections. 
Second, military relations gradually matured. Cambodia’s accommodation of the War on 
Terror encouraged the Bush administration to return the favors by lifting the ban on military aid 
imposed in 1997 and by providing military aid to strengthen capacities of the RCAF in areas of 
counterterrorism, maritime security, and border control. The United States also made modest 
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logistical donations of equipment and provided language and counterterrorism training for RCAF 
personnel. Engagement broadened further following the first docking of a U.S. Navy vessels in 
2007 and exchange visits between senior Cambodian and U.S. military officials. While these 
happened, the RGC also improved its military ties with Beijing in order to seek more military 
assistance, to balance its engagement with the U.S., and to avoid choosing a side. This behavior is 
parallel with the logic of indirect balancing in hedging. The essence of Cambodia’s indirect 
balancing is that it forged military ties with both the United States and China, but it did not, and 
must not, do so through formal treat alliance in order to strengthen self-defense, to maintain a 
middle path between the two powers, and to safeguard strategic autonomy. 
Finally, the most fluctuation can be seen in political relations, as the hypothesis predicts. 
The 1997 event in  Cambodia kickstarted the slow demise of the royalist FUNCINPEC and 
elevated the CPP’s relations with the CCP to the center stage. China legitimized the reconstituted 
government and backed Hun Sen internationally. In return, Cambodia became one of the strictest 
enforcers of the “One China” policy by closing down TECO and banning Taiwanese presence in 
Cambodia. The kingdom also stood with China on the international stage during events such as 
the 1999 bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade by the U.S. and the EP-3 Incident. The ties 
were mutually beneficial because each side saw the other as reinforcing its credibility at home and 
abroad. Both of them almost wholly disregarded issues of human rights and democracy. Therefore, 
even though Cambodia went through two elections in 2003 and 2008, its political ties with China 
remained unshakable, deepening over time as a result of limited bandwagoning with Beijing. 
On the other hand, the 1997 crisis created a long-lasting detrimental effect on Cambodia’s 
ties with the United States, which suspended direct civilian and military aid. Restriction began to 
ease gradually only during George W. Bush’s first term because Cambodia accommodated the 
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War on Terror by strengthening its law enforcement, taking a hardline position against Islamic 
fundamentalist networks involved in the 2002 Bali bombings, exempting U.S. citizens from the 
ICC’s jurisdiction, and easing its grip on democracy at home. For these reasons, the Bush 
administration adopted a non-confrontational stance with Cambodia’s human rights records. 
Nevertheless, bilateral ties were not free of political rhetoric because, in contrast to the White 
House, the U.S. Congress maintained a bipartisan and hardline position by criticizing the RGC’s 
clampdowns on opposition lawmakers and dissenters during the 2003 and 2008 elections. It is 
critical to note here that fluctuation in U.S.-Cambodian political relations during this period were 
largely rhetorical and did not result in any substantial disruption in government-to-government 
engagement. Moreover, instability in ties occurred after the general elections, not before. 
To summarize, in its default condition, maintaining a balance between the United States 
and China dictates Cambodia’s hedging foreign policy from 1999 to 2008. Around general election 
time, the RGC’s limited bandwagoning with China either stays stable or grows closer, but political 
ties with the United States deteriorate temporarily due to its suppression of opposition. Once the 
ruling CPP wins the election, the country tries to repair the damage done with Washington by 
releasing jailed opponents and perpetuating a mirage of liberal democracy. This pattern of 
behaviors repeats every general election cycle, as we will observe in the following section. 
 3.2 Hedging Amid Growing Uncertainties, 2009-2019 
 Internal Challenges 
 Heading into the second decade of the twenty-first century, Cambodia faced several 
domestic challenges, both old and new. The first was corruption. Cambodia is one of the most 
corrupt countries on the globe, and it is the worst in this respect among the ten ASEAN states, 
according to the recent Corruption Perceptions Index released by Transparency International 
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(2020). It was ranked 162 out of 180 countries with an integrity score of 20 out of 100 points. 
Corruption has been so widespread and chronic that it has been among the primary concerns of the 
population. Based on public opinion polls in 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2013 conducted 
by IRI, an average of 40% of Cambodians blamed corruption for turning the country in the wrong 
direction (IRI 2007, 2008b, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2014). The judiciary and law enforcement are the 
two most corrupt bodies -- laws exist on paper but are not adequately enforced, leaving public 
integrity to peril (Transparency International Cambodia 2014). Public officials use their power to 
benefit from bribes and to contribute back to the CPP for job security. While people at the top 
enjoy their handsome sums, low salaries leave underpaid police officers and public-school teachers 
no choice but to take bribes for ill-conceived traffic tickets and from the exclusive sale of 
classroom materials to privileged students, respectively. That is because in a developing country 
where corruption is so rampant, having enough food on the table is more vital than maintaining 
ethical values for some of these people than is maintaining ethical values. 
Another challenge is the maintenance of GDP growth. Economic growth and domestic 
stability are core pillars of the CPP’s legitimacy. As long as these two conditions remain stable, 
the CPP will continue to enjoy the support from low-income rural voters and some segments of 
middle-class voters. From 1998 to 2018, according to the World Bank (2019), the kingdom was 
one of the fastest-growing economies in the world, with an eight percent average annual GDP 
growth, thanks mainly to its booming textile, tourism, and foreign investment sectors. As indicated 
in Table 3.5, between 2009 and 2018, Cambodia’s GDP grew more than twofold, from $10.40 
billion to $25.54 billion. In the meantime, GDP per capita rose substantially from $738.06 to 
$1,510.33. Cambodia aspires to become an upper-middle-income country by 2030 and a high-
income country by 2050.  
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Table 3.5  Cambodia’s GDP and ODA inflow, 2009-2019 (Source: World Development 
Indicators) 
Year 
GDP 
(current $ 
billion) 
GDP per 
capita 
(current $) 
Annual 
GDP 
growth (%) 
Net ODA 
received (current 
$ million) 
Net ODA received 
(% of government 
expense) 
2009 10.40 738.06 0.08 710.96 62.33 
2010 11.24 785.50 5.96 733.98 61.40 
2011 12.83 882.28 7.07 792.43 55.89 
2012 14.05 950.88 7.31 807.69 54.35 
2013 15.23 1,013.42 7.36 808.21 44.75 
2014 16.70 1,093.50 7.14 802.68 38.79 
2015 18.05 1,162.90 7.03 679.04 31.23 
2016 20.16 1,278.90 7.03 728.41 27.82 
2017 22.18 1,3885.46 7.01 842.93 26.59 
2018 25.54 1,510.33 7.50 N/A N/A 
2019 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
 
The main hurdle for the Cambodian economy goes beyond its lack of a highly skilled 
workforce and infrastructures. It also includes the weakness of public institutions and the 
narrowness of its export sectors, which has been concentrating mainly on the garment and footwear 
industries. According to Heng (2018b), to compete with its peers in the region, Cambodia needs 
to enhance the technical skills and the general education of its workforce and to diversify exported 
products to include goods that capture higher added value such as machinery, bicycles, sugar, and 
palm oil. Despite Cambodia’s consistently strong economic performance, the problem of poverty 
and income inequality remained; the number of people living under the national poverty line still 
stood at 13.5% in 2014, and 70% of the total population survived on less than $3 per day in 2018 
(Sim 2018; Sok 2018). Meanwhile, rural households made only 60% of the average income of 
urban families (Hansen and Gjonbalaj 2019). Another problem is that Cambodia remained an aid-
dependent state, receiving more than a quarter of its annual budget from aid by the end of 2017.  
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Economic growth is a double-edged sword for the incumbent CPP because higher income 
means that the population has broader and better access to information, smart devices, and the 
Internet, enabling them to air grievances and to demand accountability, political participation, and 
governmental reforms. The party no longer had tight control over the flow of information broadcast 
through mainstream outlets owned by its allies. Surging usage of social media and mobile phones 
is a case in point. In 2013 alone, 1,100 new Cambodian Facebook accounts were added daily with 
an average of one new registrant every two minutes (de Carteret 2013). Meanwhile, the total 
number of mobile phone subscribers stood at 20.2 million in 2014, and 96% and 48% of 
Cambodians had a mobile phone and a smartphone by December 2016, respectively (Ben 2014; 
Phong et al. 2016). The number of Internet-using citizens increased steeply from 320,190 in 2010 
to 1.68 million in 2011, 3.8 million in 2014, and 8.8 million in 2019, which is more than half of 
the country’s population (Ang 2019; Ben 2014). Also, some 89% of Khmer Facebook users are 35 
years old or younger, meaning millennials are the most digitally connected demographic.  
Social media enables Cambodian electorates to access sensitive news not broadcast through 
mainstream media such as cases of land grabbing, deforestation, human rights abuses, corruption, 
and other forms of social injustices perpetrated by public officials and the CPP elites. According 
to Phong et al. (2016), the Internet became the most vital source of information for the general 
public, surpassing both TV and radio in popularity in 2016. It also gave a platform to opposition 
leaders such as Sam Rainsy, who had not had fair access to the mainstream media, to reach out 
directly to their bases of support and to galvanize new supporters, especially those who had been 
economically, socially, or politically marginalized by the state. The CNRP’s mass mobilization of 
worker protests demanding higher wages and the party’s significant gains in the 2013 election are 
examples of how social media could level the playing field against the CPP. 
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 The CPP’s popularity has gradually shrunk among voters. One public opinion poll in 
November 2013 indicated that only 55% of Cambodian people believe that the country was on the 
right track, and they blamed corruption, environmental degradation, inflation, and land grabbing 
as the main culprits (IRI 2014). This poll reflected the CPP’s lowest approval rating since 2006. 
Between 2009 and 2017, the most prominent external threat to its power was the emergence of the 
CNRP. Campaigning on platforms of “rescuing” the country from Hun Sen’s authoritarianism, 
enabling higher wages, providing a universal basic income for seniors, pushing reforms, and 
mobilizing anti-corruption efforts, the CNRP tapped into simmering grievances among voters and 
won 55 seats, slashing the CPP’s control in the parliament from 90 to only 68 seats. 
Aside from its vigorous use of the Internet and social media, two additional factors 
contributed to the CNRP’s rise and the surging unpopularity of the CPP. First, controversial 
incidences of land grabbing against poor communities by the CPP oligarchs stirred contention 
among voters. For example, about 770,000 people were affected by various sorts of land disputes 
from 2000 to 2014 (Tang and Prak 2017). The most infamous case was the forced eviction of locals 
from the Boeung Kak lake in Phnom Penh. In 2007, the RGC granted 99-year development rights 
of the 133-hectare lake in central Phnom Penh to Shukaku Inc, a development conglomerate owned 
by CPP Senator Lao Meng Khin, at a “throwaway price” of $79 million, although the estimated 
market value of the lake, once developed, may have been as high as $1.3 billion or even more 
(Baliga and Khouth 2017; Strangio 2014). The eviction sparked demonstrations, imprisonments, 
and adverse reactions from the press, human rights groups, and several Western democracies.  
Second, changes in voter demography propelled millennial voters to become the essential 
constituents in the Cambodian elections. For instance, 3.5 million out of 9 million registered voters 
in the 2013 general election were between 18 and 30 years old (Ponniah 2013). More than 1.5 
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million of them were voting for the first time. The landslide victory in 2008 bolstered the CPP’s 
confidence and encouraged it to loosen its grip on critical news outlets such as The Phnom Penh 
Post and The Cambodia Daily as well as radio stations such as Voice of America (VOA), Radio 
Free Asia (RFA), Beehive Radio, and Voice of Democracy, all of which ran stories about cases of 
human rights abuses and corruption to a broad segment of Cambodia. After the 2013 election, 
nobody learned about what the weakening control over the media could mean for the ruling party 
better than the ruling party itself. 
Inside the CPP, Hun Sen’s position appeared more potent than ever after he took over the 
Party’s presidency in 2015 and began stacking its Central Committee with loyal allies (Mech 
2018a). However, the watershed moment in 2013 dealt a severe blow to the elite group’s 
confidence in him as his inner circle began searching for an exit plan from Cambodia in case of a 
leadership change (Baldwin and Marshall 2019). Hun Sen would likely pass the baton of leadership 
to his eldest son, Lieutenant General Hun Manet (Hutt 2019b). A West Point graduate with a 
doctorate in economics from the University of Bristol, Manet currently serves as deputy 
Commander-in-Chief of the RCAF, and as Commander of the army, and he sits on the CPP’s elite 
Permanent Committee. In recent years, he had taken on more active public roles by attending 
graduation ceremonies, inaugurating schools, visiting the CPP’s rural bases, and establishing 
contacts with foreign military officials. The main challenge in Manet’s succession would be to 
ensure that the elite elements within the CPP threw their support behind his candidacy if his father 
stepped down as prime minister for any reason in the future. 
Finally, Cambodian democracy has deteriorated in recent years. According to the Freedom 
House, the country consistently ranked as a “not free” country, having a 5.5 freedom rating from 
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2008 to 2019.20 Since 2013, the RGC has suppressed opposition parties, free press, civil society, 
and dissenters. For instance, the National Assembly passed a series of restrictive measures such as 
the Law on Associations and Non-Governmental Organization (LANGO), an amendment to 
Article 45 of the Law on Political Parties, and a new lese majeste provision into the penal code. 
 External Challenges 
First and foremost, Cambodia’s shared borders with Thailand, Vietnam, and Laos 
continued to pose serious threats to its security. In late 2008, as Deth (2014) aptly notes, Cambodia 
became a victim of Thailand’s internal power struggle. After the RGC enlisted the Preah Vihear 
temple as a UNESCO World Heritage Site, two Thai opposition parties – the Democratic Party 
and the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD) – stoked nationalist sentiment by pressuring 
Bangkok to take a harder stance against the claim. Following the ascent of Abhisit Vejjajiva as 
prime minister in Thailand, tension rose when Bangkok mobilized troops near Preah Vihear, 
prompting a similar response from Phnom Penh. Military tension accelerated, and there were 
sporadic armed clashes into 2011, killing more than a dozen Khmer and Thai soldiers. Tension 
eased only after the July 2011 election of Yingluck Shinawatra, sister of former Thai prime 
minister Thaksin Shinawatra who shares warm personal and political ties with Hun Sen. 
On its eastern borders, Cambodia saw its relations with Vietnam sour due to prolonged 
issues with the demarcation of lines of control over contested territory. Between 2013 and 2016, 
the RGC sent nearly two dozen diplomatic protest notes to Hanoi to complain about the latter’s 
illegal constructions of ponds, roads, and army outposts near contested “no-man zones” in Kandal, 
Rattanakiri, and Svay Rieng provinces (Kry and Chy 2017; Leng 2017). The issue of illegal 
 
20 The Freedom House ranks a country’s level of freedom between 1 (most free) and 7 (least free). 
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Vietnamese immigrants living in Cambodia is another thorny topic that had dogged Hun Sen for 
years. Since 2013, he began taking a stricter stance on Vietnamese immigrants by deporting 11,195 
between 2014 and August 2018 (Voun 2018). Likewise, disputed borders with Laos led to armed 
standoffs in 2017 and 2019. 
The second issue involved relations with ASEAN. As chairman of the ASEAN summit in 
2012, Cambodia was under unprecedented pressure from both China and fellow member states 
concerning the South China Sea dispute. The kingdom needed to preserve warm relations with the 
PRC, which was arguably the most prominent economic and political backer of the CPP. 
Cambodia also could not jeopardize its ties with ASEAN claimant states such as Vietnam, the 
Philippines, and Malaysia, for it would be harmful not only for its economy and its position in this 
regional bloc but also for its ties with the United States. 
Bilaterally speaking, deepening relations with China had created some negative effects in 
Cambodia. The rapid influx of investments and immigrants from China increased the number of 
criminal activities perpetrated by Chinese nationals. Between 2014 and 2019, the RGC has 
deported 2,700 alleged Chinese fugitives (Kann 2019). The most well-known example of the 
effects of Chinese money is in the coastal province of Sihanoukville, which has dramatically 
transformed from a beach town to a de facto Chinese colony and casino capital. Also, an influx of 
Chinese investments has stoked corruption, and inadequate inspection of Chinese-owned 
construction projects led to deadly collapses of buildings killing more than 60 workers and injuring 
dozens of others (Farrer 2019; Kijewski 2020). Moreover, Khmer-owned businesses in 
Sihanoukville were either bought out or forced to go bankrupt by deep-pocketed Chinese spenders 
who monopolized 90% of the commercial activities (Hin 2019b; Po and Heng 2019). To protect 
its interests, Beijing interfered in the 2018 Cambodian general election by orchestrating a cyber 
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espionage campaign against the Cambodian National Election Committee, the Ministry of Interior, 
diplomats, human rights activists, and opposition lawmakers (Seiff 2018). 
Cambodia’s growing economic dependence on China is another concern. As of June 2019, 
Cambodia’s public external debt21 stood at $7.27 billion or 21.3% of its total GDP (Cambodian 
Ministry of Economy and Finance 2019). Around 39.55% of this sum was owed to the PRC alone. 
Experts have warned about debt-trap diplomacy, wherein Beijing uses financial inducement as a 
tool to coerce indebted borrowers to lease strategic facilities such as a deep-water port or air hub 
in exchange for debt alleviation. Beijing’s no-strings-attached aid has exacerbated corruption and 
abuse of power among government officials, enabling the CPP to insulate itself from Western 
pressure and to become increasingly authoritarian. In addition to social repercussions, Cambodia’s 
global reputation has also suffered. Scholars have labeled Cambodia as China’s client state or as 
an extension of Chinese foreign policy, and its bid for non-permanent membership on the UN 
Security Council in 2012 fell short due to concerns about its dismal human rights records (Ciorciari 
2015; Hutt 2016). Cambodia came under global scrutiny following reports accusing it of allowing 
Chinese military outposts in Sihanoukville and Koh Kong (Cochrane 2020; Page et al. 2019). 
Correspondingly, Cambodia’s diplomatic relations with the United States has plummeted 
to its lowest point since the early 1990s. One of the causes is the lingering issue of the $500 million 
debt owed by Cambodia to the United States. The original loan of $276 million occurred under the 
military regime of General Lon Nol from 1970 to 1975 when Washington supplied Phnom Penh 
with agricultural aid to help its fight against the Khmer Rouge and Viet Cong. Despite the RGC’s 
multiple pleas for lower interest rates or a debt swap deal similar to the one made with Vietnam, 
 
21 The Cambodian Ministry of Economy and Finance (2019) defines public external debt as concessional loans 
provided to Cambodia by bilateral and multilateral external development partners. 
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the debt had accrued without settlement since the 1970s, leaving total interest to grow as high as 
the principal amount (Bower 2010). For Hun Sen, this debt is a blood-stained loan that reminds 
him of U.S. war legacies such as its aerial bombardment, which killed many people and played a 
role in the rise of the Khmer Rouge (Kiernan and Owen 2015). “They brought bombs and dropped 
them on Cambodia and [now] demand Cambodian people to pay,” Hun Sen once remarked 
(Chheang 2017a). 
Another disagreement involves the deportations of Cambodian nationals, who had fled the 
civil war in the 1970s when young age and had settled in the United States. They were convicted 
of various felony crimes. The RGC argued that these individuals had already served sentences in 
U.S. prisons and that it would be double punishment for them to be sent away permanently from 
their families in the United States to a country they barely know and whose language they do not 
even speak. Yet Washington has deported more than 700 Khmer refugees back to Cambodia since 
2002 (Dunst 2019c). In the first two years of the Trump administration, deportation increased by 
279%, and there were 1,855 more waiting to be deported to Cambodia by 2019 (Dunst 2019a). 
Following Cambodia’s refusal to continue this repatriation program, the U.S. government slapped 
limited visa sanctions on its foreign ministry officials (Boyle and Kann 2018). Finally, deepening 
ties with China and the deterioration of democracy and human rights contributed to more friction 
with the United States from 2009 to 2019. 
Finally, the intensifying strategic competition between the United States and China posed 
a great challenge to Cambodia’s foreign policy as a small state. Since Xi Jinping came to power 
in 2012, the PRC has adopted an assertive posture around the world with political and economic 
tentacles stretching across every region. One example is the establishment of the “One Belt, One 
Road” initiative, a massive infrastructure project aimed at constructing railways, pipelines, 
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highways, and canals connecting Asia, the Middle East, Europe, and Africa. This grand project 
poses geostrategic, geoeconomics, and geopolitical impediments on Washington’s global power 
(Cavanna 2019). According to Elizabeth Economy (2014, 2018), this is part of Xi’s plan to 
rejuvenate the Chinese state as the Middle Kingdom with world affairs revolving around its 
peripheries. The old days of Deng Xiaoping’s “hide your strength, bide your time” are long past 
because Xi’s China has opted for an “activist” foreign policy to try to shape the world to its liking 
(Harshaw 2018). The emergence of a globally assertive China has collided with the United States’ 
“pivot” to Asia and FOIP. The tension between the two powers has slowly morphed into a 
geopolitical contest that concerns small Asian states, pushing them to hedge their bets. As each 
side had taken more aggressive steps to try to offset the other’s influence, the stakes were even 
higher for Cambodia, which is a small and weak state. The CPP government has to carefully weigh 
between the costs and benefits attached to ties with each power and balance them against internal 
and external pressure facing its external security and domestic legitimacy. 
 3.2.1 Chinese-Cambodian Relations: A De Facto Diplomatic Ally? 
 Political Ties 
 From 2009 to 2019, Cambodia continued its limited bandwagoning with China in 
exchange for strengthened political ties. One of the most symbolic accommodations was its 
deportation of 20 Uighur asylum seekers in December 2009. As a signatory to the 1951 UN 
Refugee Convention, Cambodia was supposed to assess their cases and prevent any repatriations 
that would expose them to persecution by their country of origin. Pressured by Beijing, Phnom 
Penh caved in and repatriated 20 Uighurs to the PRC despite interventions by UN and U.S. officials 
(Strangio 2014). Their removals took place ahead of Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping’s planned 
official state visit the following day. In another example, when critics claimed that constructions 
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of Chinese dams in the Mekong River basin would suppress water level and disrupt fishery ecology 
for adjacent countries such as Thailand, Vietnam, and Cambodia itself, the RGC downplayed these 
fears and instructed its officials to avoid complaining about China’s activities in regional forums 
(Ciorciari 2015). In 2010, during Chinese President Hu Jintao’s visit to the kingdom, the two 
countries upgraded their bilateral ties to a “Comprehensive Strategic Partnership of Cooperation,” 
which is the highest form of diplomatic relations Cambodia accords to a foreign country (Thayer 
2013a). There were several other agreements aimed at enhancing cooperation in finance, 
investment, communication, energy security, and shared interests in multilateral forums. 
Nothing demonstrated Cambodia’s limited bandwagoning with China better than the 
position it took during the ASEAN summit in 2012. As chairman, it blocked fellow member states 
who are claimants in the South China Sea dispute – the Philippines and Vietnam – from pushing 
for a unified message directing at China’s violation of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS). Citing “lack of consensus” and provocative language as justifications, it torpedoed 
Manila’s and Hanoi’s proposals and reportedly leaked the draft statements to Beijing (Ciorciari 
2015).22 As a result, the summit ended without a joint communiqué for the first time in ASEAN’s 
45-year history. Later that year, Cambodia doubled down on its support for China by deliberately 
claiming that ASEAN had agreed not to internationalize the South China Sea issue, although the 
Philippines said otherwise. The debacle invited sharp criticisms accusing the RGC of doing 
Beijing’s bidding or serving as a spoiler.  
Two factors explain Cambodia’s deference to China during the summit. First, the next 
general election would be held in July 2013, and it would be the most contested vote to date 
 
22 Vietnam and the Philippines lobbied to include a statement mentioning the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and 
tension with China at the Scarborough Shoal into ASEAN’s joint communiqué, respectively. 
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because the main opposition CNRP was surging significantly among urban voters. Since any 
restriction on democracy at home would certainly invite Western condemnation, the CPP needed 
Beijing’s backing in the international arena to legitimize the electoral process and to rally its 
winning coalition and give then more peace of mind. Another reason for Cambodia’s 
accommodation is that the Chinese consider the South China Sea as a core interest, and the summit 
was an opportunity for Cambodia to repay Chinese assistance lavished on it over the past decade 
and to secure future support from the PRC. 
The general election on July 28, 2013, was a watershed moment because the CPP faced its 
most formidable opponent since FUNCINPEC. As dusk was settling over Phnom Penh, 
preliminary results came showing that the CPP had lost 22 seats – down from 90 in 2008 to only 
68. Meanwhile, the CNRP had captured 55 seats. The CPP’s poor performance was a clear sign of 
its declining popularity. As Strangio (2014) puts it, the ruling party’s formula of posing as having 
brought “liberation” from the Khmer Rouge genocide and as bringing internal stability along with 
economic development had gradually lost its appeal with post-civil war millennials. The result was 
a red line for the CPP’s tolerance for opposition. It became clear that a competitive election bore 
the imminent risk, threatening the CPP’s power and that of its winning coalition. Therefore, 
tightening its grip on democracy was the only way to safeguard the status quo, and that was what 
the CPP would do over the next five years.  
Although the CPP retained enough seats to form a new government unilaterally, the 
outcomes testified to its declining popularity. Despite this poor performance, China stood behind 
the CPP by endorsing the results of the election and signaling that it would continue to help 
Cambodia block “foreign disturbance” (Kung 2014). Behind the public face, as Ciorciari (2014) 
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explains, both the CPP and the CCP began reevaluating their ties because the aftermath of the 
election aftermath triggered political gridlock due to boycotts by CNRP legislators. 
From 2014 to the end of 2019, Cambodia’s political relations with China deepened further 
as Cambodia continued to bandwagon with China’s position in the South China Sea and toward 
Taiwan. For instance, the RGC repeatedly rejected to Taiwanese requests to establish a consulate 
on its territory and went so far as to deport accused Taiwanese nationals to the PRC instead of 
Taiwan to reiterate its unshakable commitment to the “One China” policy (Aspinwall 2018; Khuon 
2019b). Given Taiwan’s considerable influence in Cambodia’s garment and other trade-related 
sectors, this was a significant risk (Hutt 2019c). When Vietnam and the Philippines advocated that 
the South China Sea dispute should be negotiated multilaterally between ASEAN claimants and 
China, Cambodia mimicked Beijing’s talking point, saying that ASEAN is not a court and that the 
issue should be resolved bilaterally (O’Neill 2018). When the Permanent Court of Arbitration ruled 
in favor of the Philippines in July 2016, Cambodia backed China’s rejection of that ruling, 
declaring that the decision was “the worst political collusion in the framework of international 
politics” (China Daily 2016). In that very same year, Cambodia blocked an attempt to include the 
PCA ruling into the ASEAN communiqué during a summit in Laos (Mogato et al. 2016). During 
his meeting with U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, Hun Sen warned against the 
internationalization of the South China Sea, arguing that the world “should not take gasoline to 
douse on fire” (O’Neill 2018). Moreover, the RGC supported all “necessary measures” taken by 
the Beijing government in response to the pro-democracy protest in Hong Kong (MFAIC 2019).  
The intensity of government suppression of democracy during the 2018 election season 
shed light on the CPP’s grave concern about the stability of its rule, although political intimidation 
had been part of Cambodia’s electoral dynamics since the civil war ended in the early 1990s. Its 
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near-loss performance five years earlier had put the party on severe alert about a possible defeat. 
If the CNRP was allowed to compete openly in the polling again, there was a chance that the CPP 
might lose the election. To protect the status quo, something had to be done to marginalize the 
leading opposition group and its supporters politically.  
In 2015, the Phnom Penh Municipal Court issued an arrest warrant for CNRP President 
Sam Rainsy on a defamation charge, even though the same charge had been brought against him 
by Deputy Prime Minister Hor Namhong since 2008. To avoid the arrest, Rainsy fled into exile 
once again, leaving the CNRP and its new leader, Kem Sokha, in disarray. In that same year, the 
CPP-controlled National Assembly passed LANGO to allow tighter government control on civil 
society groups and NGOs. The law also empowered the state to shut down any organizations 
deemed as jeopardizing national security and any foreign entities that fail to register at the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation. 
The last straws came in late 2017 when the RGC expelled the National Democratic Institute 
(NDI), citing its violation of LANGO (Kann 2017). Then, two local radio stations that sold airtimes 
to RFA and VOA had their licenses revoked. The U.S. government funds NDI, RFA, and VOA. 
Next, in the early hours of September 3, CNRP President Kem Sokha was arrested in a midnight 
raid and charged with attempting to set up a “color revolution” against the incumbent government. 
One day later, The Cambodia Daily, one of the two hard-hit English newspapers, was shut down 
due to its inability to pay an unanticipated $6.3 million tax bill (Westerman 2017). In mid-
November, the Supreme Court-dissolved the CNRP and banned its 118 members from politics for 
five years based on an accusation that they colluded with the United States to try to topple Hun 
Sen. While the international community was still chanting the “death of democracy in Cambodia,” 
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the election on July 28, 2018, handed all 125 parliamentary seats to the CPP. Cambodia 
transformed into a “closed autocracy” (Levitsky and Way 2020). 
Compared to what happened during previous election cycles, the vote in 2018 was a more 
challenging litmus test for Sino-Cambodian ties. The message was clear. The CPP had to win to 
retain the status quo, whereas Beijing needed the CPP to win to secure its economic and political 
interests. Even so, Cambodia now needed China much more than ever before because the 
dissolution of the CNRP prompted the United States and the EU to impose punitive economic and 
political sanctions. At the same time that the Western community sharply criticized the grave 
damage done to democracy, China stood firmly behind Cambodia, suggesting that the 2018 
election will be “fair,” although no credible opposition was permitted to compete openly against 
the CPP (Martina 2018). When Western democracies withdrew their support for the electoral 
process, China provided $20 million worth of polling booths, laptops, and essentials stationery to 
Cambodia’s National Election Commission (NEC) (Chandran 2018). Beside logistical assistance, 
according to one Reuters report, the Chinese ambassador to Cambodia, Xiong Bo, took a bold step 
by participating in a CPP rally, leading one regional expert to argue that 2013 had been “unsettling” 
for China and that Beijing sought “stability” this time around (Allard and Prak 2018). When the 
United States and the EU refused to send their electoral observers, China and other autocratic 
regimes such as Singapore, Myanmar, Vietnam, Russia dispatched what Morgenbesser (2019) 
calls “zombie” monitors to justify the flawed election that the CPP ran essentially uncontested. 
After the election, the RGC continued to bandwagon with China, but the degree of its 
accommodation became even stronger than before, as Cambodia’s relations with the United States 
plummeted to the lowest point in recent memory. For instance, Cambodian leaders, including King 
Norodom Sihamoni, expressed support for the “One Belt, One Road” Initiative (Hul 2019). 
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Cambodia is also a founding member of the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank 
(AIIB), which was founded in December 2015. AIIB has raised questions among some analysts as 
to whether it is part of China’s global strategy to compete with the U.S.-dominated World Bank 
and the Japanese-led Asian Development Bank (Runde et al. 2015; Weiss 2017). In addition, 
Cambodia openly welcomed a massive influx of Chinese investments. As explained earlier, the 
best example of how Chinese money impacted Cambodia is the case of Sihanoukville province. 
Before capital began to flow in from the Chinese mainland, Sihanoukville had been packed with 
Western backpackers and local tourists. It had a population of 150,000. That began to change in 
the early 2010s. According to Po and Heng (2019), PRC-backed companies invested $1 billion of 
capital every year from 2013 to 2017, most of it concentrated in the casino, real estate, and 
entertainment sectors. Between 2016 and 2017, investments almost doubled from $3.6 billion to 
$6.3 billion, as the number of casinos skyrocketed to over 100 establishments, leading the media 
to dub Sihanoukville as “Macau 2.”  
During the 2017-2018 period, the number of new Chinese arrivals in Sihanoukville doubled 
from 100,000 to 210,000, outnumbering the local population who came to feel like strangers in 
their lands (Soth 2018). As the influx of cash and workers accelerated, so did corruption, money 
laundering, prostitution, online fraud, homicide, violent assault, and kidnapping perpetrated by 
Chinese nationals (Ellis-Petersen 2018; Khidhir 2019; Nachemson and Kong 2019; Taing 2018). 
Between 2011 and 2017, Cambodia deported 1,133 Chinese hackers for telecommunication frauds 
(Taing 2018). Chinese companies were also involved in land grabbing cases affecting 20,000 
families in Sihanoukville (Hul 2018a). Meanwhile, reckless usage of the Khmer language seen in 
billboards of Chinese-run businesses stirred contention among locals. As negative impacts of 
Chinese investments began to surface in the local and international press, Hun Sen hit back at those 
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who criticized these adverse effects, citing contributions made to the national economy and calling 
critics “racist” and “jealous” of China (Ben 2019; Neou and Kann 2018). 
The pieces of evidence discussed above further reinforces the hypothesis that the 2013 and 
2018 general elections in Cambodia did not cause its political relations with China to fluctuate. In 
contrast, diplomatic ties matured and expanded in scope and intensity over time because the 
kingdom implemented limited bandwagoning with the PRC’s core interests, such as the Taiwan 
issue and the South China Sea dispute. The RGC also welcomed an influx of Chinese investment 
and immigrants, regardless of some negative impacts made on the local population. For its part, 
China continued to back the ruling CPP internationally, even though the latter had its worst 
electoral performance in 2013. Despite a heavy crackdown on the CNRP, following the 2013 
election, China stood behind the CPP to protect its interests. Due to the mutually beneficial nature 
of their ties, Sino-Cambodia political relations experienced only maturity and stability through the 
2013 and 2018 elections, which are clear evidence supporting the central argument of this thesis. 
 Economic Ties 
Similar to what happened in the political realm, economic relations strengthened as China 
became the biggest aid donor and investor in Cambodia despite political uncertainties and tension 
created by the 2013 and 2018 elections. After the RGC deported 20 Uighur asylum seekers in 
December 2009, China announced $1.2 billion in grants and loans, including 14 separate bilateral 
agreements (Thayer 2012). That same year, China became the biggest donor to the World Bank-
led multilateral fund for Cambodian reconstruction with a total pledge of $257 million, surpassing 
the United States, the EU, and Japan (Heng 2012). When Chinese President Hu Jintao visited 
Cambodia in 2012, he offered $70 million and $430 million in aid and loans, respectively. After 
96 
Cambodia blocked statements made by the Philippines and Vietnam on the South China Sea at the 
2012 ASEAN summit, Beijing stepped in with $500 million in soft loans and grants (Prak 2012).  
In 2013, Hun Sen came back from Beijing with $548 million of infrastructure grants. Three 
years later, Chinese President Xi Jinping announced $237 million in soft loans and canceled $89 
million of debt (Lin 2018; Prak 2013b). Following Cambodia’s support for its rejection of the 
ruling by the PCA in July 2016, the PRC gave $600 million in aid and sponsored the construction 
of a 12-story administrative building for the Cambodian National Assembly (Hunt 2016). Between 
1996 and 2016, China had channeled about $15 billion in aid to Cambodia, and by 2017, according 
to Heng (2018a), it had sponsored the construction of 2,000 kilometers of roads and seven bridges. 
From 2018 to 2019, the two countries sealed 19 aid and investment agreements within a $588 
million aid package for the 2019-2021 period (Prak 2018; Prak 2019b). It is hard to deny that the 
People’s Republic was more generous to Cambodia than the United States when it came to bilateral 
aid. Moreover, China’s assistance did not place strict conditions concerning human rights and 
democracy. This financial support played a fundamental role in bolstering the CPP’s ability to 
develop infrastructures in rural regions where its core constituents live. In return, as noted earlier, 
China expected to see the recipient state accommodating the “One China” policy and its other 
positions around the world. 
By the end of 2011, Chinese investment in Cambodia amounted to $8.9 billion and spread 
across 317 projects (Thayer 2012). Since 1994, China had poured in $12.6 billion in investment, 
and it became the largest FDI source with accumulated funds of $5.3 billion or about $1 billion 
annually from 2013 to 2017 (Hin 2019a; Nachemson 2019a). The annual inflow of Chinese FDI 
reached $3.59 billion at the end of 2018 and concentrated in sectors such as real estate 
development, textiles, infrastructure, mining, and agriculture. In the energy sector alone, China 
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was the biggest investor with a capital of $11.5 billion invested in seven large-scale hydropower 
and coal-fired powerplant, which have severe effects on the environment, protected lands and 
animals, and local Khmer communities (Chheang 2017b; Heng 2018a). Meanwhile, the two-way 
trade grew substantially. While Cambodian exports to China increased from $16.33 million in 
2009 to almost 1 billion in 2018, Chinese imports spiked by nearly eightfold from $881 million to 
$6.7 billion in 2018. Similar to the 1999-2008 period, Cambodia continued to deal with a growing 
trade deficit with China, which rose from $864.95 million in 2009 to $5.77 billion in 2018. 
 
Table 3.6  Cambodia’s Trade with China, 2009-2019 [Source: International Monetary 
Fund’s Direction of Trade Statistics (data.imf.org)] 
Year 
Exports to (mainland) 
China ($ million) 
Imports from (mainland) 
China ($ million) 
Trade Balance  
($ million) 
2009 16.33 881.28 -864.95 
2010 65.02 1,184.71 -1,119.69 
2011 154.54 1,738.30 -1,583.76 
2012 182.88 2,161.72 -1,978.84 
2013 280.38 3,002.46 -2,722.08 
2014 356.60 3,710.09 -3,353.49 
2015 405.52 3,926.20 -3,520.68 
2016 609.28 4,550.95 -3,941.67 
2017 745.35 5,4949.86 -4,749.51 
2018 982.99 6,761.45 -5,778.46 
2019 N/A N/A N/A 
 
Tourism is another area dominated by China. For instance, among 6.2 million foreign 
tourists visiting Cambodia in 2018, two million were Chinese (Sorn 2019). In the first ten months 
of 2019 alone, 2.03 million people from the PRC visited the kingdom, indicating a 24.4% year-
on-year increase (Lipes 2019). According to one estimate, Chinese travelers brought about $700 
million to the Cambodian economy in 2017 (Heng 2018a). The rising number of visitors from the 
PRC, however, does not always translate into more income for the local population because many 
visitors spend their money at places run by their fellow Chinese people. As the head of one 
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Cambodian tourism association said, “They eat meals at Chinese restaurants then go to shop at 
Chinese stores. Tourists from Western countries, on the other hand, always take taxis and buy 
things at Khmer markets” (Lipes 2019). This trend also occurs in Laos and Myanmar, where 
Chinese tourists are known as “Zero Dollar Tours.” 
 Cambodia’s economic relations with China from 2009 to 2019 expanded significantly 
through bilateral trade, aid, investment, and tourism. Though the kingdom had a $5.77 billion trade 
deficit with China in 2018, its exports to the PRC grew exponentially from $16.33 million in 2009 
to $982.99 million in 2018. That number, however, was minimal compared to how much products 
Cambodia sold to the United States over the same period. China was also the most significant 
donor and foreign investor in Cambodia, whose portfolio outnumbered other players such as Japan, 
the United States, and the EU. The high-stakes elections in 2013 and 2018 did not alter Cambodia’s 
persistent implementation of economic pragmatism in its hedging toward China, because the CPP 
needed to create jobs for ordinary citizens, produce rents for the elites, develop infrastructures, 
maintain social stability, and bolster economic growth in order to keep people satisfied.  
 Military Ties 
Throughout the 2010s, Cambodia continued to implement indirect balancing toward China 
to continue modernizing and strengthening the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces. This policy 
served four purposes. First, it improved the defensive and offensive capabilities of the RCAF in 
response to traditional threats posed by neighboring Thailand, Vietnam, and Laos. Second, it was 
an indirect response to regional arms acquisitions made by fellow ASEAN states and growing 
geopolitical uncertainty created by the collision between the United States’ “pivot” to Asia and the 
FOIP and the rise of China’s military power. Third, indirect balancing with toward supplemented 
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modest defense assistance provided by Washington. Last, it improved the RGC’s ability to 
maintain domestic order, stability, and security.  
As of 2019, China was the most significant donor and supplier of military assistance to 
Cambodia. In December 2009, when Washington suspended the delivery of 200 military trucks to 
punish Phnom Penh for deporting 20 Uighur asylum seekers, Beijing stepped in with 257 trucks, 
50,000 military uniforms, 1,000 handguns, and 50,000 bullets for its national police (Kung 2014). 
One year later, the PRC offered a loan of $195 million for purchases of 12 Harbin Z-9 helicopters 
and training for two dozen pilots and mechanics (Thayer 2013b). Between 2012 and 2013, the 
Cambodian and Chinese defense ministries inked military deals totaling $17 million. The 
agreements allowed China to train RCAF uniformed members, construct a Combined Arms 
Officer School and medical facilities, and provide additional training and equipment. In 2015, the 
PRC made a significant donation of heavy weaponry, including jeeps, rocket launchers, anti-
aircraft guns, and spare parts (Aun 2015). Before and after the 2018 general election, it pledged a 
total of $184 million to the RCAF’s modernization program (Elmer 2018; Khuon 2019a). In July 
2019, Cambodia announced the purchase of $40 million of Chinese-made arms to replace old 
inventory and to bolster its army (Prak 2019a). Since 2009, about 200 RCAF cadets have been 
admitted to a four-year military education in Cambodia, which is overseen by Chinese military 
experts (Belford and Prak 2015). The program includes a six-month mandatory training in China. 
Another area of growing cooperation had to do with a joint military exercise. In December 
2016, the PLA and the RCAF conducted their first joint drill in Kampong Speu, which involved 
nearly 500 soldiers and 100 tanks and armored personnel carriers (Aun 2018). Since then, the 
“Golden Dragon” exercise has been conducted annually with a growing number of troops and 
weaponry involved. Its primary purposes included training for counterterrorism, peacekeeping 
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operation, humanitarian assistance, emergency engineering, and live combat action 
(Parameswaran 2020). Bilateral defense cooperation also extended to maritime security. For 
instance, the Royal Cambodian Navy conducted its first exercise with its Chinese counterpart in 
2016 and entered into a negotiation to purchase two warships equipped with sophisticated missile 
systems (Khuon and Ford 2016). Cambodia’s intention to upgrade its modest naval fleet has a 
connection not only with the tension in the South China Sea but also with the growing maritime 
capabilities of neighboring states, which have beefed up their fleets in recent years. While the 
United States continued to place strict conditions on military ties, Cambodia looked to China, 
among other countries, as an alternative supplier and partner.  
 Defense relationships strengthened at the highest level of government as well. In May 
2010, General Pol Saroeun, Commander-in-Chief of the RCAF, met with General Chen Bingde, 
Chief of the General Staff of the PLA, to discuss military aid and human resource development 
for the RCAF. Four months later, Cambodian Defense Minister General Tea Banh agreed to boost 
high-level communications and to expand the scope of security cooperation with his counterpart. 
After the two countries raised their ties to “Comprehensive Strategic Partnership of Cooperation” 
in 2010, defense ties deepened further following the signing of a bilateral treaty to enhance 
cooperation to deal with illegal immigration, transnational crime, counterterrorism, arms 
proliferation, and human trafficking. Following border tension with Vietnam in 2015, General 
Banh led a top-ranking delegation consisting of 23 leaders of the RCAF for a five-day visit to 
China to seek more military assistance (Neou 2015). 
 Cambodia’s deepening defense ties with China extended beyond conventional activities 
such as joint exercise, policy coordination, and exchange visits. The kingdom had granted 
development rights to Chinese-backed firms along with its coastal areas that have strategic and 
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military implications. For instance, in 2008, it approved a 99-year lease over a piece of land in 
Koh Kong province stretching over more than 45,000-hectare to a Chinese firm called the Union 
Development Group (UDG). Dubbed as “Dara Sakor,” the UDG worked to develop the $3.8 billion 
project, which stretches over 20% of Cambodia’s total coastline, and, according to UDG, the aim 
is to build an entertainment resort with an airport that can accommodate up to 10 million 
passengers annually (Celera 2019). Skeptics had begun questioning whether Dara Sakor was a 
dual-use civilian-military project that might become a Chinese military base, even though the UDG 
claimed the project would serve only commercial purposes (Puy 2019). Satellite image, however, 
shows that the firm built a 3.4-kilometer runway similar to the one constructed on the Spratly 
Islands, making it longer than the average length generally recommended by the U.S. Federal 
Aviation Administration for civilian aircraft such as the Boeing 747 and the Airbus A380.  
According to Charles Edel (2019), when completed, the airstrip will be able to 
accommodate Chinese reconnaissance, bomber, and fighter aircraft and thus will allow Beijing to 
project power over adjacent waters next to Thailand and Vietnam and across the South China Sea 
through a “triangular perimeter” connecting its bases in the Spratly and Paracel Islands to Koh 
Kong. Speculations about Dara Sakor are not without merit because Cambodia had lately become 
more indebted to China. By June 2019, 39.55% of Cambodia’s $7.27 billion public external 
borrowings were owed to the PRC (Cambodian Ministry of Economy and Finance 2019). What 
makes the project appear even more suspicious is that it is in a mostly remote jungle area that 
makes an unlikely tourist destination. Furthermore, it has been visited by senior officials from the 
Chinese Communist Party and the PLA (Cochrane 2020; Nachemson 2019b).  
 In mid-2019, another allegation emerged in Sihanoukville. Citing unnamed U.S. and allied 
sources, the Wall Street Journal reported on July 22 that Cambodia had signed a secret agreement 
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allowing China to use its Ream Naval Base for 30 years with automatic renewal every ten years 
after the end of the first period of agreement (Page et al. 2019). The claim was later backed up by 
U.S. Army Brigadier General Joel B. Vowell, Deputy Director for Strategic Planning and Policy 
of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, who said that construction of the Chinese outpost would begin 
in 2020 (Neou 2019). Speculation about China’s activities at Ream caught the attention of U.S. 
officials after Cambodia at first requested U.S. assistance to upgrade the base in 2017 but then 
backtracked it two years later, prompting the Pentagon to seek a fuller explanation.  
Following the Wall Street Journal’s report, the RGC prepared a choreographed visit to 
Ream for journalists trying to convince them that there was no such thing as a Chinese base in 
Cambodia, while Hun Sen called the allegation “the worst fake news” made up against his country 
(Tum 2019). Although Cambodia’s 1993 constitution prohibits foreign military bases in 
Cambodian soil, doubt still looms large over the RGC’s denial because the ruling CPP currently 
controls all 125 seats in the National Assembly, making it more than possible to amend the 
constitution to accommodate the presence of the Chinese military, if necessary. If true, military 
outposts in Ream and Dara Sakor would add additional sticking points for U.S.-Cambodia 
relations. They may also antagonize fellow ASEAN members, who are increasingly worried about 
Chinese assertiveness in Asia. 
 Overall, we see evidence of Cambodia’s indirect balancing toward China, in which it 
forged closer ties with the Chinese PLA through joint bilateral exercises, high-level visits between 
defense officials, and coordination on shared security interests. The PRC was the principal supplier 
and donor of military equipment to the RCAF, whose abilities and inventory remained relatively 
behind its neighbors in the region. As a small state with restrained economic resources, Cambodia 
benefited immensely from its non-alliance relations with China, because they empowered the 
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RCAF, supplemented logistical and operational assistance received from the United States, 
enabled the country to diversify its defense partnership and to avoid overt alignment with any one 
power. As the hypothesis argues, the 2013 and 2018 elections did not force Cambodia’s indirect 
balancing toward China to fluctuate. 
 3.2.2 United States-Cambodian Relations: Tumultuous Years 
 Political Ties 
Much as in 1999-2008, the status of U.S.-Cambodian political relations in the second 
decade of the 21st century can be categorized as strategically misaligned and plagued with a deficit 
in trust due to persistent issues of human rights and democracy (Cheunboran 2015; Deth et al. 
2017). Bilateral cooperation stabilized and expanded in some practical areas of mutual interest, 
but disagreements on Cambodian domestic politics continued to deter deeper strategic 
engagement. Things started on a positive note when the first female U.S. Ambassador to 
Cambodia, Carol A. Rodley, began her tenure on January 20, 2009. The general election had been 
held the year prior, and the CPP’s power became more potent than ever before, with overwhelming 
control of 90 out of a total of 123 seats in the National Assembly. The 2008 election dealt a severe 
blow to the opposition SRP. The GDP growth stood at nearly 7%, and income was rising steadily. 
People got to enjoy prolonged peace and stability for the first time after two decades of internal 
strife. The border clash with Thailand proved timely, coming not long before the July vote and 
moving many to rally behind Hun Sen as he responded to Thailand’s provocation. Seeing that his 
platform was losing appeal, SRP leader Sam Rainsy reverted to his chauvinistic tactics of attacking 
the premier’s past relations with Vietnam.  
In October 2009, Rainsy stormed down to the southern border in Svay Rieng province, 
where he pulled out half a dozen wooden demarcation poles along the Vietnamese borders and 
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then produced a false map to accuse the government of losing territory to Hanoi (Strangio 2014). 
He was slapped with an 11-year jail sentence and forced into self-imposed exile again. The 
relationship between the United States and Cambodia hit another speedbump after the latter 
deported 20 Uighur asylum seekers to China. In response, U.S. lawmakers introduced the 
Cambodia Trade Act of 2010 (H.R. 5320) in November 2010, prohibiting the forgiveness of the 
Lon Nol-era war debt on which massive interest had accumulated without settlement since the 
1970s (Thayer 2012). During her first visit to Phnom Penh that same month, U.S. Secretary of 
State Hillary Clinton warned Cambodia that “you don’t want to get too dependent on any one 
country,” specifically targeting China (U.S. Department of State 2010).  
To keep a balance between the United States and China, Cambodia, therefore, participated 
in the Lower Mekong Initiative (LMI), which eventually became a regional competitor to the 
China-led Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (LMC) grouping. Founded in 2009, LMI was part of 
President Barack Obama’s “pivot” to Asia aimed at leveling the playing field against China’s 
presence in the Lower Mekong Subregion. In 2010, the United States committed $178 million to 
LMI’s funding, enabling it to address issues such as food security and water resources management 
in this particular part of Southeast Asia (Thayer 2012).  
From 2010 to early 2012, bilateral relations were mostly stable because Cambodia adopted 
limited bandwagoning with the United States by joining the LMI, maintaining internal stability, 
improving education and public health, loosening its grip on critics, and adopting piecemeal 
reforms. It was in late 2012 that ties began to deteriorate. There was evidence of Cambodia’s 
distancing itself politically from the U.S. as it began to suppress domestic oppositions. During a 
meeting with Cambodian Foreign Minister Hor Namhong in Washington D.C in June 2012, 
Secretary Clinton pressed for the releases of 13 residents of Boeung Kak lake who had been 
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arrested the month before for protesting their forced eviction by a development firm of CPP 
Senator Lao Meng Khin (Worrell and Khout 2012).  
On November 19, 2012, U.S. President Barack Obama flew to Cambodia from Myanmar 
to attend the U.S.-ASEAN Summit and the East Asia Summit, marking the first visit by a sitting 
U.S. leader. Dogged by concerns among human rights advocates, Obama had a brief and “tense” 
meeting with Hun Sen, in which he pressed hard on issues of human rights, releases of political 
prisoners, and a free and fair election (Spetalnick 2012). Even though the meeting was tense and 
ended without a joint press conference, Obama’s trip was arguably a big boost for the CPP’s 
legitimacy, because it showed that after more than 20 years under its leadership, Cambodia had 
made commendable progress in domestic and foreign policy and that it had earned recognition 
from various world leaders. Besides President Barack Obama, there were visits by several other 
prominent U.S. figures to Cambodia, such as Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta in 2012, then-
House Democratic Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi, and First Lady Michelle Obama in 2015, and 
Secretary of State John Kerry in 2016. 
Two contentious issues strained U.S.-Cambodian relations before the 2013 election. The 
first one was the expulsions of 27 opposition legislators from the National Assembly, whereas the 
second involved CNRP’s exiled president Sam Rainsy, who had been disqualified from running 
for office by the NEC in late 2012. Pressured by the United States and the international community, 
Hun Sen, nine days before the election, paved the way for Rainsy’s pardon by the Cambodian king 
and allowed him to return home. For a brief period, the prospect of a democratic Cambodia did 
not look as bleak as some had argued it was. The reason was that the CPP had once again loosened 
its grip on democracy and allowed for a competitive election. Rainsy’s return fueled excitement in 
the opposition movement, as hundreds of thousands of factory workers, monks, labor unions, 
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students, urban voters, and marginalized groups who had been affected by corruption, land 
grabbing, and abuse of power by the ruling elites rallied behind the CNRP. The ruling party itself 
was concerned about a possible loss of control. However, it remained confident in its ability to win 
the hearts and minds of rural votes, where its entrenched patronage machines had long dominated 
local bureaucracies from village and commune to district and provincial levels since the 1990s. 
Whatever it was that the CPP expected, the actual outcomes of the election were not one of them. 
In July 2013, the ruling CPP lost 22 seats in the National Assembly, having its portfolio 
slashed from 90 in 2008 to only 68. Meanwhile, the freshly minted CNRP captured 55 seats. This 
election had three implications for Cambodia and its foreign policy. First, it triggered another 
parliamentary logjam and posed a grave challenge to the CPP’s domestic hegemony. For example, 
during the opening session of the 5th legislature, 55 elected CNRP legislators boycotted the 
ceremony to embarrass and delegitimize the ruling party (Prak 2013a). After one year of rhetoric, 
boycotts, and contentious negotiations, the two parties reached a power-sharing agreement in July 
2014 that included three compromises. One, Sam Rainsy, who had not been disqualified from 
running for political office since 2012, would be able to take a seat in the Assembly. Two, CNRP 
deputy Kem Sokha would become the first Vice President of the parliament. Three, chairmanships 
of parliamentary commissions and the NEC would be equally shared between the CPP and the 
CNRP. The second implication of the deal was that the post-election impasse sparked nationwide 
protest against the CPP as thousands of people took to the streets to demand Hun Sen’s resignation.  
Third and more importantly, although the United States recognized the electoral result and 
applauded Cambodia for administering a more competitive vote, the election kick-started the 
beginning of a downward spiral in diplomatic relations between the two countries that persisted 
over the next six years. For the ruling party, the CNRP’s stunning success would not have been 
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possible without a fifth column working behind the curtain to undermine its power. Due to its 
connections with Sam Rainsy, Kem Sokha, and local NGOs, no foreign country fit better as a 
scapegoat than the United States. As a result, Cambodia’s limited bandwagoning with the U.S. had 
to be dialed back until after the political elimination of the CNRP. 
In July 2015, the RGC began to systematically clampdown on the oppositions by passing 
LANGO. Then, in October, two CNRP parliamentarians were dragged out of their cars and 
severely beaten by protestors next to the National Assembly building. The subsequent 
investigation implicated three members of Hun Sen’s elite bodyguard unit who were jailed for 
only one year before they were freed and promoted to the ranks of general and colonel (Ith 2017; 
Turton and Mech 2016). One month later, Kem Sokha was voted out as the first Vice President of 
the Assembly, while Sam Rainsy was hit with multiple lawsuits, had his parliamentary immunity 
revoked, and was forced into exile for the third time since 2008.23 Between late 2015 and 2017, 
about 25 CNRP senators, lawmakers, and supporters were either imprisoned or forced to flee the 
country (LICADHO 2016; Lum 2018). Tension escalated after the RGC expelled the National 
Democratic Institute in September 2017. In connection with NDI, on September 2, CNRP 
President Kem Sokha was arrested for the “color revolution” attempt, accused of treason, and 
jailed without trial for over a year. The RGC then closed more than a dozen local radio stations 
and newspaper outlets, including Voice of America, Radio Free Asia, and The Cambodia Daily.  
 In response, U.S. Ambassador William A. Heidt rejected the allegations that his 
government was colluding with CNRP, calling them “baseless” and “classic red herrings” (U.S. 
Embassy in Cambodia 2017). By mid-November, the Supreme Court dissolved the CNRP. The 
tension grew worse when Cambodia suspended its cooperation in the 2002 deal that ensures the 
 
23 In February 2017, Sam Rainsy resigned as CNRP President and left the position to Kem Sokha. 
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repatriation of Khmer refugees. In retaliation, Washington imposed visa sanctions on Cambodia’s 
foreign ministry officials and listed it as a “recalcitrant” country that impeded the United States’ 
deportation effort (Lum 2019). To retaliate, the RGC suspended the U.S. search program aimed at 
recovering the remains of personnel missing-in-action (MIA) from the Southeast Asian War, and 
it also called for the expulsion of the Peace Corps. 
Between November 2017 and December 2019, the Trump administration took a number of 
punitive measures against the RGC in the hope of deterring it from backsliding further into 
authoritarianism, countering Chinese influence, and discouraging its hostility toward the United 
States. In September 2017, the White House announced the suspension of $1.8 million to assist 
with the Cambodian election process. Then U.S. Senator John McCain (R-AZ) spearheaded a 
unanimous adoption of a Senate resolution (S. Res. 279) calling for the freezing of assets owned 
by all senior RGC officials and placing these individuals under the Specially Designated Nationals 
list (U.S. Senate 2017). In June 2018 and December 2019, the U.S. Department of the Treasury 
(2018, 2019) sanctioned three allies of Hun Sen, including the commander of his bodyguard unit, 
General Hing Bun Hieng, for human rights abuses under the Global Magnitsky Act. As of this 
writing, the U.S. Congress is considering at least three sanction bills.24 While the United States 
was considering punitive actions, the EU, which is Cambodia’s largest common market, had 
investigated whether to revoke the country’s Everything-but-Arms (EBA) preferential trade status 
that has allowed it to export to the EU market without quotas and tariffs since 2001. Revocation 
of the EBA would hit hard at the garment sector, which accounts for 40% of annual GDP.25  
 
24 The first two bills are the Cambodia Accountability and Return on Investment Act of 2019 (S. 1468) and the 
Cambodia Democracy Act of 2019 (H.R.526). They aim to freeze assets owned by RGC and RCAF officials 
implicated in undermining Cambodia’s democracy. The bills also authorize educational funds for Internet contents in 
Cambodia about China’s impediment of Cambodia’s sovereignty. Meanwhile, the Cambodia Trade Act of 2019 (S. 
34) requires a presidential report on the kingdom’s duty-free status under GSP. 
25 According to Ean (2019), the loss of EBA status would cost Cambodia about $654 million and 245,000 jobs. 
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It is worth mentioning here that although political relations between the United States and 
Cambodia have been in a downward spiral since 2015, government-to-government cooperation in 
some practical areas has remained intact. The first one is education. The U.S. government offered 
numerous educational opportunities for Cambodian students. The most prestigious program is the 
J. William Fulbright Foreign Student Fellowship, a flagship program of the Department of State 
that sponsors a small number of students to continue their graduate education in the United States. 
Since 1993, 189 Khmer students have pursued master’s or doctoral studies under the Fulbright 
program, and many of them have taken on influential positions in their home country such as 
general, diplomat, scholar, economist, civic leader, scientist, and entrepreneur. In addition to 
making an impact through their professions, 98% of these scholars self-reported their participation 
in community service. Some 86% say they have a positive view of the United States. Meanwhile, 
there have been 123 U.S. Fulbright scholars who have conducted studies in Cambodia. Besides, 
the United States has also offered shorter exchange opportunities to undergraduates, mid-career 
professionals, and government officials through programs such as the Global Undergraduate 
Exchange Program (UGRAD), Young Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative (YSEALI), and the 
International Visitor Leadership Program (IVLP). The United States is also a top destination for 
those who can afford private tuition. As of 2018, over 650 Cambodian students were studying at 
U.S. universities through private funding or various sorts of scholarships, and the number keeps 
rising every year (Newbill 2019; U.S. Department of Commerce 2019).  
Other areas of cooperation include law enforcement, removal of unexploded ordnance 
(UXO), preservation of ancient temples and artifacts, and environmental protection. For example, 
in late 2018, Cambodian authorities seized 3.5 tons of African ivory with the help of tips from the 
U.S. embassy in Phnom Penh (Mech 2018b). Moreover, the United States had repatriated to 
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Cambodia many ancient Khmer antiquities stolen during the civil war and brought charges against 
those involved in illegal smuggling or sale of such artifacts (Hunt 2019b; Khouth 2019; Len 2016; 
Mashberg and Blumenthal 2013). Although the Cambodian government temporarily halted the 
U.S. MIA program in 2017, it reversed the decision one year later despite continued U.S. visa 
sanction on its foreign ministry officials. The Peace Corps program is another area of stable 
engagement. Since 2007, the Peace Corps has sent 612 volunteers to serve in 19 of Cambodia’s 
25 cities and provinces, with its primary emphases being the English language and community 
education (Peace Corps 2018). Last, Cambodia had firmly abided by global sanctions against 
North Korea, even though the two countries shared a relationship that dated back to the early 
1960s. For example, it has condemned Kim Jong-un’s missile testing, closed North Korean-owned 
businesses, and deported its nationals. 
After the CPP won all 125 seats in the 2018 election, Cambodia’s limited bandwagoning 
with the United States began to change course from aggressiveness to accommodation, as the RGC 
sought to repair damages done by its clampdown on the CNRP since 2015. This accommodation 
was activated after the CPP secures its control of the country because limited bandwagoning 
rebalances Cambodia’s position between Beijing and Washington and helps in maintaining the 
support among the winning coalition, which favors China, and the opposition group, which favors 
the United States. 
 Less than four months after the 2018 election, Cambodia told the outgoing U.S. 
Ambassador William A. Heidt that it wanted RFA and VOA to reopen, ironically citing its 
promotion of freedom of information (Niem 2018). By June 2019, VOA received its broadcasting 
license. From then on, signs of a mutual détente began to emerge. For instance, on October 23, 
2019, Hun Sen had his first meeting with the new U.S. Ambassador to Cambodia W. Patrick 
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Murphy. This date is significant because it fell on the anniversary of the 1991 Paris Peace 
Agreements that aimed to put an end to the Cambodian civil war a little over two decades earlier, 
an agreement to which the United States was a party. Indeed, it was a day to make peace. Two 
days later, the premier instructed his cabinet to reinvigorate ties with the United States and went 
so far as to suggest that there be an elaborate celebration of the 70th anniversary of U.S.-Cambodian 
diplomatic relations in 2020. He also called for a reunion of Cambodian alumni of U.S. universities 
and of Peace Corps volunteers, whom he had threatened to expel two years prior (Fresh News 
2019a). Then on November 10, 2019, CNRP President Kem Sokha was transferred to house arrest 
after two years in jail, paving the way for further rapprochement. Ambassador Murphy and Hun 
Sen had their second encounter that same month, in which the former delivered two friendly letters 
from President Donald J. Trump. The first reaffirmed the United States’ commitment against 
regime change in Cambodia, and the second was an invitation for Hun Sen to a special U.S.-
ASEAN Summit to be held on U.S. soil in the first quarter of 2020 (Bong 2019). The Cambodian 
leader swiftly accepted the invitation, thanked U.S.’s “generous market access,” and applauded 
Trump’s summit initiative, even though the U.S. leader had snubbed ASEAN meetings for two 
years in a row and sent only his National Security Advisor, Robert O’Brien, to the 2019 summit 
in Thailand (Fresh News 2019b).  
For its parts, the United States appeared to be paying more attention to Cambodia and 
adopting a less rigid approach after the recent deterioration in ties. For instance, it nominated one 
of its most experienced career diplomats, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and 
Pacific Affairs W. Patrick Murphy, to be the new chief of mission in Phnom Penh in late 2018. In 
the age of widescale bureaucratic vacancies under the Trump administration, where more critical 
diplomatic posts in places as Indonesia, Singapore, and Thailand remained unfilled at the time, 
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sending a top hand to a small and strategically less vital state such as Cambodia is a sign of 
intensifying U.S. attention and effort to counter China’s influence in the kingdom. 
Then during the 2019 ASEAN summit in Thailand, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo 
tactfully welcomed Cambodia’s defense of its national sovereignty and encouraged other countries 
to follow its example (U.S. Department of State 2019). His remarks came while Cambodia was 
being scrutinized over a recent report in the Wall Street Journal that Cambodia had signed a secret 
agreement to host a Chinese military outpost at Ream Naval Base. There are two ways to interpret 
Pompeo’s remarks. After several years of diplomatic friction, Washington considered adopting a 
more flexible position. As it had come to learn over the past decade, a fixated and hardline position 
on human rights and democracy had only pushed Cambodia closer to China and farther away from 
the U.S. itself, because Beijing had willingly played the role of a “counter-hegemonic power,” 
filling in the void left open by Washington (Levitsky and Way 2010). Another interpretation is 
that Pompeo intended to put more pressure on Cambodia because it sent a strong message that the 
U.S. is watching the situation closely. 
By the end of 2019, tension continued to ease further because the RGC had opted for a 
softer approach and to bandwagon with U.S. interests. However, as noted in Bong (2019), there 
remain three stumbling blocks to this rapprochement. First, the passage of the three sanctions bills 
in the U.S. Congress is likely to reverse signs of progress achieved since late 2019. Second, 
Cambodia must tread carefully to avoid antagonizing China, which may not be pleased with its 
détente with the United States. Third and most importantly, although CNRP leader Kem Sokha 
was released from house arrest, a treason charge against him still proceeds in court, and he is barred 
from political activity. Since Washington has repeatedly pushed for dropping all charges against 
Sokha, the RGC will likely use restriction of his freedom as leverage to deal with the United States. 
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This move would repeat what the RGC had done in the past with Sam Rainsy, who had been 
charged, forced into self-imposed exile, and granted royal pardons at the prime minister’s request 
numerous times. Since releasing Sokha before a verdict could undermine Hun Sen’s executive 
authority and local appeal as a strongman, the court may charge Sokha with treason. Sokha may 
then be pardoned and have his political rights reinstated if Cambodia’s rapprochement with the 
United States continues unabated. In case he is convicted and handed jail sentence without 
clemency, bilateral relations between the two countries are likely to strain. As the argument posits, 
Cambodia bandwagons with the United States by loosening its grip on opposition elements and 
allowing democratic activities once the CPP wins the election. 
To sum up, the trajectory of U.S.-Cambodian political relations from 2009 to 2019 was 
much more turbulent than Chinese-Cambodian ties. Domestic politics strongly impacted the 
kingdom’s behaviors toward the United States. This volatility reinforces the hypothesis that Phnom 
Penh distances itself from Washington around election times. 
Before the July 2013 general election, tension began to increase due to Cambodia’s 
worsening human rights condition. President Obama’s trip to Phnom Penh in November 2012 
provided a rare opportunity for him to meet Hun Sen for the first time and to engage in a candid 
engagement. The meeting, however, added more friction between the two leaders because Obama 
touched upon the sensitive issue of democracy and political prisoners. Although the 2013 vote was 
the most competitive process to date, the near-defeat performance of the CPP dominated the 
agenda of Cambodia’s hedging toward the United States because regime survival became a grave 
danger threatening Hun Sen and his inner circle. As a result, Cambodia orchestrated a prolonged 
diplomatic offensive campaign against the United States by siding closer with China, cracking 
down on domestic opposition, and criticizing alleged interventions into its internal affairs by the 
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U.S. government. These escalations pushed bilateral ties to plummet to the lowest point since 
1997. The logic of authoritarian survival dictates that political defeat may lead to severe personal 
retribution made against the incumbent by the incoming leader. The CPP had to do everything to 
eliminate the CNRP, even though it had to jeopardize ties with Washington. It was after the 
CNRP’s dissolution in 2017 and the CPP’s victory in 2018 that Cambodia began to mend its 
relations with the U.S. in an attempt to rebalance its hedging. 
For its part, the United States seemed to be contemplating a détente because of the alarming 
geopolitical inroads of China in Cambodia. Although there remain several disagreements, 
Cambodia implemented limited bandwagoning toward the United States by allowing the reopening 
of VOA and by releasing Kem Sokha from prison. Tension eased further in late 2019 when 
Cambodia responded positively to the arrival of Ambassador Murphy, by adopting a softer tone 
and by proposing a fanfare celebration of the 70th anniversary of diplomatic relations. Meanwhile, 
Hun Sen welcomed President Trump’s letter reaffirming U.S. commitment against regime change 
in Cambodia and accepted the invitation for a special U.S.-ASEAN summit in 2020. Cambodia’s 
apparent rapprochement with the United States in post-July 2018 period indicates that its limited 
bandwagoning toward Washington fluctuates temporarily around election time, and it reverts to a 
more stable path after the ruling CPP wins. 
 Economic Ties 
While political relations deteriorated during the 2013 and 2018 elections, economic 
exchanges between Cambodia and the United States remained strong and expanded almost every 
year from 2009 to 2019. Deepening economic links were achieved during this period without 
interruption, as the two countries confined their rhetoric and disagreements to the political arena. 
We will see further evidence supporting the hypothesis that Cambodia’s economic pragmatism 
115 
toward the United States is the most consistent and stable element in its hedging because the CPP 
government could not afford losing access to U.S. market, which is responsible for consuming 
more than 25% of the kingdom’s annual export. In June 2009, the Obama administration removed 
Cambodia from the finance blacklist to reward its commitment to a free-market economy. The 
decision allowed U.S. companies planning to invest in Cambodia to seek a guarantee from the U.S. 
Export-Import Bank (Thayer 2010). Three months later, the two sides amended their bilateral trade 
agreement to expand cooperation to include food security and climate change. Then Washington 
channeled $7.9 million to the USAID’s Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprise and Business 
Enabling Environment program to support family-run enterprises. In 2016, Cambodian travel 
goods received duty-free status under GSP, which drove the export volume to expand (Chea 2019). 
 
Table 3.7  Cambodia’s Trade with and Foreign Assistance from the U.S., 2009-2019 
[Source: Lum (2009, 2013, 2015, 2018, 2019), USAID (n.d.), U.S. Census Bureau (n.d.)] 
Year 
Exports To 
($ million) 
Imports From 
($ million) 
Trade Balance  
($ million) 
Development Assistance 
($ million) 
2009 1,942.2 127.1 1,797.2 45 
2010 2,300.8 153,8 2,147 80 
2011 2,712.4 186.6 2,525.9 75.2 
2012 2,619.6 226.4 2,465.1 76 
2013 2,771.1 241.2 2,529.9 76 
2014 2,847.8 328.1 2,519.7 70.9 
2015 3,026.2 391.1 2,635.2 93 
2016 2,813.7 360.7 2,453 108 
2017 3,062.7 400.1 2,662.6 88.3 
2018 3,818.2 445.8 3,372.5 79.3 
2019 4,961.7 484.1 4,477.5 21.81 
 
According to Table 3.7, Cambodia’s exports to the United States grew from $1.94 billion 
in 2009 to $3.02 billion in 2015 and $4.96 billion in 2019. Meanwhile, U.S. exports to Cambodia 
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increased by nearly fourfold from $127.8 million in 2009 to $484.1 million in 2019. From 2007 to 
2017, two-way trade grew 60% and reached $4.26 billion in 2018, including $3.81 billion of 
Cambodian exports, indicating a 25% uptick compared to 2017 (Bulut 2017; Chea 2019; Sum 
2019). In the first six months of 2019 alone, Cambodian exports to the United States soared by 
30% with a total value of $2.24 billion, while sales of travel goods such as luggage, handbags, and 
backpacks increased by eightfold from $50 million in 2016 to $400 million in 2018. Today, the 
United States consumes about 26% of Cambodia’s annual exports, compared to merely 6% used 
by the Chinese. Together, the United States and the EU constitute over 60% of Cambodia’s exports 
annually (Hutt 2019a). 
In addition to trade, the United States remained a sustained source of bilateral aid, even 
though its generosity was lower than China’s. Total U.S. aid to Cambodia increased nearly twofold 
between 2009 and 2010. It then remained steady at around $70 or $80 million every year until the 
Trump administration cut it by 75% in 2019 due to the deterioration of bilateral relations. Unlike 
Chinese aid that was targeted mostly at physical infrastructure, U.S. support had concentrated on 
six areas: Development Assistance (focusing on civil society, early education, human trafficking, 
political parties, food security); Global Health Program (including reproductive health, STDs 
prevention, family planning);  International Military Education and Training (fostering the study 
of English, military leadership and human rights training); Foreign Military Financing (including 
English-language training, vehicle maintenance, logistical management training, and maritime 
security); and Non-Proliferation, Antiterrorism, and Demining (Lum 2013). The sixth area is the 
Economic Support Fund for the UN-backed Khmer Rouge Tribunal. Since 2008, the U.S. had 
contributed $32.2 million to support the international side of the court along with $9.8 million to 
sustain the operation of the Documentation Centre of Cambodia (DC-Cam), a non-governmental 
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public archive working to collect and store historical records related to the Democratic Kampuchea 
regime (ECCC 2020; Lum 2018). Furthermore, to address its war legacy, the United States 
provided Cambodia with $133.6 million to support its mine-removing efforts and victim 
rehabilitation (Martin et al. 2019). 
Finally, there was a considerable presence of U.S. companies in Cambodia, but the total 
volume of invested capitals and the public visibility of the ventures was minimal compared with 
those of Chinese firms. According to former U.S. Ambassador to Cambodia William E. Todd 
(2013), several factors are responsible for this hurdle. Among them were the high level of 
corruption, the weak rule of law, and poor political institutions that created red tape and 
encouraged U.S. businesses to divert their resources away from Cambodia and toward neighboring 
countries. High electricity cost, the lack of adequate infrastructure, shortage of skilled workers, 
and flawed democracy were other confounding factors. Despite its large pool of young and cheap 
labor and that few restrictions were placed on foreign ownership of investments, according to the 
World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business ranking, Cambodia still stood at 144th place worldwide, 
faring better than Laos and Myanmar but worse than other ASEAN members (World Bank n.d.). 
Today, major U.S. brands operating in Cambodia include Chevron, General Electrics, Abbot 
Laboratories, Coca-Cola, and Starbucks. 
The constant increase of Cambodia’s trade volume with the United States indicates the 
stability of its economic pragmatism element that does not vary due to the internal political process, 
specifically, the general election cycle. Although the 2013 and 2018 elections pushed its political 
ties with Washington into a downward spiral, economic links remained strong and grew 
substantially every year. The Trump administration cut 75% of aid to the RGC in 2019, but that 
amount was very minimal compared to two-way trade between the two countries that rose to more 
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than $5.44 billion in that very same year. That is because the U.S. market constitutes over a quarter 
of Cambodia’s annual exports, and it is the largest single buyer of textile and footwear products. 
Any disruption in bilateral trade may pose detrimental challenges for the CPP’s domestic 
legitimacy and result in social instability. 
 Military Ties 
Defense relations between Cambodia and the United States strengthened during the entire 
period of the Obama administration from 2009 to 2016. Between March and April 2009, U.S. 
Marine Corps and Navy personnel conducted joint salvage and medical capabilities exercises with 
the RCAF personnel (Thayer 2012). Five months later, the United States offered 20 containers of 
excess military equipment, including Kevlar helmets and camouflage uniforms, with a total value 
of $6.5 million. Meanwhile, U.S.-educated RCAF officials led the Defense Strategy Working 
Group at the Cambodian Ministry of National Defense and worked in consultation with U.S. 
experts to draft the fourth iteration of a forward-looking defense paper (Stern 2009). The high 
point came when the RGC opened a defense attaché office at its embassy in Washington, D.C., 
followed by an official visit of General Tea Banh to the Pentagon in September. Banh was warmly 
received by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, who reaffirmed his commitment to helping 
Cambodia strengthen its peacekeeping, maritime security, and counterterrorism capabilities. Gates 
also invited Cambodia to participate in a Defense Policy Dialogue, which would establish a 
bilateral channel to cooperate on mutual security interests (Thayer 2012). 
In 2010, under the State Department-led Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), the 
two countries co-hosted an international peacekeeping exercise known as the “Angkor Sentinel,” 
which involved 1,000 peacekeepers from 20 countries in command and post drills The Angkor 
Sentinel later became an annual exercise between the RCAF and U.S. army. Also, the Cambodian 
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and U.S. navies began conducting a joint exercise called Cooperation Afloat Readiness and 
Training (CARAT). There were at least four port visits by U.S. Navy vessels such as the USS 
Tortuga in 2010, USS Stockdale in 2011, USS Blueridge in 2012, USS Germantown in 2016, and 
hospital ship USNS Mercy, which conducted a 10-day program of medical checkups for nearly 
30,000 Cambodians in 2010 (U.S. Embassy in Cambodia 2010). 
After a prolonged period of deepening military relations under the Obama administration, 
the RGC’s domestic clampdown on the CNRP led defense ties to downgrade once President Trump 
took office. In January 2017, Cambodia unilaterally canceled the Angkor Sentinel exercise, citing 
preparations for the upcoming election and local war on drugs (Cheang 2017). There were two 
reasons for this unprecedented decision. One, in addition to the deterioration of political ties, the 
CPP government downgraded military relations with the United States to further insulate itself 
from Western pressure caused by its crackdown on the CNRP. Two, the cancellation was intended 
to curry favor with China, with which the RCAF had held the first iteration of the “Golden Dragon” 
exercise in 2016. A few months after the postponement of the Angkor Sentinel, Cambodia 
distanced itself further by canceling the long-running humanitarian program of the U.S. Navy 
Mobile Construction Battalion or the Seabees, which had been building $5 million worth of 
community projects in Cambodia since 2008, without any reason (Hunt 2019a). Still worse, reports 
about Chinese military installations at Dara Sakor and the Ream Naval Base added more alarm for 
U.S. military officials who saw Cambodia swinging drastically toward China in recent years.  
Similar to economic pragmatism, Cambodia’s indirect balancing toward the United States 
had yielded growth and stability since relations had been restored in 2004. Nonetheless, since the 
CPP’s poor performance in the 2013 election had shaken the confidence of its winning coalition, 
which feared possible defeat by the CNRP, and that the 2018 general election was critical for Hun 
120 
Sen’s political survival, it was worth causing temporary damage to defense ties with the United 
States in order to secure the status quo. 
Nevertheless, there were signs that Cambodia might reverse course on its military hedging 
with the U.S. Although it had canceled the Angkor Sentinel exercise indefinitely, engagements in 
other military-related areas such as humanitarian demining, POW/MIA matters, international 
peacekeeping, and medical research remained largely unscathed (U.S. Department of Defense 
2019). Second, high-level exchanges between military leaders had slowed but had not been 
terminated. For example, on January 15-16, 2019, U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
South and Southeast Asia Joseph H. Felter toured Cambodia, where he met with senior RCAF 
officials and discussed the revitalization of military ties (Sun et al. 2019). Then in April, deputy 
Commander-in-Chief of the RCAF, Lieutenant General Hun Manet, attended the Pacific Special 
Operation Conference in Honolulu, Hawaii, where he discussed regional counterterrorism and met 
with Commander of the U.S. Special Operation Command Pacific, Brigadier General Jonathan B. 
Braga, to boost defense ties between the United States and Cambodia (Niem 2019).  
Third, in September 2019, Cambodia participated in the first ASEAN-U.S. Maritime 
Exercise (AUMX), which involved 1,260 military personnel from all ten ASEAN countries 
(Heydarian 2019). Starting from Sattahip Naval Base in Thailand, the group sailed through the 
contested South China Sea before ending in Singapore. Although the exercise sends a message to 
Beijing, it should also be viewed as a hedging strategy pursued multilaterally by ASEAN members 
aimed at diversifying their military engagement with major powers, because the joint exercise with 
the United States was not exclusive. In fact, ASEAN had also held a joint naval exercise with 
China since 2018. As a participant in AUMX, Cambodia used this opportunity to signal its interests 
to mend relations with the United States and to join other ASEAN members to enmesh Washington 
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deeper in regional security affairs. Last, during Ambassador Murphy’s recent meeting with 
Cambodian Defense Minister General Tea Banh, the two sides discussed the resumption of the 
Angkor Sentinel, the docking of U.S. Navy’s vessels, and other military-to-military activities, even 
though the ongoing treason trial against Kem Sokha remained an impediment (Mech 2019). 
In summary, U.S.-Cambodian defense relations from 2009 to 2019 can be separated into 
two distinct periods. In the first period, which covers the entire Obama administration from 2009 
to 2016, Cambodia consistently implemented its indirect balancing toward the United States 
through high-level exchanges between military officials, dockings of U.S. Navy vessels, joint land 
and maritime exercises, and cooperation in other practical areas described above. In the second 
period, which stretches from early 2017 to late 2019, Cambodia downgraded its defense ties with 
the United States. It began to invigorate ties with the U.S. again after the CPP won in 2018. 
This fluctuation challenges the hypothesis, which argues that Cambodia will distance from 
the United States politically and leave economic and military cooperation intact. However, it 
reinforces the argument that domestic politics does influence Cambodia’s hedging between the 
United States and China. Moreover, this volatility sheds light on an unexpected and interesting 
dynamic in the pattern of hedging of a small authoritarian state. It indicates that, when faced with 
a critical internal threat to its survival, the CPP government is willing to shift politically as well as 
militarily between two major powers in order to remain in office, even though such decision bears 
high risk and that it has broad implications on the defense posture of Cambodia itself and the 
strategic landscape in Southeast Asia and the Asia-Pacific. 
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 Key Findings 
 What happened from 2009 to 2019 with Cambodia’s economic, military, and political 
relations with the United States and China further support the hypothesis about the causal 
relationship between the kingdom’s domestic politics and hedging. First, Cambodia’s economic 
pragmatism continued to mature and grow over time, regardless of two high-stakes elections in 
2013 and 2018. Its two-way trade with China and with the United States both increased 
significantly in total volume, although it is essential to remember that Cambodia exported much 
less to the PRC than it imported, while the surplus of its trade with the United States grew the 
entire time. Furthermore, the two powers were among the principal donors of foreign aid, although 
their assistance fulfilled different demands of the Cambodian government. Chinese aid was mostly 
targeted at the development of physical infrastructures, whereas U.S. aid concentrated on sectors 
such as civil society, democracy, public governance, public health, education, demining, and 
cultural preservation. Even though elections in 2013 and 2018 were watershed moments for the 
CPP, economic relations with these two powers remained strong, stable, and expanded. That is 
because economic growth is essential for the CPP’s domestic legitimacy. 
 Second, Cambodia continued to implement indirect balancing toward the United States and 
China in order to modernize the RCAF, maintain internal stability, and respond to external threats 
posed by neighboring Thailand, Vietnam, and Laos as well as strategic fluidity in the Asia-Pacific 
region. On the one hand, military relations with the U.S. matured from 2009 to 2016, thanks to the 
rapprochement pursued earlier during George W. Bush’s presidency. The two most notable 
achievements were the official visit by the Cambodian Defense Minister to the Pentagon and the 
six annual iterations of the Angkor Sentinel exercise from 2010 to 2016. These developments show 
that Cambodia looked to the U.S. as a potential partner in the defense arena, although U.S. military 
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leaders still had to tread cautiously due to lingering concerns about the RGC’s human rights record. 
Following the political suppression against the CNRP, the free press, NGOs, and government 
critics, Cambodia’s defense ties with the U.S. began to deteriorate in 2017, because Cambodia saw 
the need to distance itself from the U.S. militarily to appease China, to reduce Western penetration 
in its domestic affairs, and to secure electoral victory for the CPP. Cambodia had canceled the 
Angkor Sentinel exercise and the Seabees’ program indefinitely, although high-level exchanges 
and engagement in some practical areas remained active. By the end of 2019, some signs indicate 
that this downgrading ties with the United States may be a temporary decision. After all, China is 
the principal supplier of arms and technical support to the RCAF, but China’s experience still lags 
behind the United States in the areas of counterterrorism and maritime security, which Cambodia 
still needs to strengthen.  
On the other hand, Cambodia deepened its relations with the Chinese military because, 
first, China provided much more material support to the RCAF than the U.S., and, second, China 
was willing to look the other way regarding Cambodia’s domestic politics, and it firmly backed 
the CPP, which had become more autocratic after it almost lost to the CNRP in 2013. Non-alliance 
ties with both the U.S. and China enable Cambodia to balance each power’s influence on its 
defense policy, to absorb resources for its armed forces, to send a signal to the potential aggressors, 
and to project a nuanced image of its alignment posture. 
 Third, the area of political relations is where we see the most significant difference because 
Cambodia uses limited bandwagoning as the primary way to hedge between the U.S. and China 
during each general election. The actions of the RGC in the 2013 election pushed Cambodia’s ties 
with Washington into freefall because the RGC began curbing activities of domestic opposition. 
Unlike what happened in 2003 and 2008, when Cambodia shifted away from the U.S. temporarily 
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and tried to repair damages afterward, events in 2013 posed the gravest threat to the CPP’s survival 
since at least 1993 when it lost to the royalist FUNCINPEC but managed to achieve a coalition 
government. As a result, diplomatic offensive after July 2013 needed to be more prolonged, more 
systematic, and more intense because the price of losing would be too high for the winning 
coalition after being in power for over three decades. As Milan Svolik (2012) argues, the 
possibility of personal retribution under authoritarian governments is constant. It always looms 
large over decisions made by the ruling elites because there is no independent political institution 
to either protect or advocate for a fair and peaceful transition of power. The culture of personal 
vendetta is alive and well in Cambodian politics since leaders depend on personalist control and 
charisma to project their power rather than democratic institutions and the rule of law. As one 
Khmer proverb vividly puts it, “when water rises, fish eats ants; when water recedes, ants eat fish” 
(pel teuk laoeng trey si sramaoch pel teuk haoc sramaoch si trey) (Un 2019).  
To safeguard the status quo, the CPP had to do whatever it took to eliminate the CNRP 
before the 2018 election, including a highly intense and prolonged diplomatic campaign against 
U.S. influence in Cambodia. Once it won, the ruling party reverted to bandwagon with the U.S., 
as Washington also appeared to be contemplating a détente. For the time being, as long as 
Cambodia continued to accommodate China on the “One China” policy, the South China Sea, and 
its positions in regional and global forums, the PRC would reciprocate by backing Hun Sen with 
little to no regard for the worsening of democracy and human rights. As a result, Sino-Cambodian 
political ties are mutually beneficial and practically immune to what happens domestically unless 
an unexpected change of events pushes the CPP out of power, which is a highly unlikely possibility 
for the near future. Even so, China would likely put its eggs in the new leader’s basket when its 
interests were at stake. 
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 3.3 What About Diversification? 
So far, this thesis has examined Cambodia’s implementation of limited bandwagoning, 
indirect balancing, and economic pragmatism. The other three sub-elements, such as dominance 
denial, binding engagement, and economic diversification, have received only brief attention. This 
segment traces these policies by looking at Cambodia’s relations with third-party actors in the 
regions that are not the United States and China – namely Japan, the EU, and ASEAN. The reason 
is that Cambodia maintains a middle path by forging a nuanced position with not only two but with 
multiple external powers to create a balance of influence in its foreign policy so that no one country 
can have too much unilateral influence on its behavior and autonomy. 
 3.3.1 Dominance Denial 
Dominance denial is a risk-contingency measure aimed at preventing political 
overdependence on external powers. Because it has had a long and often close strategic 
relationship with Cambodia, Japan helps to showcase this sub-element of the kingdom’s hedging. 
The two countries first came into contact in 1569 when their merchant ships began docking at each 
other’s ports to conduct trade (Leang 2017). For the recent past, however, the time of World War 
II is especially pertinent. From 1941 to 1945, when Japan occupied Cambodia, which was then 
part of French Indochina, the occupying troops did not inflict any significant brutalities on the 
Khmer people the way they did on the Chinese. After the war ended, Cambodia decided not to 
seek any reparations, leading the Japanese parliament to pass a resolution expressing appreciation 
for Cambodia’s graciousness. In 1953, Cambodian King Norodom Sihanouk became the first 
Asian monarch to visit Japan in the post-war era, where he met with Emperor Hirohito and signed 
a bilateral treaty to promote peace and to strengthen bonds of friendship (Chheang 2018). 
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Following the 1991 Paris Peace Agreements, Japan bankrolled a significant proportion of 
the UNTAC mission and deployed 608 ground troops, 75 civilian police, and 41 polling station 
officers to help keep the peace in Cambodia from 1991 to 1993 (Takeda 1998). It was during this 
time that the Japanese Self-Defense Force (SDF) was deployed outside of its home country for the 
first time since the end of World War II, as the Japanese public began embracing the changing face 
of their military power (Smith 2019). Due to Japan’s generosity, the position of the Special 
Representative of UN Secretary-General overseeing administrative component of UNTAC was 
given to Japanese diplomat Yasushi Akashi. Since the end of the UNTAC mission in 1993, Japan 
has continued to play a pivotal role in reconstructing Cambodia and in supporting progress in soft 
and hard infrastructure, social services, agriculture, rural development, human resources, and 
public governance. Following the power struggle between the CPP and FUNCINPEC in July 1997, 
Japan broke ranks with the West by choosing not to condemn Hun Sen; and it spearheaded a peace 
deal between the two parties. These kind gestures had gradually cemented trust in Japan among 
Cambodian leaders and among the majority of the population who looked for additional sources 
of assistance and partnership other than China and the United States. 
During Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s visit to Phnom Penh in June 2007, the two countries 
signed the Agreement for the Liberalization, Promotion, and Protection of Investment to bolster 
bilateral economic exchanges. Then in 2013, Cambodia upgraded its ties with Japan to the level 
of strategic partnership, which covers a wide range of cooperation, including security, defense, 
and policy coordination, days after China announced its Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) 
over the East China Sea. Furthermore, Cambodian Foreign Minister Hor Nam Hong agreed with 
his Japanese counterpart to hold a regular consultation between the two countries’ ministries of 
defense and foreign affairs. According to Leang (2017), there are three reasons why the RGC 
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raised Tokyo’s diplomatic profile in its foreign policy formula. First, Japan has shown itself to be 
a reliable and sincere partner, which had contributed an enormous amount of support since the 
early 1990s. Unlike Washington, which tended to criticize Phnom Penh’s human rights and 
democracy record openly, Tokyo would tread carefully regarding domestic politics. Also, the two 
nations share a similar vision of a peaceful, stable, and prosperous Asia. 
Second, Hun Sen still remembered China’s principal roles in the Khmer Rouge regime that 
butchered nearly two million Cambodians. Before his rapprochement with Beijing in 1997, Hun 
Sen spent most of his time under the PRK regime backed by Vietnam criticizing and fighting 
China. He wrote in 1988 that “China was the root of everything that was evil in Cambodia” (Jeldres 
2012). Although an unexpected chain of events brought him closer to the PRC, there remained a 
lingering sense of mistrust that China might swap old friends for new ones whenever its interests 
were at stake. For instance, following the CPP’s poor performance in 2013 and during the 
subsequent massive demonstration led by the CNRP and its supporters, China hedged its bets 
against the uncertain future change of political leadership in Cambodia by maintaining its silence 
about the protest; one China’s state media outlets published a very rare openly critical story calling 
for the CPP’s reform (Ciorciari 2015). 
Third and most importantly, ties with Japan have helped Cambodia safeguard its autonomy 
and avoid political and economic domination by the Chinese. Aside from its political influence, 
Japan has been one of the kingdom’s principal economic benefactors. For instance, it accounts for 
20% of the total inflow of ODA since 1992 (Chheang 2018). From 2011 to 2015 alone, Japanese 
ODA disbursement to Cambodia totaled $2.52 billion, including $213.9 million in loans, $1.4 
billion in grants, and $827 million in technical cooperation (Leang 2017). In the midst of the 
domestic clampdown on the CNRP in 2017, Japan shrugged off criticisms by global rights groups 
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and inked a $90 million aid agreement with the RGC and offered an additional $7.5 million along 
with 10,000 ballot boxes after the United States and the EU suspended their support for the 2018 
general election in Cambodia (Chandran 2018). Japan has been the largest international donor to 
the Khmer Rouge Tribunal, which is responsible for $87 million or 28% of the total costs incurred 
by the court since 2006 (ECCC 2020). 
 
Table 3.8  Cambodia’s Trade with Japan, 2009-2019 [Source: International Monetary 
Fund’s Direction of Trade Statistics (data.imf.org)] 
Year 
Exports to Japan  
($ million) 
Imports from Japan 
($ million) 
Trade Balance  
($ million) 
2008 32.12 114.74 -84.62 
2009 79.52 118.91 -39.39 
2010 89.51 156.35 -66.84 
2011 153.32 248.33 -95.01 
2012 199.15 222.97 -23.82 
2013 334.22 175.47 158.74 
2014 344.88 263.96 80.92 
2015 571.55 422.95 148.6 
2016 827.19 528.27 298.92 
2017 821.38 584.42 236.96 
2018 997.50 637.35 360.15 
2019 N/A N/A N/A 
 
Trade is another area where Cambodia depends on Japan to prevent China’s domination. 
Table 3.8 indicates that although the kingdom imported more from Japan than it exported from 
2008 to 2012, this trend reversed its course from 2013 onward with Cambodia enjoying a trade 
surplus of $360 million in 2018. Compared with China, although the volume of Japan’s FDI is 
minor, the number is still significant for a small economy like Cambodia’s. By 2019, there were 
137 Japanese-run FDI projects, which were worth $2.5 billion, as well as 1,799 small and medium 
enterprises (Khmer Times 2020). Furthermore, having close relations with Japan enhances the 
CPP’s popularity. According to one recent opinion poll, 48% and 84% of Cambodians view Japan 
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as an essential partner and as a reliable friend, respectively (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 
2019b). Tokyo is also the most trusted foreign country among Cambodians, whose popularity 
outperforms both Beijing and Washington by a significant margin.  
To reinforce its commitment to Japan and to avoid overdependence on China, Cambodia 
has taken several measures to support Tokyo’s regional positions. In 2014, it endorsed ASEAN’s 
joint communiqué with Japan underlining freedom of overflight following China’s ADIZ 
declaration over the East China Sea (Leang 2017). More recently, it was the first Southeast Asian 
state to endorse the Japanese version of the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific,” even though FOIP was 
viewed critically by China as an overt attempt to offset its power (Takahashi 2019). Cambodia is 
also part of the Japan-Mekong Cooperation grouping, a regional competitor of the China-led 
Lancang-Mekong Cooperation. From 1999 to 2019, there were 25 visits by Cambodian leaders to 
Japan, including King Norodom Sihamoni, Prime Minister Hun Sen, and other top government 
officials. The premier himself visited Japan every year between 2012 and 2019, except in 2016, 
and built warm personal relations with Prime Minister Shinzo Abe (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
Japan 2019a). In late 2017, Abe went so far as to throw a surprise birthday celebration with a 
candlelit cake for Hun Sen during his visit to Tokyo. 
Overall, Cambodia implements dominance denial in hedging, in part, by forging political, 
economic, and strategic relations with Japan in order to deny China’s unilateral domination of 
Cambodia’s foreign policy. Nevertheless, Japan is only one of many foreign countries with whom 
Cambodia maintains diplomatic relations as part of its dominance denial. Other notable players 
include ASEAN members, Australia, India, Russia, South Korea, the EU, and, obviously, the 
United States – all of them are partners in varying areas of engagement and intensity. The place of 
the United States in Cambodia’s hedging strategy and Japan’s significant economic influence on 
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the RGC along with its keen interest in balancing Chinese power make it logical that Phnom Penh 
relies on Tokyo as a strategic partner to cultivate a balanced foreign policy with Beijing, thus 
avoiding becoming subservience to external power.  
 3.3.2 Economic Diversification 
 Economic diversification is another part of the risk-contingency pillar in Cambodia’s 
hedging, where a state forges economic links with as many external powers as possible to increase 
the number of trade partners, to attract more FDI, and to diversify its economic portfolio. In 
addition to the United States, China, and Japan, the kingdom also has significant economic links 
with other key players, one of the most important being the European Union. As a collective entity, 
the EU is Cambodia’s largest export destination, absorbing even more products than the United 
States, which is the largest state buyer. As one of 48 underdeveloped countries, Cambodia has 
been granted the EU’s EBA preferential trade status since 2001. Under the EBA scheme, 
Cambodia can export all products except weapons, which are mostly textile and footwear goods, 
to the EU without tariffs and quotas. 
According to Table 3.9 below, Cambodia’s exports to the EU rose significantly from 
$811.51 million in 2008 to $2.79 billion in 2013 and over $5.5 billion by the end of 2017, which 
was 49% of the total outflow of Cambodian goods that year. The EU and the United States together 
accounted for 60.9% of Cambodia’s overall exports in 2018 (European Commission 2019). 
Furthermore, just as its trade with the United States, Cambodia exported much more to the EU 
than it imported back, leading to a constant trade surplus that grew year after year. Especially given 
the trade numbers with China for the same period, it is clear why a small state such as Cambodia 
incorporates economic diversification into its hedging strategy. 
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Table 3.9  Cambodia’s Trade with the European Union, 2008-2018 [Source: European 
Commission (2019)] 
Year 
European Union Cambodia 
Exports to 
($ million) 
Imports 
from 
($ million) 
Total 
Export  
($ million) 
Total 
Import ($ 
million) 2008 811.51 170.73 3,306.41 3,354.40 
2009 862.51 141.96 3,987.11 3,120.06 
2010 1,121.93 170.73 4,700.17 4,115.44 
2011 1,665.15 216.18 5,376.41 4,921.12 
2012 2,268.25 273.83 6,811.45 6,135.22 
2013 2,793.74 266.07 7,771.13 7,747.69 
2014 3,370.22 331.48 5,780.36 8,619.21 
2015 4,598.58 514.30 8,627.02 11,279.52 
2016 5,124.06 710.63 10,181.47 13,004.70 
2017 5,555.23 943.44 10,717.10 15,942.86 
2018 5,942.23 
 
 
 
 
858.08 11,743.73 18,334.24 
 
The idea of diversifying the trade partnership that it has with the EU is not only about 
supplementing trade with China, the United States and Japan. It also involves the maintenance and 
creation of jobs for over a million textile workers, many of whom could be a potential source of 
anti-government dissent if left unemployed. Moreover, most of these workers are adults who are 
better mobilized than employees in other service or manufacturing sectors of the Cambodian 
economy, and they tend to support opposition parties such as the SRP and the CNRP, which 
deployed populist and nationalist rhetoric to stir anger and to pit ordinary workers against the CPP 
elites. The massive protest led by the CNRP after the 2013 election, in which parts of the country 
ground to a halt and which escalated into a violent demonstration in Phnom Penh, is an example 
of that risk created by discontent among factory workers. 
Trade is the lifeblood of Cambodia’s internal stability, social development, peace, and the 
legitimacy of the CPP government. That is why the country diversifies its trade portfolio as much 
as possible so that it does not put all of its eggs in one basket. Growing trade figures with the 
United States, China, Japan, and the EU discussed above are evidence supporting the hypothesis 
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that Cambodia continuously implemented economic diversification in its foreign policy, which 
does not fluctuate during the general elections between 1999 and 2019.  
 3.3.3 Binding Engagement 
 Binding engagement is a profit-maximization policy aimed at establishing diplomatic 
contact with external powers, shaping their foreign policy behaviors, and integrating them into the 
region so that they play responsible and constructive roles that enhance peace and stability (Kuik 
2015). Much like dominance denial, binding engagement is intended to safeguard the hedger’s 
independence and ability to steer clear of overt alignment or unwanted alliance, and it can be 
implemented either bilaterally state by state or multilaterally by a group of like-minded states. For 
example, Cambodia bilaterally binds the United States and China by engaging them through 
government-to-government channels, policy exchanges, and dialogues. To understand how 
Cambodia uses multilateral binding engagement, this section looks at Cambodia’s position in 
ASEAN, where it works in concerted efforts with other small states to enmesh the U.S. and China 
within the region in order to promote stable and peaceful relations between these two major powers 
as well as harmonious ties between ASEAN and each respective powers. 
 After being a guest from 1993 to 1995, and then an observer from 1995 to 1996, Cambodia 
became the 10th and latest member of ASEAN on April 30, 1999. Since then, ASEAN has been a 
cornerstone of Cambodia’s foreign policy. As a member, it enjoys international legitimacy as a 
state possessing equal diplomatic footing and privilege in Southeast Asia’s economy, politics, and 
security affairs. Three years into its membership, Cambodia was put to a stress test when it hosted 
the ASEAN summit for the first time in 2002. During that meeting, Cambodia made a significant 
contribution to promoting peaceful relations between ASEAN and China by pushing for the 
adoption of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC). This measure 
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was intended to promote a peaceful settlement of disputes among interested parties, to build trust 
and confidence, to reaffirm commitment to UNCLOS, and to call for self-restraint and avoidance 
of escalation near disputed territories (ASEAN 2002). DOC is also a step forward for the eventual 
enactment of a Code of Conduct (COC) between ASEAN claimant and China. 
 When chairing the ASEAN summit for the second time in 2012, Cambodia faced some 
problems but also achieved some progress. For example, it came under severe criticism when 
ASEAN failed to issue a joint communiqué for the first time in 45 years, leading analysts and 
scholars alike to label the country as China’s proxy that drew a wedge within ASEAN. This 
debacle, however, can be interpreted into two distinct ways. First, it is a sign of the PRC’s growing 
influence on Cambodia after more than a decade of economic and diplomatic inducement. Second, 
it shows that since the early 2000s, Cambodia has adopted a very consistent foreign policy 
concerning the South China Sea. It is not a claimant state, and the RGC has said that the issue 
should be negotiated bilaterally between each ASEAN claimant and China. According to 
Cambodia, using the regional body as an adjudicating platform does not represent the interests of 
all member states, especially those who do not have a territorial stake in that area. Also, collective 
negotiation by ASEAN might result in the internationalization of the dispute, paving the way for 
the involvement of the United States and Japan, both of which are regional competitors of China, 
that will further complicate the situation. Last, it is highly likely to stoke tension and hostility from 
Beijing, which is the largest trading partner of many ASEAN members, which will be detrimental 
to regional peace and prosperity. 
 Although the disagreement dominated headlines around the world, other noticeable 
achievements under Cambodia’s ASEAN chairmanship should be commended. For example, it 
oversaw the adoption of the long-awaited Bali Concord III Plan of Action (2013-2017), which lays 
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out a common platform for ASEAN’s external relations (Heng 2013). ASEAN also officially 
launched the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), a free trade agreement 
between 10 ASEAN nations and Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea. 
Moreover, Cambodia managed to get the EU, the United Kingdom, and Brazil to commit to 
ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), a core document embodying respect for 
sovereignty, peaceful settlement of disputes, non-intervention with one another’s internal affairs, 
and non-use of force (ASEAN 1976). External powers must accede to TAC before they are eligible 
to participate in ASEAN-led multilateral platforms such as the ASEAN Regional Forum and the 
East Asia Summit, which are premier intergovernmental forums for dialogues on political and 
security issues among states in the Asia-Pacific region. ASEAN has taken the driver’s seat in 
socializing key players such as the U.S., China, the EU, India, Russia, Japan, and Australia; 
familiarizing them with regional norms such as the “ASEAN Way,” preventive diplomacy, 
confidence-building, consensus decision-making process, and integrating them into consultation 
on defense and security policy. Regarding the dispute in the South China Sea, Cambodia, with the 
help of Indonesia, pushed for the adoption of the ASEAN’s Six-Point Principles, which were 
endorsed by the United States. They reaffirm commitment to full implementation of the 2002 
DOC, a guideline for the DOC, the early conclusion of a binding COC, the exercise of self-
restraint, peaceful conflict resolution, and respect for UNCLOS and other international laws 
(Emmerson 2012). 
 ASEAN’s relations with the United States also affected Cambodia, which had been an 
active member of ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus). The ADMM-Plus 
counts Washington as one of eight dialogue partners, and much like the ASEAN Regional Forum 
and the East Asia Summit, it is a multilateral platform for cooperation on defense and security 
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matters. Its priorities include counterterrorism, peacekeeping, military medicine, maritime 
security, cybersecurity, and humanitarian assistance and disaster management (ADMM 2017). In 
November 2012, Cambodia hosted U.S. President Barack Obama for the 7th East Asia Summit, as 
tension was running high between ASEAN and China as well as Japan and China. Then in 
February 2016, Hun Sen joined nine other ASEAN leaders for a special summit with Obama in 
Rancho Mirage, California. Aside from the fact that it was the first U.S.-ASEAN summit held on 
U.S. soil, it was a symbolic achievement, for it indicated an elevating U.S. commitment to broaden 
and institutionalize its engagement with Southeast Asia, especially after the two sides upgraded 
their bilateral relations to a strategic partnership in 2015. 
Furthermore, it shed light on evolving attitudes among U.S. policymakers from viewing 
ASEAN as a “talk shop” to seeing it as a principal gateway through which to strengthen the United 
States’ influence and image in the region. The special summit ended with the Sunnylands 
Declaration, which reaffirms ASEAN’s leadership role in maintaining a rules-based order in the 
Asia-Pacific, freedom of navigation, and cooperation in traditional and non-traditional security 
matters (The White House 2016). Normally, Hun Sen had publicly supported any initiative aimed 
at promoting ASEAN’s relations with the U.S, China, and other powers. That is one reason why 
he had the same positive attitude toward President Trump’s invitation for a similar special summit 
in early 2020, even though the plan was later postponed indefinitely by the U.S. due to the outbreak 
of the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic. 
 Finally, in response to the United States’ and Japan’s “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” 
strategy, Cambodia and other ASEAN members pushed for their own version of FOIP. Released 
on June 23, 2019, “the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific” (AOIP) or simply “the Outlook,” 
offers a more inclusive vision of connections between the Asia-Pacific and the Indian Ocean 
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regions, compared with the U.S. document that tends to target China militarily and strategically. 
As Acharya (2019) argues, AOIP is a collective effort of Southeast Asian states to shape their 
region based on ASEAN’s centrality and norms such as TAC, regional inclusiveness, consensus-
building, and normative relations rather than the military-centered approach of Washington. AOIP 
is an additional step taken by ASEAN to send a signal to the major powers that it has a say in how 
diplomatic, economic, security, strategic architectures in the Asia-Pacific region evolve and that 
no external actors can dominate its backyard.  
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Chapter 4 - Conclusion 
 This thesis argues that from 1999 to 2019, Cambodia’s hedging foreign policy between the 
United States and China incorporated the stable implementation of economic pragmatism, 
economic diversification, binding engagement, dominance denial, and indirect balancing. 
However, it showed fluctuation in limited bandwagoning with the United States during each 
Cambodian general election. Comprehensive evidence presented in Chapter 3 firmly supports this 
argument. Cambodia distanced itself politically from Washington and strengthened ties with 
Beijing in a period when the ruling CPP moved to curtail the activities of opposition parties in 
order to secure an electoral result in its favor. Once the party won, Cambodia worked to repair 
damages with the United States in order to rebalance its foreign policy. Meanwhile, the other five 
sub-elements of hedging remained constant with little to no fluctuation. Table 4.1 on page 138 
summarizes the trajectories of each sub-element of Cambodia’s hedging before and after the 
general election in 2003, 2008, 2013, and 2018. 
First, Cambodia steadily implemented dominance denial by forging strategic ties with 
Japan. Keep in mind that Japan is only one of a number of countries with whom Cambodia has 
built relations to broaden its diplomatic links. There are three reasons why Tokyo received such a 
high profile in Phnom Penh’s hedging strategy. First, it sits in the middle of Beijing and 
Washington. Like the two powers, Japan has traditionally been a traditional player in Cambodia 
since the early 1990s. Second, Japan is one of the biggest donors of aid to Cambodia, providing 
for both soft and hard infrastructure, and it has proven to be a very reliable and sincere partner 
since the end of the Cambodian civil war. Third, Japan is widely considered as a Western power, 
which does not speak critically and openly about human rights and democracy issues that 
antagonize the ruling CPP, namely, Prime Minister Hun Sen. As a result, the RGC retains close 
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relations with Japan to neutralize Chinese domination and to signal its non-alignment posture. The 
dominance denial column in Table 4.1 shows a constant upward trajectory of Cambodia’s 
dominance denial with the upward arrow (↑) during all four elections. 
 
Table 4.1  Trajectories of Cambodia’s Hedging Sub-Elements, 1999-2019 (Source: Author) 
General 
Election 
Limited 
Bandwagoning 
Economic 
Pragmatism 
Indirect 
Balancing 
Dominance 
Denial 
Economic 
Diversification 
Binding 
Engagement 
U.S. China U.S. China U.S. China Japan EU ASEAN 
Pre-2003 ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ 
Post-2003 → ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ 
Pre-2008 ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ 
Post-2008 → ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ 
Pre-2013 ↓ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ 
Post-2013 ↓ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ 
Pre-2018 ↓ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↓ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ 
Post-2018 ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ 
 
Second, to diversify its economic links, Cambodia trades with the EU to supplement 
commercial exchanges with the United States and China. As the largest single collective buyer of 
Cambodian products, the EU alone consumes more than 40% of exports every year and has granted 
Cambodia with the most preferential status with free quotas and tariffs. As a result, the economic 
diversification column in Table 4.1 indicates a constant upward trajectory (↑) for the entire period 
covered in this study. 
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Third, Cambodia acts concertedly with fellow ASEAN member states to enmesh the United 
States and China in ASEAN-led norms, dialogues, and institutions in order to create a regional 
balance of power and influence among all interested powers. Under its chairmanship in 2002 and 
2012, ASEAN took noticeable steps in adopting documents such as the DOC, the Six-Points 
Principle, and the Bali Concord III Plan of Action (2013-2017). Although Cambodia’s resistance 
against proposed ASEAN collective negotiations with Beijing on the South China Sea dispute has 
earned it regional criticisms, the issue remains unsolved even after the chairmanship had been 
passed among many countries since 2012. Furthermore, vocal claimants such as Vietnam and the 
Philippines, which criticized Cambodia for its alleged spoiling, had ironically grown more 
accommodating toward China in recent years due to Beijing’s immense economic power, which 
surpasses that of the United States in trade and investment. As a small state, Cambodia wants to 
see a stable and prosperous Southeast Asia that is free of hegemonic domination. That is why it 
has supported ASEAN’s relations with regional players such as China, the United States, Japan 
and others who aim to engage with ASEAN. The involvement of more external players means that 
there is a better chance for Southeast Asia to reject the great power politics that could engulf the 
region in war, disrupt free trade, and trigger hostility among states. For these reasons, Cambodia 
constantly implemented binding engagement, which is indicated by an upward arrow (↑). 
Fourth, Cambodia’s economic pragmatism toward the United States and China stayed 
stable and expanded steadily over time, as indicated by an upward arrow (↑) before and after each 
of the four elections. Although Cambodia exported much less to China than it imported back, the 
PRC was the most significant foreign investor and donor of aid, which bankrolled the RGC’s 
infrastructure projects such as bridges, roads, and irrigation systems across rural parts of 
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Cambodia. These projects boosted Hun Sen’s legitimacy among Khmer electorates as a leader who 
delivers real results for the people and makes their livelihood better by the day.  
Meanwhile, the Cambodian economy continued to rely heavily on exports of garment and 
footwear products to the United States, which constitutes about 26% of total goods sold. Taken 
together, the EU and the United States consume approximately 60% of Cambodia’s annual exports, 
a share valued at about $9.76 billion or 40% of total GDP in 2018. Furthermore, Washington is a 
long-time provider of foreign aid in areas of human rights and democracy, civil society, public 
health, education, and other areas, which supplement Chinese aid. Economic links with both the 
United States and China through trade, foreign aid, investment, and others enabled the CPP to 
create jobs, improve social development, maintain internal stability, bring in more foreign capital 
and new skills, and, most importantly, keep the economy growing. For these reasons, Cambodia’s 
implementation of economic pragmatism toward both the United States and the PRC experienced 
only growth between 1999 and 2019, just like the hypothesis claims. 
Fifth, indirect balancing also had a low degree of change over time. Cambodia considers 
China as the principal supplier of military aid and a key partner in the RCAF’s modernization 
program through bilateral land and naval exercises. As in the political realm, the PRC provided 
weaponry, and it trained RCAF personnel without regard to Cambodia’s domestic political 
conditions, whether in the general election, human rights, or democracy. This friendly gesture was 
highly appreciated by Cambodia, which seeks to strengthen its defense capability without the 
forms and commitments of an alliance, forging an autonomous path and preparing itself for the 
fluid strategic and security structures in the region.  
On a similar note, Cambodia appreciates that its defense relations with the United States. 
have been to the benefit of its armed forces. Since the early 2000s, as leader of the War on Terror, 
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Washington had provided both material and training assistance to strengthen RCAF’s capacities 
in counterterrorism, maritime security, and border control, all of which are critical to Cambodia’s 
national security in the twenty-first century. International peacekeeping operations are another 
vital area, which the United States made a noticeable footprint. The Angkor Sentinel exercise 
serves as a primary platform for the kingdom to strengthen its army, to raise its international profile 
by contributing to the UN-led peacekeeping, and to foster mutual understanding between RCAF 
and U.S. forces. From 1999 to 2016, there was an unabated upward trajectory (↑) in defense 
relations between Washington and Phnom Penh. Between 2017 and 2018, ties, however, 
deteriorated due to the RGC’s suppression of the CNRP. This situation is characterized by the 
downward arrow (↓) in pre-2018 of indirect balancing toward the United States shown in Table 
4.1. Then in early 2019, the kingdom began to repair the damage done by joining the AUMX and 
by signaling its interest in restarting the Angkor Sentinel exercise, docking of the U.S. Navy, and 
other military-to-military activities in order to balance against its dependence on the Chinese PLA. 
It indicates a rapprochement (↑) in Cambodia’s defense policy toward the United States.  
Finally, Cambodia’s limited bandwagoning with China was utterly immune to what 
happened at home. Beijing was willing to work with Hun Sen and backed the CPP so long as 
Cambodia bandwagoned with its core interests, such as the “One China” policy and its ascendency 
in the South China Sea, supporting China’s domestic and international agendas. The two countries’ 
political relations are mutually beneficial, and they operate at the highest government-to-
government and party-to-party levels. Even though there were four general elections between 1999 
and 2019, Sino-Cambodian political relations were strong and deepened every year. This condition 
is captured by the upward arrow (↑) in Table 4.1. 
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 As the hypothesis posits, the U.S.-Cambodian political relations are a completely different 
story from Sino-Cambodian ties. Before the 2003 and 2008 elections, bilateral ties improved 
steadily (↑) because Cambodia accommodated with the War on Terror. After each of these two 
elections, tension rose, and relations became unsteady after the RGC suppressed SRP lawmakers, 
namely, opposition leader Sam Rainsy. Even though there was a growing contention between 
Phnom Penh and Washington, relations did not experience any major disruption since the White 
House maintained a more flexible position toward Cambodia than the U.S. Congress did. The 
rightward arrow (→) in the pre-2003 and pre-2008 rows of limited bandwagoning with the United 
States indicates that the two countries had public disagreements on issues of human rights and 
democracy, which strained their ties, but the rhetoric did not do severe damage to official relations. 
 Cambodia’s political ties with the United States began to deteriorate rapidly (↓) in 2013, 
which was an election year. After the incumbent CPP almost lost to the CNRP in July of that year, 
relations plummeted further into a downward spiral (↓) and remained in such condition until the 
end of 2018. Then in 2019, the two countries began to contemplate diplomatic rapprochement (↑). 
This repeatedly volatile nature of U.S.-Cambodian political relations from 1999 to 2019, which 
shifts from warmth to deterioration and back to warmth again every election cycle, supports the 
argument that Cambodia’s limited bandwagoning tends to see a much higher degree of fluctuation 
than the other five elements of its hedging foreign policy between the United States and the PRC. 
In conclusion, domestic politics dictated that Cambodia’s hedging foreign policy between 
the United States and China from 1999 to 2019 operates at a different degree of limited 
bandwagoning, which would be, nonetheless, a trajectory much like that of the five other sub-
elements. That is because the ruling CPP under Prime Minister Hun Sen must maintain economic 
growth, create jobs, safeguard national security, and retain foreign policy independence in order 
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to maintain the support of the winning coalition, which is pro-China, and the opposition group, 
which is pro-U.S. As a small country with flawed democracy, Cambodia adopts hedging out of 
internal and external necessity because other foreign policy models are not viable and could pose 
a grave risk to the incumbent’s legitimacy and the nation. As long as geopolitical uncertainty in 
Southeast Asia and the Asia-Pacific remains as uncertain as it is today, the Kingdom of Cambodia 
will continue to hedge between the United States and China into the future. 
 4.1 Policy Implications 
This thesis has three policy implications for scholars and practitioners of international 
relations who seek to analyze Cambodia’s foreign policy between contesting major powers, 
namely, the United States and China, and for those who study geopolitical and security affairs of 
the Asia-Pacific region.  
First, endowed with a tragic history, limited resources, weak institutions, and vulnerable 
geography that is wedged between hostile neighbors and in a region shared by more than one 
potential hegemons, Cambodia today is a hedger by default. After its predecessor, the Khmer 
Empire, collapsed in the 15th century, Cambodia played the balancing game between Thailand and 
Vietnam by pitting each against the other in order to safeguard its existence. Soon after it became 
independent in 1953, Cambodia, under Norodom Sihanouk, opted for neutrality in response to real 
and perceived threats from North Vietnam, on the one hand, and Thailand and South Vietnam, on 
the other. It sought assistance and guarantee from both the socialist and the capitalist camps so that 
it could remain a neutral state in a geopolitically hyperpolarized world divided between two 
ideological lines. Cambodia under Hun Sen hedges between the United States and China because 
it faces with similar internal and external challenges that occurred in the past, such as weak central 
government, poor armed forces, threats from neighboring countries, the need for external 
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legitimacy, and growing geopolitical polarization around its peripheries. Even though Phnom Penh 
tends to be closer to Beijing than Washington in normal circumstances, both these countries 
continue to be the two most preeminent external players, which have diplomatic, economic, 
military, and strategic impacts on the RGC’s foreign policy.  
There are two key takeaways for U.S. policymakers in this regard. The first is to expect to 
see Cambodia adopt a hardline approach toward Washington around the general election and to 
view this policy as a temporary choice rather than a permanent one. As demonstrated throughout 
this study, Cambodia distanced itself from the United States. politically and leaned closer to China 
during the elections in 2003, 2008, 2013, and 2018 in order to secure a favorable electoral result 
for the ruling CPP since defeat would mean severe consequence for Hun Sen and his elites. Once 
the party won, Cambodia eased the tension and improved its relations with the U.S. in order to 
counterbalance its dependence on China and to appease domestic constituencies: the winning 
coalition and the opposition group. Even though this study does not establish exactly how long it 
takes for Cambodia to begin its rapprochement with the U.S. in post-election, it explains what 
causes the country to readjust its relative bandwagoning position between the U.S. and the PRC.  
This pattern of behavior serves as a future reference for U.S. policymakers who seek to 
understand the logic of Cambodia’s foreign policy. A policy recommendation for the United States 
is that it should tone down rhetoric regarding democracy and human rights during the Cambodian 
general election season, for it would help prevent unnecessary tension between the two 
governments, which may undo the progress made previously. The CPP will continue to be the 
most powerful political party in Cambodia for at least the upcoming decade or so and that the 
leader who comes after Hun Sen is likely to be someone from the CPP. Therefore, Washington 
should express its criticisms and concerns through private rather than public channel, because this 
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method may reduce diplomatic friction and promote a proactive response from the CPP elites who 
are very sensitive to real and perceived signs of inference into Cambodia’s internal affairs by 
foreign powers, namely, the United States. Private diplomacy may pave the way for a candid 
engagement and cement mutual trust between Washington and Phnom Penh. 
Another takeaway is that the United States should continue to engage Cambodia even when 
it distances itself from Washington during election time in order to retain its diplomatic influence 
and to offset the growing presence of the PRC. Public diplomacy programs such as short- and 
long-term scholarship opportunities, cultural exchanges, support for home-grown entrepreneurs, 
and educational events aimed at engaging the youth population are one aspect the United States 
can do to shape Cambodia’s behaviors from the inside out. It is obvious that the CPP elites, who 
tend to favor China, dominate Cambodia’s foreign policy decision-making. However, Hun Sen 
does not and cannot completely ignore the demands of young voters, who are the main backbone 
of the economy and whose support is essential for his political survival. That is why Cambodia 
shifts the degree of its accommodation with the United States and China every election cycle to 
keep both the pro-Washington and pro-Beijing camps satisfied. Likewise, civil society groups and 
NGOs will continue to shape Cambodian politics at the grassroots level due to their proximity to 
voters. The United States should continue to provide funding and technical supports for these 
groups so that they can effectively perform their jobs of keeping the RGC accountable, advocating 
for responsive public policies that answer the demands of the Cambodian people, and facilitating 
democratization process in the country. A vibrant and resilient community of civil society and 
NGOs is crucial for Cambodia and its people. A broader and more robust partnership between U.S. 
and Cambodian foreign policy think tanks and academic institutions should be encouraged by both 
governments, for it would bridge the gap and narrow cultural, language, and ideological 
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misunderstanding between scholars and analysts who may shape each country’s diplomacy 
directly or indirectly. Furthermore, the United States should consider canceling the $500 million 
war debt left by the Lon Nol government, which has accumulated without any settlement since the 
1970s. Instead of using this debt as a political stick, the U.S. should invest the money back into 
Cambodia through a multiyear bilateral aid package or through social initiatives such as 
scholarship provision, public health program, cultural preservation, and rural community-based 
projects that directly benefit the people. The resolution of this debt will eliminate one of the 
thorniest issues plaguing contemporary U.S.-Cambodian diplomatic relations and help address the 
legacy of the U.S. war in Southeast Asia. 
The second policy implication of this study is that Cambodia is and will continue to 
implement hedging in the future because this strategy serves domestic and foreign policy purposes 
of the ruling CPP. Domestically, hedging enables the CPP to show the Cambodian electorates that, 
as the incumbent party, it does everything in its power to safeguard the kingdom’s independence 
and to steer the country away from becoming a pawn on a geopolitical chessboard. Moreover, the 
CPP has been able to extract economic, political, and military benefits from its relations with the 
U.S. and the PRC and use them to bring about social stability, economic growth, and national 
security for voters. More specifically, ties with the U.S. boost the CPP’s legitimacy and enable it 
to perpetuate the illusion of liberal democracy with the presence of regular elections, a sizeable 
community of NGO and civil society groups, local and international press, and piecemeal 
governmental reforms. The CPP’s message for the Cambodian voters is that as long as it remains 
in power, Cambodia will not deviate from hedging to align with a foreign power. As enshrined in 
the 1993 constitution, Cambodia’s foreign policy will continue to be “permanently neutral and 
non-aligned.” Therefore, people can rest assured and enjoy peace, stability, and prosperity. 
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With the external audience, hedging allows Hun Sen to use control over local democracy 
as leverage to manipulate the Western community and to extract legitimacy as a duly elected leader 
of Cambodia, who is recognized internationally. Although opposition leader Sam Rainsy poses an 
imminent threat to Hun Sen’s power, his absence from the political arena delegitimizes the latter’s 
false depiction of multiparty democracy in Cambodia. On his part, speaking out against the CPP 
triggers grave legal and political consequences for Rainsy, but it rallies pro-democracy voters such 
as students, factory workers, and urban middle-class households behind his agenda and raises his 
international profile. Therefore, Hun Sen and Sam Rainsy have engaged in politics of catch-and-
release for the past two decades in order to preserve their legitimacy at home and abroad. 
Distracted with more essential foreign policy priorities and having no viable alternative, the United 
States and its allies have adapted, participating in this game in order to maintain their influence, 
stay relevant, and counterbalance China, which has left no stones unturned and willingly filled in 
the vacuum left open by the West. Hedging also enables Cambodia to maintain good relations with 
its neighbors in Southeast Asia and with middle powers such as Japan, South Korea, and the EU, 
all of which are essential economic and political partners. Finally, Cambodia can play its part in 
cultivating peaceful U.S.-China relations and in paving the way for ASEAN to facilitate the 
involvement of other regional players such as India, Australia, and Russia. These two measures 
will help ensure the continuity of the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region. 
The lesson for U.S. policymakers here is that the dynamic of Cambodia’s internal political 
process dictates its foreign policy choice of hedging. The country will not deviate from this foreign 
policy anytime soon because such a decision would be too risky for its short- and long-term 
security, and it would jeopardize the political survival of the CPP elites themselves. This 
continuation is an opportunity for the U.S. to engage Cambodia through meaningful ways other 
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than its current fixation on human rights and democracy issues. Advocacy for democratization 
abroad fits well with Washington’s liberal internationalist foreign policy, in which the U.S. is, in 
the words of former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, the “indispensable nation” whose 
benevolent responsibility is to advocate for freedom on behalf of the oppressed. Moreover, this 
policy, at times, pressures the CPP to enact minor reform and to loosen its grip on political 
opponents. However, the rigidly hardline position on human rights is counterproductive for the 
United States’ geopolitical interest in Cambodia because it antagonizes and alienates the CPP elites 
in Phnom Penh, who have the real power to decide most of the key decisions for the country, 
whether it is economics, social, defense, or diplomatic matters. Another drawback from this 
inflexibility is that it exposes the double standard applied by the United States to other autocratic 
regimes, whose records are practically as dismal as or even worse than Cambodia’s. In contrast to 
strength and resolve, it shows the hypocrisy in Washington’s foreign policy to ordinary Cambodian 
electorates, and it undermines the United States’ own credibility in the region. 
This, however, does not mean that the United States should adopt a hands-off approach 
regarding Cambodia’s democracy. It should continue to speak out, but it should do so more 
selectively and discreetly through private channels rather than public ones. The “naming and 
shaming” technique has proven to be counterproductive for advancing U.S. interests in Cambodia 
because it pushes Phnom Penh closer to Beijing. Another thing the U.S. can do is to foster trust 
through either formal or informal channels with pro-reform Western-educated elements among 
CPP elites who want to see a more democratic Cambodia that shares warmer relations with the 
West. These people are second-generation CPP cadres who will eventually pick up the leadership 
baton from the party’s old guards, and they will play preeminent roles in shaping Cambodia’s 
foreign policy in the future. 
149 
The third policy implication has to do with the future of geopolitics and security landscape 
in Southeast Asia and the Asia-Pacific region. As mentioned previously, Cambodia is not the only 
small state that hedges between the United States and China. Other ASEAN states such as 
Vietnam, Singapore, Malaysia, or Indonesia, for instance, are also hedging but with distinct 
characteristics. That is because upholding the regional balance of power, in which no one country 
can dominate the region alone, seems to be the ultimate purpose of states in the ASEAN bloc. This 
common pattern of hedging of small Southeast Asian countries is an opportunity for the United 
States to strengthen its economic, political, and military presence and to promote a rules-based 
order in Southeast Asia, one that discourages a rising China from opting for a revisionist posture, 
which may destabilize the region. 
The United States should deepen its engagement with ASEAN bilaterally and 
multilaterally. Bilaterally, Washington should sustain foreign aid provision, extend access to U.S. 
universities to students through scholarships and exchange programs, strengthen ties between U.S. 
and ASEAN scholar community, invigorate the activities of the Lower Mekong Initiative, and 
bolster engagement with each ASEAN government on issues of shared international interests. 
Multilaterally, the United States should pay more attention to ASEAN and signal its support for 
this regional organization because an empowered, stable, and prosperous ASEAN is vital to the 
economic and security interests of Washington itself. One thing U.S. leaders can do is to show up 
more consistently at key meetings such as the U.S.-ASEAN summit, the East Asian Summit, and 
the ASEAN Regional Forum. Participations of U.S. leaders in these forums reassure states in the 
regions of Washington's firm commitment and interest in Southeast Asia. As long as the PRC’s 
economic and military power continues to grow, ASEAN members look to the United States as 
the most vital strategic actor, which has adequate resources to counterbalance China. 
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